S.P. P. 101 Rivers, and the Carpathians. The Gorals also use this word to designate the country and people of Poland.

Towards the close of the tenth century, as far as we know, the Lekh people consisted of the following tribes:

The Polianes primitively settled on the Warta, the Notec (today in German, Netze) near the lake of Goplo and as far as the Oder.

The Vislanes on the upper Visla (Vistula).

The Mazovi on the two banks of the middle Vistula.

The Kuiavi at the bend of the Vistula, near Thorn.

The Slezani (Silesians) on the upper Oder and to the east as far as the other side of the Bobra. They included the tribes of the Didoshi, the Bobrani, the Bezunchani, the Opolani and the Holasici.

S.P. P. 101 175 /63/ What were the ties of kinship between the Polish tribes and the Slavs of the seacoast, the Pomoriani (1) (between the lower Vistula, the Oder and the Notec) and the Lutitsi to the west on the Varnava and the Elbe? [1] It would be difficult to determine them. The old writer of the Kiyev annals, in the indications which he gives us of the country inhabited by the Poles, relates these peoples to the Lekhs. Here is what he says: "For these Slavs coming to settle on the Vistula called themselves Lekhs and among these Lekhs certain of them called themselves Polianes, Lekhs, some Lutitsi, some Mazovi, others Pomoriani."

1. It is from this name (po, along the, more, sea) that Pommern is derived, the German name of Pomerania now Germanized.

All these tribes subjected themselves to the Polianes of the center under the princes of the Piast dynasty and accepted their name. It is not known when this unification took place. We only know that the principal authors of it were the princes Mesek I (960-992) and Boleslav the Brave (992-1025).

SP P. 175 648 Unity was not accomplished at the outset; it was achieved by the development of internal colonization.

At the beginning, the regions of Little Poland and of the Mazovia were sparsely inhabited. The foreign element which hastened this unification, was obviously the Germans against whom it was necessary to carry on warfare from the time when they subjugated and annihilated the Slavs of the Elbe (eleventh and twelfth centuries).

The struggle against the Germans exercised among the Poles, as among the Czechs, a considerable influence upon their internal and

[1] [Between the different Polish tribes, cf. Above and page 41, Category 116 — Analyst]

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175 external development. From their primitive homeland located in the 648 basins of the Oder, of the Warta, and of the Vistula, they sought to spread out in all directions. But they encountered in the west the resistance of the Germans; they were unable to overcome it; they were even compelled to give way and they sought to assure their existence and expansion by constant fights and invasions against the Prussians, the Lithuanians, and the Russians. Obviously, the Poles clearly recognized that one of their first tasks was to maintain in the north a wide passageway to the sea and in the west, their frontier on the Oder, if not on the Elbe. Unfortunately all of the advantages, all of the conquests which they gained in this direction were of a purely ephemeral character. A terrible blow fell upon them through the Tatar invasion and through the battle of Legnica--/in German--Liegnitz/ (1241). It broke the bonds which united Silesia with Poland and threw this province into the arms of Germany, who began to Germanize it. Another check was the summons of the Teutonic Knights into the country of Chelm and of Loba (1226) which facilitated the Germanization of the seacoast. P SP [563] Finally, let us point out the German colonization which the ecclesiastical or lay princes invoked, beginning with the thirteenth century, in Silesia, into Little Poland, Great Poland and Mazovie; these colonies did not become assimilated and remained completely German in language and customs. Thus a grave peril for Polish nationality was created and developed. "Exterminare idioma Polonicum" /exterminate the Polish language/ became the order of the day for the Germans on the western froniter. Beginning with the thirteenth century, the Polish nationality appeared to be gravely compromised.

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66 However, it succeeded in escaping from this peril.[1] The clergy showed themselves to be highly patriotic; literature was born and exercised a happy influence upon all classes of society. The Hussite movement also exercised its influence in Poland against the Germans. The dynasty followed a national political line. It accomplished noteworthy successes, P especially over the Teutonic Knights, who were defeated at Grunwald SP 175 in 1410. In truth, the provinces beyond the Oder and to the north 648 could not be saved. The Poles lost three-quarters of their primitive 668 domain; but what they lost in the west, they attempted to regain in the east, that is toward the northeast, and toward the southeast. This double direction was imposed upon them by the very nature of the terrain; in the center, the basin of the Pripet presented an inhospitable and insurmountable area; to the south rose the barrier of the Carpathians. The Polish flood had to direct itself on the one hand towards Lithuania,

[1] [Germanization of the Polish nationality beginning with the 13th century-- Analyst]

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on the other, towards the Ukraine, and this double march characterized a new phase of Polish history.

The offensive movement was begun at an early date, /66/ but it achieved no serious result until the Union of Lublin (1569) when Lithuania was rejoined to Poland together with a large section of southern Russia (see above in S. 3).[1]

Kazimir had already occupied Red Russia in 1340, and in 1370 the Galician area was detached from the political control of Kiyev.

In Lithuania Polish institutions and language gained the upper hand over the native institutions and language; the upper classes of society took on Polish ways, and Polish colonization penetrated into the country, especially in Polesia. The same occurred in Galician Russia, the Volhynia and Podolia. The Poles were unable to hold Russian Galicia except by making it a base of operations for invading the basins of the Dnestr and the Bug. In the fifteenth century they colonized Podolia and Volhynia, and carried on this enterprise through the sixteenth century. Bobrinskii (1) claims that at this period this province was half Polish! To these attempts at colonization was joined a religious action, the "union" of Polish-Lithuanian Russia with Rome.

During that time the Russian princes, emancipated from the Tatar yoke, had formed at Moscow a new and formidable political center. They /67/ had undertaken to group about them all of the Russian countries. We do not need to explain here how this plan was carried out. Moscow naturally entered upon a struggle with Poland: the war at first had as its object the Lithuanian provinces, then the Ukraine and finally Poland proper. It went steadily against Poland and finally resulted in the three partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795.

These events naturally had an ominous influence upon the development of the Polish national group; the conquests of the Poles were annulled and with them all of the Polish colonization of Russian territory. The states which divided up the Polish domain among themselves had for some time the idea of annihilating the Polish nation. But the vital force of this nation, its great traditions and its high hopes for the

1. A contemporary Polish historian. See my Coup d'oeil sur l'histoire de Pologne in the 3d series of the Monde Slave (Paris, Hachette, 1902). Translator.

[1] [cf. E16 Slavic Peoples, 1: Niederle, P. 16, category 116-Analyst]

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future, preserved it and even strengthened it so that its adversaries themselves had partially to renounce their intentions.

The struggle which the Polish national group has undergone for its existence since the fall of the Republic has been extremely painful and still is so today, especially the struggle against the Germans.

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When the Congress of Vienna in 1815 perpetuated and revised the partition, it annexed to Russia the Duchy of Warsaw and set up the realm which the Poles call "Kongressowka." It guaranteed to the Poles their nationality and their autonomy. /68/ At first they enjoyed these benefits; but beginning in 1830 the situation changed. The revolution of Warsaw was smothered in blood. An the anti-Polish reaction which already existed in Russia became only more pronounced. The unhappy revolution of 1863 brought about the enslavement and the misery of Poland. Russianization was carried out with eagerness, and it required a terrible blow struck at the governmental system--the unfortunate war with Japan--to permit Poland to breathe a little more freely. The advent of the constitutional regime and the institution of the Parliament provided her with the possibility of making known her miseries, and we can hope that at the present moment, they will, at least in the Russian Empire, receive satisfaction.

The situation in Prussia is more serious. There arose, before 1775, a new and intensive movement of German colonization, especially in the basin of the Netze, and, after the insurrection of 1830, a political evolution which tended very simply to Germanize the Polish element. The attempted insurrection of 1845 and the events of 1848 gave this policy an opportunity to assert itself. At the beginning neither force nor violence was used. The Prussian government was convinced that the Polish element would eliminate itself little by little. The census of 1870 proved the contrary. Bismark then had recourse to new methods. He strove to uproot the Polish nation and had /69/ recourse to the most violent means. Certainly, in Russia the Poles were not comfortable; but in the Empire such violent measures, such refined ones as the Prussians thought up had not been employed. What no nation had ever before attempted to do against another nation, the Germans now undertook against Poland. They sought to dispossess an entire people by the law of colonization (Ansiedelunggesetz), which placed at the disposal of the government one hundred million marks to purchase ground from the Poles and to establish German colonies there. Thanks be to God

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that up to the present all of these efforts have failed. At least, the results obtained are not in any manner in proportion to the pecuniary sacrifices. The law of expropriation voted in 1908 succeeded no better, and there is room to believe that all the efforts of the German "hakatists" (1) will break against the energetic resistance of the Polish people.

> 1. This name of Hakatists is given to a Prussian association founded in 1891 to colonize the routes to the east. This association was founded by Hansemann, Kennemann, and Tiedeman. It is from the initials of these three persons, H, K, T, that the word "hakatists" has been formed. (Translator).

Nevertheless, the situation of the Poles of Poznan and of Silesia remains a difficult one and there is no reason to hope that it will improve. The Prussian minister Von Arnim clearly stated in 1907 that they cannot be Germanized and that this is not being thought of. However, it is the goal towards which Prussia is steadily striving. And naturally the struggle /70/ of three and a half million souls against sixty million Germans can only be looked upon with anxiety.

And in fact Germanization is making serious progress among the Mazuri, in Silesia and Poznan, even though in certain places the Poles succeed in gaining the upper hand.

It is in Austria that the condition of the Poles is the most bearable. For the past forty years the former system of Germanization has been abandoned and the Polish nationality has developed in complete liberty; it even exercises a certain influence upon the destinies of the Empire and of the other nationalities.

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S 12. The Domain of the Polish National Group.

We do not encounter as many difficulties in outlining this domain as we did in the case of the Russian domain. However, we do run into certain difficulties.

S.P. P. 197

Here again our principal criterion is the language.[1] It is upon the basis of the language that certain ethnographic maps have been drawn up in Prussia and in Austria. But the work has not always been done correctly. The latest census carried out in Prussia, has been based upon the mother tongue; but it is known that a great number of persons on the side of both the Poles and Germans have declared that they spoke

[1] [i.e. to determine the domain of the Polish national group.--Analyst]

1: Niederle--79 E-5 1911 EK Slavic Peoples E 16
Czechoslovakia E 81

S.P. C. 166 161 What is much more serious is that the Czech areas are losing population to the profit of the German sections. (In Moravia it is completely the contrary). \ In 1890 33.46% of the Czechs in Bohemia were living in German areas; in 1900 there were already 34.61% of them. During this ten year period the birth rate in the German sections was 8.1% for the Germans, and only 4.8% among the Czechs of the Czech sections. These phenomena are explained by the importance of German industry which attracts the Czechs into the German areas.

S.P. C. ● 148 177 Already the Germans--at least /125/ the sensible ones--recognize that it is impossible to Germanize the Czechs. The chauvinists alone still dared to hope for it, especially those who consider Bohemia as a lock which one can burst asunder in order to open to the German race an access to the Adriatic. But they are fooling themselves, as are those who believe that the Poles of the Kindom of Prussia can be denationalized.

S.P. C. 101 The situation of the Slovaks in Hungary is not nearly so good; they are deprived of all political rights and, following the example of what is happening in Prussia, they are being threatened with expropriation. Nevertheless, they continue to stand against the Magyars within their ancient boundaries, they give way only very slightly within these boundaries, and, were it not for the Magyarization which is being energetically imposed upon the nation, especially upon the upper classes, and for a rather considerable emigration, the people would be able to hold their own, all the more since they are constantly assimilating Polish and Russian elements in the north and east of their territory.

000 When in 1900 I drew up my ethnographic map for the Slovaks, the Russians protested against the figures which the statistics showed to their detriment. It has been demonstrated that the progress of the Slovaks had not been as rapid as I had thought, but it exists nevertheless. All of eastern Slovakia is nothing but Russia which has been Slovakized, and this assimilation is continuing.

S.P. C. 178 [144] /126/ S 24. Differentiation.--The primitive differentiation of the tribes has left no important trace among the Czechs. All of the shades of difference have been leveled off by time and those which relate to the physical aspects, to the languages, to costume in these latter days, have almost entirely disappeared.

1: Niederle--131 E-5 1911 Slavic Peoples F

Bulgaria EF1 Contemporary Macedonians EF8

B. 101 Many Bulgarian Gagauz are to be found also in Bessarabia, in the district of Benderj, where they are concentrated in the outskirts of Komrat. Mochov estimates their number at 70,000; but in the official statistics they are considered to be Bulgars. According to Zanetov the Bulgarian Slavs of Bessarabia should be called Tukani.

S.P. B. 141 [197] /211/ From an anthropological viewpoint, the best documented specialist, Mr. Vatev distinguishes a certain number of groups in the Bulgar nation. But up to the present these groups have not coincided with the linguistic groups. What is certain is that the east differs from the west, noticeably from the region of Sofia and of Macedonia, and that the south offers characteristic traits.

Basing himself upon the measurements of 320,000 school children, 36,000 soldiers and 1,330 skulls, he arrived at the following conclusions regarding the Bulgarian type:

This type is of medium height: 1.665 millimeters for the men, 1,567 millimeters for the women; dark complexion predominates (50 % against 5% light blond; the remainder mixed). But it must be noted that the dark complexion predominates in the east, while in the west and in Macedonia, which formerly was the center of the Balkan Slavs, the dark type is still rare. The Bulgars have a regular nose, high eye sockets, and an erect head. As to the shape, there are 77% mesocephalics (index 75-80). The average index among the soldiers is 79.65 (in Macedonia 79.45) and among the skulls 77.97.

The dolichocephalic types are found especially in the south, the brachycephalic in the west; in the south of Macedonia the average index exceeds 85.

S.P. C.M. 101 648 S 39. The Slavs of Macedonia.---As we have already mentioned, the Slavs of Macedonia and of Old Serbia are claimed /212/ by both the Serbs and the Bulgars.

Let us note at the outset that it is not well known where Macedonia and Old Serbia begin and end. Thus, the Bulgars attach to Macedonia the regions of Skoplje, Tetovo, and Koumanovo; on the other hand, the Serbs attach Skoplje and Tetovo to Old Serbia; some of them lay claim even to Prilep, Bitolia, Ochrida, and Veles; all of these claims, of course, have a political objective.

Macedonia and Old Serbia represent the country bounded, roughly

1: Niederle--132 E-5 1911 E11 Slavic Peoples E11
Contemporary Macedonians EF8

S.P.
C.M.
101
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speaking, on the west by Lake Ochrida, the Drin, and the Chardagh, on the north by the frontier of Serbia, by mounts Osog and Rilo, and on the east by the Mesta River (Kara Su in Turkish). Both Serbs and Bulgars claim these two provinces. In this conflict the scholars of the two sides have not always been able to refrain from showing a certain amount of favoritism; some foreign scholars, Slav and non-Slav, especially Russian, have taken a more objective position in this argument and a third theory has been developed according to which the Slavs of Macedonia are neither Serbs nor Bulgars, but a special people. Such was for example the point of view of P. Draganov, in 1887, and it was this idea that prompted the Slavic Benevolent Society of St. Petersburg to publish the ethnographic map of the Balkans worked out by Komarov and Zarianko, and this theory has been defended /213/ by an eminent Serbian ethnographer, Tsviitch. (1)

1. See on this question our study upon l'Expansion des langues slaves (Le Monde Slave, 1st vol., Paris, Hachette, 1897, p. 309). Translator.

The historians have occupied themselves with the relationship of Macedonia with the Serbian and Bulgarian states; the ethnographers have compared the folklore of the Slavs of Macedonia with that of the Serbs and of the Bulgars; finally, the philologists have gone to great trouble to study the traits characteristic of the Macedonian dialects and to see to which of the neighboring idioms they are related. This struggle has brought forth a whole scientific leterature; but it is not ended and it will not be for a long time to come, because it is not a matter of scientific questions, but above all of politics.

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C.M.
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And from a political viewpoint reasons are always to be found for keeping solution in abeyance. The Serbs need the sea and Austria has prevented their access to the Adriatic by taking Bosnia-Hercegovina from them; from that moment they turn their covetous glances towards the Archipelago, especially towards the mouth of the Vardar, towards Salonica, and for this reason they are making every effort to demonstrate that Macedonia belongs to their nation.

On the other hand, the Bulgars do not wish to disavow what today is a fact, proved by past centuries, that is, the close /214/ interdependence of Macedonia and Bulgaria. In addition to these two principal claimants, other States, Greece and Rumania assert grossly

S.P. C.M. 648 exaggerated claims, without counting Turkey which is today the proprietor of the contested territory, without speaking of the Great Powers, especially Russia, Italy, and Austria, who have their eye on Macedonia.

000 From all of this whirlpool of literary, political, and scientific endeavors, a disinterested observer can draw today only these obvious conclusions:

S.P. C.M. 181 1). The Slavs of Macedonia and of Old Serbia represent a people whose national consciousness is not yet completely and equally developed, if we compare them with the two neighboring nations. However, it is beyond doubt that the largest portion of this people S.P. C.M. [795] feel themselves and proclaim themselves to be Bulgars, that they belong to the independent Bulgarian Church, whose head is the Exarch resident at Ortakioi. (1) On the other hand, it is certain that the name Bulgars is an historic name in these regions and that it has not been brought in through the religious propaganda of these recent years. Even though these regions were once annexed to the Serbian State, yet the name Serb has not taken root among the people. This is why in recent times the Bulgarian propoganda, both ecclesiastical and political, has found a very deep response throughout the country; Serbian propoganda has a chance of future success only in the northern region which is in contact with the Serbian Kingdom and has direct dealings with it; this region is Old Serbia.

S.P. C.M. 197 2). From a philological point of view it is true that the language of the Slavs of Macedonia presents an aggregation of local dialects rather distinct from one another. They form a sort of idiom which is intermediate between the Serbian stokavski and the Bulgarian language proper. (1) But taken altogether and in certain details it is much more S.P. C.M. [194] [193] closely related to the Bulgarian than to the Serbian. These special traits are the use of the postpositive article (used after the substantive), the loss of declension and the retention of the nasals. Only the dialect of the northern region is more closely related to the dialect group of Vranje, Nish, Timok, which Profesessor Belic assigns to the domain of the Serbian language, but certain philologists do not agree with him.

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1. According to Brankov, there are in Macedonia 77% Exarchists and 23% Patriarchists. According to Hilmi, the proportion is entirely different. See above in Section 37. 1

1. See Section 32, above. 2

175* 631 721 the slightest claim of primacy. Indeed, George's able son Andrew entertained no respect for Kiev at all and concentrated his efforts on enriching and adorning his own northeastern domain, which he ruled so autocratically that he was assassinated in 1174. Andrew's son Vsevolod who possessed equal capacity and better judgment, was recognized as a leader by all adjacent local princes, though he interfered but little in Kievan affairs and on the western Russian frontier the prestige of Vsevolod's domain was balanced by the rise of a powerful Galician principality. Kiev itself was disastrously sacked by the Polovtsi in 1203, and of this event a chronicler wrote, "No such woe had ever befallen Kiev during the whole time since conversion."

Amid the uncertainties of Russian political life at the beginning of the thirteenth century, the shadows of future events were already gathering. The German knights were moving up the Baltic coast, where Riga was founded in 1201. Their intrusion impelled the threatened Lithuanian tribes to unity, with the result that a Lithuanian state arose which began to absorb the northwestern Russian cities, though Russian culture [648] in turn absorbed the conquerors. The Russians were not friendly to the Latin Empire of Byzantium after 1204, and it was in 1206 that the Mongols under Temuchin (better known as Genghis Khan) began their military expansion. But the Russian princes continued their petty quarrels, not suspecting the catastrophe that was impending.

The Mongols or Tartars first reconnoitered the country west of the Caspian in 1220, and the next year they menaced the Crimea and the steppe country, thus forcing the Polovtsi to apply for support to the Russian princes against whom they had so often fought. Since 1212, Kiev had been in the possession of Prince Mstislav, a member of the ruling family of Smolensk, able, courageous, and erratic; his wife was the daughter of a Polovtsian khan. The princes of Kiev, Chernigov, and Volhynia thus united with the Polovtsi against the Tartars, whom they met on the river Kalka, in the steppes near the

4: Cross L-5 (no date) 1948 E16 Slavs E16

175* 721 Basil II was to encounter, however, not only defeat and imprisonment at the hands of the Tartars but also the cruelty of a usurper who had him blinded. Luckily, however, the usurper's support was weak, and with aid from Tver Basil was restored. In 1452 he founded the Tartar principality of Kasimov under a friendly Tartar prince on the upper Oka east of Ryazan as a buffer against the hostile Tartars of Kazan, but now that not only Kazan but also the Crimea had split off from the old khanate, the latter was no longer a political threat of any consequence, and Basil II thus became the first prince of Moscow to emancipate himself completely from Tartar vassalage. Almost at the moment that Moscow became free Constantinople fell before the Turks, and the prince of Moscow became at one stroke the chief defender of the Orthodox faith and residuary legatee of the Byzantine tradition. Basil II was also successful in strengthening Muscovite influence in Novgorod, which had hitherto been prone to intrigue with Lithuania.

175* ● 648 The expansion of Muscovite prestige undertaken amid such great difficulties by Basil II gathered new impetus during the reign of his son, Ivan III, who inherited the principality of Moscow in 1462. After first checkmating the Tartars by diplomatic agreements with adjacent oriental states, he attached himself to the Byzantine dynastic tradition by choosing, as his second wife, Zoe (Sophia) Palaeologa who, though stout and unattractive, was the niece of the last emperor of Byzantium. The Pope hoped this marriage might advance the union of the Eastern and the Western Churches, since Zoe had been raised a Catholic as his ward, and when she went to Moscow to be married in 1472, a papal legate accompanied her. He made no progress in his attempts to initiate negotiations, and Zoe's arrival was far more fruitful through the activities of the Italian architects and artisans whom she brought with her and who were soon adorning the Kremlin with Italianate churches and palaces. 175* 721 Ivan's designs against the Tartar khanate in the south were crossed by the Turks, who in 1475 subjugated both the khanate and the Crimea, and remained in southern Russia

4: Cross L-5 (no date) 1948 E16 Slavs E16

until the reign of Catherine II. At Novgorod, the pro-Lithuanian faction was still active despite the pledges exacted by Basil II. In 1475 Ivan personally visited the northern republic and three years thereafter the great commercial metropolis, long the only stronghold of democracy in Russia, was incorporated into the principality of Moscow. Thirteen years later the Tartar khanate of Kazan as a result of local dynastic rivalries also became a vassal, and an expedition in 1481 broke up the last vestiges of Tartar power on the Volga, where only Astrakhan remained in Tartar hands. 175* 721

Ivan's reputation soon spread to western Europe, with the result that Emperor Maximilian I in 1488 sent an envoy to Moscow offering the prince a royal crown. Ivan was not unwilling to make a treaty with Maximilian covering mutual aid in case of a war with Poland, but remarked he did not need German confirmation of his royal status. On the Lithuanian side Ivan was equally fortunate since he forced the Lithuanians to abandon all claims on eastern Russian cities and to recognize him as "sovereign of all Russia" (*gosudar vseya Rusi*), while his daughter became the wife of the Prince of Lithuania. Under Ivan's son Basil III, who came to the throne in 1505, Pskov and Ryazan were added to the Muscovite domain, but relations with the Tartars both at Kazan and in the south were so far impaired that constant defensive measures were necessary on the southern frontier along the Oka. 175* 648

When Basil died in 1533, his son Ivan IV (later known as the Terrible) was but three years old. The regency thus devolved till 1538 on the lad's mother, and from that date to 1547, when Ivan was crowned as tsar, upon a council of nobles in which factional politics were rife. It was from his experiences during this period that Ivan derived his intense hatred of the older feudal nobility as a class. Ivan finally conquered Kazan and annexed Astrakhan, thus placing the whole course of the Volga under Muscovite control. From that moment begins the Russian expansion into Siberia and the initiation of diplomatic relations with Khiva and Bokhara. At the same time the Eng- 175*

4: Cross L-5 (no date) 1948 E16 Slavs E16

175* 798 homes after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In Silesia, however, the persecutions incident to the counter-reformation caused the migration into Poland of some 200,000 Germans, who were responsible for the creation of the textile industry in western Poland. In eastern Poland as well, the German element played a prominent role. In 1648, for instance, when the Cossack Hetman Bogdan Chmelnitski, aided by the Crimean Tartars, threatened eastern Galicia, the German inhabitants of Lemberg paid one third of the ransom by which the city was saved, and German officers and soldiery fought on the Polish side in all the battles of the period.

175* 131 Sweden came out of the Thirty Years' War greatly strengthened by the momentary possession of the mouths of the Oder, the Elbe, and the Weser, and its king, Charles X, thinking to gain the support of the Elector of Brandenburg for further conquests at Poland's expense, recognized him in 1656 as Duke of Prussia, thereby bringing East Prussia under the sovereignty of Brandenburg. Then, by the Treaty of Wehlau, the next year, the Poles surrendered their claims to East Prussia, thereby assuring the rising Prussian state of the undisputed possession of this area until the Seven Years' War, though it was returned to Prussia after the death of the Empress Elizabeth of Russia in 1762. Silesia was regained by Prussia the next year, the Vistula valley south of Danzig fell to the German share by the first partition of Poland in 1772, and the Posen area followed by the second partition of 1793. Such, then, in its broadest outlines, is the process by which the political frontier between Germany and Poland was determined prior to 1914.

177 175* ●648 Until the nineteenth century there was little racial hostility between German and Slav. The German expansion eastward during the Middle Ages had been dictated by religious and economic motives, and the conflicts in which Poland, as an independent state, was involved with its neighbors before the partitions were the result of dynastic ambitions and jealousies rather than of any collision of national ideologies. The practical services rendered to the development of agriculture, trade,

and industry by German immigrants to Bohemia and Poland 175*
require no demonstration. By virtue of its close political association 177
with western Europe, Bohemia was speedily drawn into 648
European intellectual life, and as early as the thirteenth century
Bohemian authors were reproducing in their own language
the forms and content of German medieval literature.
International culture was still more widely disseminated after the foundation of the University of Prague in 1348, and the Hussite movement produced a wave of intellectual activity which lasted until the Thirty Years' War in the seventeenth century.

Poland, because of its comparative remoteness and political 175*
instability, was not subject to the same cultural stimuli, and 177
the services rendered by the German settlers in Polish territory 517
were exclusively practical and materialistic. The influence of the Polish crown was never strong enough, nor were its holders cultured enough, to exert a civilizing influence comparable to that which radiated from Prague. Only in the sixteenth [871]
century do we meet with a striking development of Polish literature, and here the productive influences were more those of the Renaissance than specifically German, especially since local education was dominated by the Jesuits and strictly limited to the classical curriculum. While German economic influence was strong in both the great western Slavic states, it was Bohemia which profited the most from the absorption of German culture, and it was not until the seventeenth century that political events halted the intellectual advance so auspiciously begun.

Yet it was in Bohemia that the first seeds of a new Slavic 182
racial consciousness sprouted early in the nineteenth century. 814
The age of enlightenment had emphasized the ideals of humanity, tolerance, and culture, and these ideals were spread throughout the Austro-Hungarian monarchy by the reforms of Joseph II. As a matter of fact, the principle of nationality was first formulated by a German, for it was Goethe's great friend and mentor Johann Gottfried Herder, who declared that "the

Europe has witnessed during the past century, one is tempted to wonder whether the modern nations are not groups of human beings, mainly united by a common illusion as to their origins and an identical aversion to their neighbours. 563 829 144

But history is often only a distortion of the legend concerning the lives of nations. It matters comparatively little if scholars criticise and refute theories which human societies, wittingly or otherwise, have turned into living realities. Up to the sixteenth century the French believed in their Trojan origin, and even today they place an exaggerated faith in their 'Latinity'. 000

Consequently, as far as the Slavonic community is concerned, we will keep to the idea of it which is held by its component nations, without discussing its basis. Now it is evident that the feeling of this community, existing in embryo in former centuries, has gone on intensifying during the past hundred years, and to-day constitutes a fundamental factor in European life.

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'The first nation to impose its virile will on the invaders, and decree the destruction of the enemy, was a Slavonic nation', said the German novelist, Heinrich Mann, in a letter he addressed to the Association of Soviet Authors, in May, 1942. It was, indeed, the Russian armies which, at the cost of never-to-be-forgotten steadfastness and unheard-of sacrifices, annihilated the most formidable military organisation the world has ever seen.

This victory represents more than the physical balance-sheet of a trial of strength, the settlement of an account, outstanding for a thousand years, between two nations. Regarded from the angle of European destinies, it is an event of quite different magnitude. It is the prelude to a reintegration of the Slavonic world, hitherto split up among the powers and interests which speculated on its division. For a century, the Western Chancelleries used and abused the word 'Panslavism'. We shall see, later, what to think of this word, which is unknown in the Russian language. But it was nothing more than a diplomatic slogan, a scarecrow utilised by the Habsburg monarchy in times of crisis, with a view to mobilising the West against Tsarist diplomacy. It is only today that we can speak of a Slav 186x 829 648

186* solidarity capable of disturbing the balance of power in Europe.
829 And even so, we have to give an objective definition of this
• 648 solidarity—a task rendered difficult by the traditional prejudices, the historical misinterpretations which, in the minds of many Westerners, have falsified the laws and motives which govern the expansion of Slavism.

563 No need to go far afield to see the effects of this ignorance
829 of Slavonic realities, even when it is not reinforced by a feeling of animosity. In witness, I will simply cite this passage from a speech pronounced in the Tribunal of the French Senate on May 4, 1933, by the Chairman of the Committee for the Budget on Foreign Affairs:—

> 'That is a point to be noted, *viz.*, the awakening of the Slavonic race. . . . The objection is raised that Rumania is not essentially Slavonic: agreed. But there is Poland, there are the Baltic States, and, farther off still, the wholly Slavonic U.S.S.R., which is, so to speak, the mother of all the Slavonic nations of Central and Eastern Europe'.[3]

These few sentences, from the mouth of an authoritative speaker, contain as many errors as there are words. Rumania is not Slavonic, either essentially or in appearance. Still less the Baltic States. Far from being entirely Slavonic, the Soviet Union is hardly more than fifty per cent so. As for considering it the original habitation of the Slavonic tribes of Central and Eastern Europe, to do this is to settle, with an enviable assurance, a problem whose solution the most eminent ethnologists are still seeking.

Such was, however, the idea current in our official circles, on the eve of this War, concerning one of the determining factors of European peace.

186* Even so, the honourable Parliamentarian who pronounced
829 these gross untruths before his colleagues of the Senate was not
208 prompted by malevolence when he spoke of an awakening of the Slavonic nations. This was not always the case with our journalists and their supporters. It would be possible to compile an anthology of ill-disposed or apprehensive judgements on the Slavonic world, from the pens of French intellectuals, or of men responsible for pronouncements on foreign policy. Is it necessary

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[3] *Journal Officiel* of May 5 (1933), p. 791, col. 1.

186* Russia to the Court of Versailles. This belongs to the prolific family of apocryphal documents in which the presumed projects of deceased monarchs have found an imaginary embodiment. But this forgery has often been invoked as an argument in favour of the existence of 'Panslavism'. Now, it does contain a programme of Russian expansion, and allusions to the Balkan Christians, but nothing more specifically affecting the Slavs. Which proves, at the very least, that his own contemporaries did not regard the founder of Modern Russia as the instigator of a policy of Slav solidarity.

186* Under Catharine, every war against the Ottoman Empire
175 was the occasion of levies of Slav contingents. After the failure
• 648 of their risings, large bodies of Slavs took refuge in the South of Russia, where vast districts were allotted to them. During the Napoleonic wars, Admiral Seniavin's fleet, at the Cattaro Delta, assisted the combined Montenegrins and Serbs. But, at the Congress of Vienna, a failure on the part of Russian diplomacy caused the Cattaro Delta to be handed back to the Austrians. It was alleged that Alexander I had agreed to this betrayal of the Slavs, as the price of a night spent with the beautiful Madame de Metternich. Notwithstanding, Suvorov's victories prepared the way for the Serbian insurrection; when this broke out, the Russian general, O'Rurck, joined Karageorge, to beat the Turkish army at Varvarino, to the north of Nish.

Up to the nineteenth century, the Empire of the Tsars remained aloof from the European concert. When it did join in, through the expedient of the Holy Alliance, it espoused interests which were not its own, and for which, moreover, it showed little concern, by backing up the Balkan risings. In this way it tried its utmost to sponsor solidarity among the absolutist régimes, while at the same time supporting the Orthodox minorities.

186* But the movement whose watchword was defence of 'brothers
178 in race', did not arise in official circles. It was a creation of the
814 'intelligentsia'. It received its first impetus from the immense work of the German historical school in the second third of the nineteenth century. 'Sanctus amor patriae dat animum', the epigraph to the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica,* inspired Chafarik's *Slavonic Antiquities* in 1837, and Palatsky's *History of Bohemia*. The Slavs threw themselves passionately into these

studies, and allowed themselves to be infected with that racial pride which German science displayed, with a tremendous orgy of texts and compilations. 186* 178 814

Kollár, a Slovak, Koukouljevich, a Croat, Kopitar and Stanko Vraz, two Slovenes, with Vuk Karajich, a Serb, formed the pleiad of romantic scholars and men of letters who revealed to the Slav peoples the common basis of their culture and their traditions. Their scientific offensive, which Renan was to call, somewhat disdainfully, 'Comparative Philology transplanted to the political domain', was the prelude to an era of ferment, when far-seeing minds could foretell the catastrophe which would abolish the work of the Congress of Vienna. Never had pure learning let loose such a storm. It was destined to pile up, under the throne of the Habsburgs, the explosive forces whose work of destruction has been completed under our eyes.

The movement was precipitated by the recrudescence of racial antagonism in Hungary. The 1848 Revolution had scattered powder-trails throughout Europe. Austria-Hungary found herself, in the years that followed, a prey to two opposing currents, representing the different ideologies, rather than political conceptions, of two enemy groups among the nations of this heterogeneous Empire. While the Liberals of Vienna, in revolt against absolute power, marched in unison with the Frankfurt Parliament, and included in their scheme the Germans of Austria; while the Magyar Liberals broke with the Habsburgs and bore Kossuth to power, the Slavs of Cis-Leithania and Trans-Leithania, by a repercussion natural to oppressed races, rebelled against tendencies aiming at the strengthening of the two hegemonies, Germanic and Magyar. The ethnical crisis attained its peak in Hungary, where the Croats marched to the defence of the throne under the leadership of the Ban of Croatia, Jellachich, while the Slavs of Hungary (Slovaks and Serbs) kicked against the persecutions of a régime which Western journalism confused with Parliamentary Liberalism. Russia intervened in 1849 not only, as was long believed, to save the monarchical principle, but also under moral obligation not to let the Slavs of Hungary succumb. By the victory of Vilagos, the Russian armies restored to the Habsburgs Hungary, which they were on the point of losing. Six years later Austria, by her anti-Russian attitude in the Crimean War, was, according to a famous 186* 175 448 • 668

186* saying, to astound the world by her ingratitude. It is said that
175 Nicholas I, towards the end of his reign, visited Warsaw and,
• 648 standing thoughtfully in front of Sobieski's statue, said: 'That's
668 the first of the fools who worked for the Habsburgs. And I was the second'.

175 It was in the thick of these racial tussles that the Slav peoples
186 held their first conclaves. Bohemia, the most civilised of the
668 Slav nations, was the first to extend her hand to her sisters. By way of a counter-stroke to the German Assembly in Frankfurt, the Slav Congress took place in Prague in June, 1848. Object: the establishment of periodical relations between the Slav peoples and the drawing up of a programme of action for such of those
[171] peoples as were subject to Austrian or Magyar domination. The language spoken at the Congress was German, then regarded as the Esperanto of the Slavs, thus enabling the Germans to claim the Slavs as belonging to their *Geistesleben*. This Congress, attended by three hundred and sixty-three members, under the chairmanship of the Czech historian, Palatsky, was divided into three sections: Russo-Polish, Jugoslav, and Czechoslovak. Whilst protesting its loyalty to the Habsburgs, it claimed, for the Slav populations, the rights and guarantees granted to the Germans and the Magyars. Outbreaks occurred in Prague after this meeting, and the manner in which they were repressed showed that the Slavs could not expect much from Vienna. Once more, the eyes of the Slavonic world turned towards Russia.

186 Bakunin, in his *Confession*, has left us a picturesque sketch
668 of this Congress of Prague.[1] He had pleaded the cause of the Russian revolution, and of the Federative Republic of all Slavs. 'The Slavs', he said, 'are real children, but I have found among them an unbelievable freshness, and incomparably greater innate intelligence and energy than among the Germans. The Slavs' predominating sentiment is hatred of the Germans. The forceful, if not very polite, expression, "accursed German" ("*prokliatni Nometz*") pronounced alike in nearly all the Slavonic dialects, has produced an incredible result in every Slav. . . . Hatred of the Germans formed the inexhaustible topic of all conversations; it served as a greeting between strangers. . . . As regards the Congress itself, it was, like all the other political

[I. Slav Congress, June 1848 – Analyst]

186* 668 575 volunteers was armed and sent to Serbia a year before Russia's declaration of war, which was not made until April, 1877.

In the other Slavonic countries, the movement borrowed an ever-increasing offensive power from the general upward thrust of the nationalities. While the Czech deputies refused to sit in the Cis-Leithan Parliament, the Slovenes claimed the rights of their race and their language; the Croats, under the leadership of Mgr. Strossmayer, made of Zagreb a centre of national culture; the Serbs completed their emancipation and the Bulgarians, in two stages (1860 and 1870), secured the creation of the Exarchate. The Slavonic world was in full effervescence. Germanism grew alarmed. 'If necessary, we will put the Slavs up against the wall', Chancellor de Beust had said.

• [668] The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 was to some extent the military epilogue of this period of effervescence. The Congress of Berlin supplied Bismarck and Lord Beaconsfield with the opportunity of repressing the outbursts of the Slavonic race, and of checkmating ethnical propaganda, under colour of ensuring European peace.

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186* 178 During the years that followed, the interest taken by Russia in the Slavonic countries appeared to decrease. Internal affairs absorbed the attention of the Imperial Government, and the disappointments following the Congress of Berlin kept Russian society of the time of Alexander III in a mood of weariness or of apathy. This disaffection became more marked at the beginning of the reign of Nicholas II. Whilst Europe saw Panslavism as a volcano for ever in eruption, Tsarist diplomacy kept in quarantine the heirs of Slavophile thought. The word *bratouchka* (little brother), coined in 1877, at the time of the liberation of Bulgaria, lost its touching significance, to become a scornful term, synonymous with 'cadger', applied to the Balkan Slavs. German influence, exercised in St. Petersburg by the Baltic barons and the Court, took advantage of the repugnance felt by Liberalism and the Western type of Intellectualism to a movement which claimed to bring the country back to the real sources of its tradition.

186* 668 The Slavonic Congress held in St. Petersburg in May, 1908, was attended by members of the Duma, of *Kolo Polsko* (Polish

Club) and the *Skupshtina.* But only secondary questions were 186*
dealt with, to be re-examined—without any more practical 668
result—in the following month in Prague. These questions included the creation of a Slavonic Bank, a Slavonic Telegraphic Agency, the preparation of an Exhibition, the extension of Sokolism. . . . The time of heroic debates had passed.

Then, in the speculations founded on an identical destiny for 186*
the Slavonic community, there was one disturbing element— 563
Poland. Towards that country, Tsarist Russia displayed 648 •
implacable aversion. Had she pursued a really Slavonic policy, she would have tried to utilise the powerful factor formed by the persecuted Poles beyond her own frontiers. A Slavonic policy would have succeeded in making of Russian Poland, governed with tolerance and understanding, a centre of attraction, if not for Little Poland (where the Viennese policy of Austro-Polonism gave the illusion of some measure of individuality), at least for the savagely persecuted Poles in East Prussia, in Posnania, and in Upper Silesia.

For their part the Poles were inclined to think that there existed only two Slavonic peoples, Russia and themselves, and, of the principles of Slavism, to grasp only that directed against Germany.

It was precisely in the measure in which she appealed to the Slavonic idea that Russia caused them uneasiness. As for the other Slavonic peoples, their relations with them were only occasional. *Bohemi Polonorum infestissimi inimici* ran an old
saying. The seventy-seven Polish deputies who made up the [646]
Kolo Polsko, and together stood for all the parties represented in the Reichsrat, rarely cast their votes with those of the Slav bloc formed by the Czech, Slovene, Serbo-Croat parties of Istria and Dalmatia. Yet the Slavonic Union of 1907 proved—though for a very short time—that, with them, the Slavs would have secured an absolute majority in the Parliament of Vienna. The *Kolo Polsko* adopted a realistic and short-sighted policy; its members derived temporary advantages, but consolidated a régime which the other Slavs declared to be inhuman and condemned by the evolution of the modern world. The Poles saw the Serbs only as Orthodox Christians and vassals of the Russians. They boycotted the last Slav Congresses, in order not to sit at the same table as the Russians. In 1911, the Serbs succeeded in

186* 563 648 getting them to attend the Slavonic Press Congress which was held during the summer in Belgrade. A characteristic incident spoiled the atmosphere of this gathering. The Poles agreed to attend the banquet offered to the members of the Congress only on condition that the Imperial hymn, *Boje Tsaria Khranyi*, should not be played. In an attempt to conciliate all parties, it was agreed not to play either the Russian or the Polish hymn, but to replace them with the Panslav hymn, *Eĭ Sloveni*. But no one had thought of the fact that this is sung to the same tune as that of Dabrowsky's hymn, *Jeszcze Polska nie zginela* ('Poland is not lost'). Hence an altercation between Poles and Russians, with the result that the latter refused to take part in the proposed outing to the Iron Gates.

It was jokingly said in Belgrade that the Poles were first and foremost Poles, then Catholics, and Slavs when they had time. Yet Bethmann-Hollweg, as President of the Prussian Council in 1912, had, by his famous Expropriation Law, reawakened among the Poles the feeling of a community of destiny with the Slavs. In the Prussian Landtag Korfanty exclaimed, 'At a time when, in the Balkans, the cannon is thundering for the liberation of the Slavs, we Poles, Slavs in Prussia, are the victims of a fresh act of vile oppression and persecution'.

But the Russians did not wish, or did not know how to profit by these divisions. The idea of easing the situation came to them too late, at the time of the First World War, after Pilsudski had organised the 'legions' in Krakow, and the P.O.W. (*Polska organizacya wojskowa*), the Polish secret organisation in Russia; it was only then that Grand-Duke Nicholas proclaimed the hypothetical independence of Poland.

186* 771 The first Russian Slavophiles' die-hard attitude in matters of religion greatly contributed to disturbing the currents of sympathy between Muscovites and the Slavs of Central Europe. Yet denominational differences were not calculated to alarm the Czechs. In 1848, the populace of Prague crammed Wenceslas Square to hear the Serbian Archpriest, Stamatovich, sing the office of the Orthodox rite; a wave of emotion passed through them when the celebrant intoned the *Gospodi pomiluj* for the repose of the soul of John Hus and of Zizka, the hero of the Hussite Tabor. The fact was that the Serbs, not very much given to mysticism, saw the faith chiefly as a counterpart of

186* 771 national sentiment. It is not irrelevant to mention that the Orthodox Slavs of the Balkans are the least practising of Orthodox Christians, among whom it is the Serbs who have the largest number of unbelievers. It is said that, for a given number of inhabitants, there would be six times as many churches in Greece as in Serbia, four times as many in Rumania, and twice as many in Bulgaria.

186* 563 185 Muscovite Slavism differed from Czech Slavism not only in its internal tendencies but in its psychological structure. The patient mysticism of the Russians aimed at achievements on the basis of a millenary evolution. The Czechs, of less nebulous mentality and of intense volitional power, sought immediate results. In Moscow they talked of the divine mission of Eastern Christianity; in Prague, of the boycotting of German goods and the disposal of the products of Czech industry. Between two nations with such a differing mental outlook, it was difficult to maintain concomitant moral action for very long.

186* 668 The breach became apparent when the Czech, Karel Kramár, created the 'Neo-Slavism' which held its first Assembly in Prague in May, 1908. A Pole, Roman Dnowski, and a Bulgarian, Stevan Bobtchev, were in agreement with him to rejuvenate the old Slavonic ideal under a new climate. It was a doctrine tending towards cultural unity and the spiritual and economic collaboration of all Slavs, without distinction of religion, and on a footing of perfect equality. An anti-hegemonic conception of Slav solidarity thus replaced 'Russo-Orthodox-Panslavism', relegated to the order of romantic myths. It seemed to provide the positive basis and the practical aims which agreement among Slavs had always lacked.

186* 668 648 • But, among the other Slav peoples, this movement did not meet with the success its founder anticipated. Too many of these peoples still had to contend with foreign domination. Kramár more or less approved the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Dual Monarchy. He saw in it the legalisation of a state of things which implied an increase in the number, and therefore in the influence, of the Slavs within Austria-Hungary; it was for the inverse reason that the German Liberals in Austria had, thirty years earlier (1878), unleashed furious opposition to the occupation of these same provinces. But bound up with this question were the security and the independence of the Serbian

186* 668 ● 648 people, who protested vigorously against Kramár's attitude.

The latter alienated, in turn, the Croats and the Slovenes, by opposing 'Trialism'; in other words, the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Croatia-Slavonia, considered as a step towards the transformation of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy into an Austro-Hungarian-Jugoslav Triple Monarchy—a transformation which, by an entirely unsupported legend, was said to be favoured by Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian Empire. A memorable verbal passage of arms took place in the Reichsrat on this question, between Kramár and the Jugoslav deputy, Tresich Pavitchich. 'One is surprised', M. Benes was later on to say, 'to see how little effectiveness Neo-Slavism had, and how the governments concerned neglected to make use of it during the critical years between 1906 and 1914. This complete lack of influence was fully illustrated by the documents taken from the Foreign Affairs archives of the three Imperial powers'.

In any case, it is certain that the Czechs derived no benefit from it. In February, 1914, Scheiner, the President of the Czech Sokols, went to Russia to sound the intentions of officialdom. 'You are of no interest to us', said Sazonov. 'Do not count on us, you play no part in our plans of campaign'.

In Serbia, Russian Slavophilia found a very different climate in which to survive. The Jugoslav countries constituted an area in which Orthodox propaganda modified the interests of Tsarist 186* 829 diplomacy. The latter, at the beginning of the century, considered the Poles as 'traitors', the Czechs as the fire-brands of democracy in Eastern Europe, the Slovaks, the Slovenes, and the Croats as the outposts of Papism. Out of the fifty million non-Russian Slavs, they were interested in only ten million—the Balkan Slavs. Indeed, the policy of the Romanovs considered the Balkan Peninsula as:—

(1) The approach which should, one fine day, enable Russia to make herself independent of the whim of the 'porter' of the Dardanelles.

(2) A field of competition with Austria-Hungary; in other words, the means of exerting counter-pressure on the Vienna Cabinet when the latter encouraged agitation on the borders of the Empire, in the form of Uniatism, Austro-Polonism, or Ukrainism.

(3) A basis of reaction against Western culture and the influence of Catholicism. 186* 829

(4) More generally, a card of introduction to main European politics.

To ensure for herself the mastery of the Balkan Peninsula, St. Petersburg played the Serbian and the Bulgarian cards alternately, without considering the emancipation movements in those two countries as anything more than a trump card for Russian diplomacy in its struggle with Austria. With naïve egoism, Tsarism looked upon the Orthodox Slavs as the natural defenders of its interests, even at the expense of their own!

186* 648 To tell the truth, none of these nations was blind to this political exploitation of a sentimental bond. In their collaboration with Russia they accepted what was capable of forwarding their aspirations but declined to play the role of clients. That explains the diplomatic games of general post in the Balkans. The end of last century saw the Serbs relying upon Austria against the Bulgarians backed by Russia; on the eve of the First World War, it was the reverse. Bismarck used to say, 'I am an Austrian in Belgrade, and a Russian in Sofia'. About 1890, the *Videlo,* a Serbian newspaper, expressed what many Balkan statesmen were thinking, but were careful not to admit: 'We have carefully studied the writings of the champions of the Slavonic idea in Russia and among the other Slav nations. These writings contain many phrases about the 'liberty' and the 'unity' of the Slavonic peoples. And amongst us there have been those who, in the inexperience of youth and the enthusiasm of poetry, have believed that Slavonic fraternity was a common temple, in which each of our peoples had the altar of its liberty. . . . The matter would not be very serious, if the Slavonic idea were merely a chimera, but, in actual fact, it is also the unexpected instrument which enables a powerful Slav State to oppress its 'brothers'. The weaker a nation is, the more removed from the form of a State, the more it is attached to the Slavonic idea. It is highly significant that the nation which is most faithful to this idea should also be the one which is the most isolated and the most powerless—the Slovak nation'.

186* 641 829 The movement of the nationalities was indeed drawing the Slavonic peoples towards far less abstract aims. The age of the bards and the philologists was over. They were no longer con-

186* 641 829 cerned with taking the census of a common patrimony, but with working out their own destiny. It was the question of their future State, and of its frontiers, which demanded a solution, and was becoming yearly more imperative.

Now, if there were two ideas which were foreign to Russian Slavism, they were those two, State and frontiers. Born in an atmosphere of romanticism, the Slavophile school had no constructive views. The forces it had more or less unconsciously set in action were, above all, anti-State. The State meant Austria for the Czechs, Hungary for the Croats, Turkey for the Southern Serbs. And for the Poles it was Russia herself, or else Prussia.

As for what the possible frontiers of the liberated Slav States might one day be, Russian officialdom had not the slightest idea. In the *Memoirs* of President Masaryk, we read a suggestive anecdote. During the War he had a conversation with General Alexeiev, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army, regarding Russia's war aims. He was astounded to hear the general express the hope that the victory of the Allies would carry the Czechs to Fiume and the Serbs to Uzhorod (Carpatho-Ukraine). Seventy-five years of 'Slavonic fraternity' and Slavophile demonstrations culminated in the formulation of such an enormity!

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186* 829 • 648 Thus Tsarist Russia left the Balkan Slavs a joint heritage of good and bad memories. She had, by turns, favoured or restricted their emancipation, according to the state of her relations first with the Turks, then with the Central Empires.

The Bulgarians are commonly considered to have been her spoilt children. They speak, with tender recollection, of the 'Liberating Tsar', Alexander II, whose monument stands in front of the Parliament House in Sofia. In 1915, when Bulgaria went to war with Russia, his statue was veiled. But would the 'Great Bulgaria' (still-born of the Treaty of San Stefano) have satisfied the longings of the patriots? Would she not have been converted, by the Imperial diplomacy, into a 'Trans-Danubian Province', such as the Kaulbars government endeavoured to set up? The Russians, it is true, obtained from the Porte the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, which, freed from obedience to the Œcumenical Patriarch of Constantinople,

favoured Bulgaria's Macedonian claim. Yet they refused to 186*
associate themselves with the efforts of the Serbian Government 829
to restore the former Patriarchate of Petch. But, if their prefer- 648 •
ence went to Bulgaria, it was because the latter was one day to
open to them the route to Constantinople. So the realism of
the Sofia Cabinet practised an intermittent Russophilia. Two-
thirds of the governing classes of the Bulgarian nation were pupils
of Russia, but their number also included some Russophobes—
Stambulov, Marinov, Chanadiev (except at the end of his life),
Radoslavov and his associates. The Slavonic idea found an
indefatigable apostle in the person of Stevan Bobtchev, a volun-
teer of the 1877 War, a jurist, professor, and diplomat, who
presided over the Slav Congress at Sofia in 1910, when the Neo-
Slavism of Kramár and Miloukov triumphed. But currents of [578]
dissension appeared on various occasions, especially in the
reactions in favour of Catholicism at the time of Marinov, and
in the reminder of the Tartar or Finno-ugrian origins of the
Bulgarian nation, every time they entered into conflict with
Russia.

The Russophilia of the Serbs often took on the aspect of a quasi-religious veneration. But it did not cause them to forget that the Tsarist government had abandoned them on several occasions. Apart from the pro-Bulgarian attitude it maintained in the Macedonian question, it agreed to the annexation of Bosnia at the time of the Isvolsky-Aehrenthal interview in Buchlau (Sept. 16, 1908) and, later on, its ambassador, Benckendorff, signed the secret agreements in London (April 26, 1915) which, by ceding to Italy the eastern coasts of the Adriatic, bade fair to ruin the plans for Jugoslav unity.

Now this unity had been a fixed idea with all Serbian statesmen since the Battle of Sadowa, which had awakened as many hopes in Serbia as in Italy. As long ago as July 30, 1866, Garachanin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, said to Botmiliau, France's representative in Belgrade, 'No matter what efforts diplomacy may make, in reality, the Austrian Empire no longer exists. Three nationalities will arise in its place, the Hungarian, Bohemian, and Slav (Yugoslav). Sooner or later, the Austrian Germans will join the other German peoples. . . . The Turkish Empire will fall, as the Austrian Empire has done. The Yugoslav State will be founded—not without warfare, perhaps, but it

186* will be founded—because it is in the force of events, because
829 the peoples long for it, because it is the best possible solution to
• 648 the present difficulties, and because, if it were not founded, these
countries would fall a sure prey to Russia; Panslavism would be
established in their place'. These few sentences—prophetic
ones, moreover—provide the clue to all Serbian diplomatic
thought, whether declared or understood, up to the 1914 War.
The majority of the statesmen in Belgrade were partisans of a
Russophile policy, with the exception of the old-time Progressists,
and even so, one of their leaders, Stefan Novakovich, kept his
confidence in the Tsarist Government. But, with these men, a
Russophile policy never meant a Russian policy. We shall have
defined the historical 'Russophilia' of the Balkan States, if we
say that it always postulated the greatness of Russia, and was
bounded by the determination to eliminate that country from
internal affairs of the Peninsula.

186* Yugoslav Catholics were inclined to be prejudiced in favour
829 of Russia; this was due, on the one hand, to their geographical
795 situation, beyond the reach of Russian ambitions, and, on the
other, to the fact that their Catholicism was much less exclusivist
than that of Poland, for instance. No doubt this intellectual
liberty must be attributed to an instinctive reaction against the
policy of the Vatican, which was then axed on Austria-Hungary,
i.e., on the two countries whose yoke the Yugoslavs aspired to
shake off. The majority of the Croat and Slovene thinkers and
poets of the nineteenth century were inspired by Slav traditions;
the Illyrian movement was, in their countries, the starting-point
[793] of the national Renaissance. But the role of the Catholic clergy
in this renaissance, and its connections with Orthodox Russia,
is certainly one of the most decisive manifestations of that
'Slavonic conscience' which the politicians of St. Petersburg
believed to be the attribute of the Orthodox Slavs. In Slovenia
the priest, Jean Krek, the instigator of the Co-operative movement,
and later on, Abbé Anton Korochets; in Croatia
Bishop Strossmayer and Canon Ratski, were not only apostles
of Slav solidarity, they had frequent contacts with the Russians.
Strossmayer, who was one of the contrivers of Yugoslav unity,
had not only been one of the opponents of the Vatican Council;
he protested vigorously against the Holy See's anti-Russian
attitude at the time of the 1877 War.

Thus, at the beginning of this century, the Slavonic idea 186
had permeated all the currents of spiritual life of the nations 668
whose historic personality it exalted. In Russia, after having 178
arisen among the intellectual *élite,* it had been relegated to the rank of diplomatic accessories. But it had been rejuvenated by allying itself with Czech Agnosticism, with Croatian and Slovene Catholicism, with the positive sense of the Bulgars, the legendary spirit of independence of the Serbs. It had been an aspect, a 'phase' of the march of the nationalities towards emancipation. From the minutes of meetings of learned societies, it had advanced to the domain of direct action. After having taken stock (academically) of the injustices which formed landmarks in the history of the Slavonic world, it was preparing to achieve reparation for these injustices by conspiracies, acts of violence, war.

While Russia had given the emotional impetus to this movement, and the Czechs had demonstrated the educative elements in a Slavonic science and conscience, it was left to the Yugoslavs to set the ruthless pace which was to precipitate events. It was under their influence that Slavism entered upon its revolutionary phase. In Hungary it found the oppressive atmosphere which provoked this evolution; the beginning of the twentieth century is marked, in Croatia, by a series of trials and acts of violence which revealed to the world the progress of Yugoslav militancy. It was in fact in Bosnia, from a centre of Yugoslav irredentism, that sprang the spark which was to set the continent afire. Starting from the speculative heights of the learned world, the Slavonic idea culminated in shots, fired point blank, by a Herzegovine student, at the heir to the Austrian Empire, in a Sarajevo street. When the President of the Tribunal interrogated the authors of the crime as to the motives for their action, they repeated, with dogged fatalism, 'Francis Ferdinand was the enemy of the Slavs'.

Russian officialdom took fright at this effervescence. It - 186*
sought excuses for its passive attitude. To explain why they 829
had abandoned the Serbs at the time of the annexation of Bosnia- 648
Herzegovina, Stolypin stated that Imperial diplomacy had simply had an eye to the future. 'Give the peasants of Kostroma ten more years at the plough'. A second humiliation was inflicted on Russia in April, 1913, when, to please Austria, she

186* was obliged to join the European concert which forced
829 Montenegro to raise the siege of Scutari.

• 648 Russian society took no interest in these questions. Its members were frequently heard to say, 'God bless these "bratouchki"! Wouldn't it be better to live without them? Shan't we be happier when we have abandoned the Slavonic chimera and the dream of providential vocation, and think only of our own immediate interests?'

With the crisis of July, 1914, Russia was, for the third time, faced with the possibility of a renunciation. This time she pulled herself together. Austria was imposing on her a trial of strength in which her rank as a Great Power was at stake. On learning of the ultimatum from the Ballplatz to the Belgrade Cabinet, Nicholas II telegraphed to his minister, 'Tell the Serbs they can count on me'. With this historic sentence, another cycle in the history of the Slavonic world was closed.

186* In fact, under a common denominator of origin, of sufferings
578 and reflexes, the Slavonic peoples were inspired by different aims—independence, territorial expansion, and the acquisition of sovereign rights. Consequently, every event which brought them nearer to their respective goals had, as its first result, the relaxation or removal of their connecting bonds. It was the negative aspect of Slavism, which, having reached the stage of realisation, animated ideals which involved neither the same aims nor the same volitional power. This had been proved during the Balkan War of 1912–1913, when Serbs and Bulgarians fell upon each other, after having jointly waged war on the Turks. It was to be seen even more clearly during the World War of 1914–1918, when, some fighting under the flags of the Entente, others under those of the Central Empires, the Slavs exhausted each other in fratricidal conflict.

186* 721 coherent nor systematised; no one was pursuing a policy of defending or destroying them as a whole. But the Slavonic world had let loose outbursts of passion which, for some years, had been fanning all the centres of trouble into flame. These had greatly helped to create the psychological atmosphere which had rendered the clash inevitable. So we may say that, if Slavism as such had indeed nothing to do with the development of the drama, it had at least written the prologue to it.

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186* 668 • 648 Such being the case, it is scarcely necessary to remind the reader that, during the 1914–1918 War, the Slavs had no general political policy. They evolved within the framework of their historical antecedents, as long as the conflict offered no other prospect than that of a German victory. On several occasions Russian officialdom even adopted an anti-Slav position. They agreed to the cession of Dalmatia to Italy, opposed the union of the Slovenes and the Croats with the Serbians, resisted the concessions which Russia's allies asked her to grant to Poland, and showed obvious lack of goodwill at the Czech suggestions for the creation of an independent army.

The Czechoslovaks had a more coherent policy, and gave ample proof of loyâlism. From the very beginning of the operations, whole units deserted under fire and went over to the Russians. They have been reproached with having first declared themselves in favour of the autonomy of Poland within the framework of Russia, rather than of her full independence. At the time when they adopted it, that attitude was a realistic, rather than a sentimental one.

The Poles were, above all, anti-German; for a long time they humoured Austria-Hungary, and several of them served her brilliantly. It must not be forgotten that the Dual Monarchy's anti-Slav policy was often the work of Slavs: Coluchowski (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Bilinski (Joint Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina), Dumba (ambassador), Tarnowski, etc. In any case, a Slavonic policy would have meant a mortal struggle with Vienna and Budapest; the Poles could not resign themselves to that. Besides, would the Russians have given them sufficient understanding, if not support, to make up for the goodwill they could rely on finding among the Magyars and the Austrians?

The Yugoslavs of Austria aimed at the dismembering of the 186
Dual Monarchy and at the total emancipation of the Slav 648 •
populations living under its sway. But they found themselves 668
prevented from conducting a policy of integral Slavism, by the caution which the war-map forced them to observe with regard to Russia[2] and to Italy, owing to the Serbo-Bulgarian dispute and the Macedonian problems, and even by the difficulties encountered at the outset of the negotiations between Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs, for the formation of a single Yugoslav state.

There were, however, some attempts at understanding among [575]
the various emigrations, especially between the Polish National Committee (Dmowski, Paderewski), the Czechoslovak National Council (Masaryk, Benes, Stefánik) and the Yugoslav Committee (Troumbich, Hinkovich). These contacts lasted until the Peace Conference. But they never led to the elaboration of a programme, or of any organic agreement.

The Dual Monarchy, moreover, did not lack support among its Slav nationals. Stiepan Radich, a Russophile, a hundred per cent Slav and a poet into the bargain, addressed a rhymed call to arms against the Tsar to his brothers of Austria and of Hungary:—

> '. . . All persecuted, even to the shedding of blood, by
> the East,
> All having received their Faith from Rome,
> All having their fields bathed by the Danube'.

It is true that this same Radich, when things went badly for the Central Empires, reassured his friends, anxious about the fate reserved for Croatia: 'Have no fear', he said, 'nothing can happen to you as long as Russia exists'. This guileless inconsequentiality is rather reminiscent of the whole history of Slavism, adapted by each nation to the daily round of its own politics. Even the war made no change in this behaviour. Russia disappointed her Serbian ally by signing the London Pact, which stupidly dismembered the Dalmation coast, to the advantage of Italy, through ignorance of the fact that there were

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[2] A slight incident will show how much the latter had remained attached to her prejudices. On the Feast of the Epiphany, 1916, the divisions of Serbian and Croat volunteers in Russia arranged for a religious service, at which prayers were recited for all Christians, 'Orthodox and non-Orthodox'. The Russians did not hide their disapproval, and declared this initiative to be 'not very liturgical'.

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Catholics in Southern Dalmatia and Orthodox Christians in Northern Dalmatia. Still the same ignorance of Slavonic geography! Pilsudski raised a Polish Legion against Russia, and the Bulgars made unforgivable war on the Serbs. It is true that, in the last period of the conflict, legions were formed, in which the Slavs of Austria-Hungary rejoined forces for the defence of their own cause. And at the meeting of the Reichsrat in mid-October, 1918, at which the nationalities bade farewell to the Empire of the Habsburgs, one might have believed in a renewal of Slav solidarity. After Stanek, representing the union of the Czech parties, had bravely declared: 'Know that no Czech willingly gave his life for the cause of the Central Empires', the Polish orator spoke of a 'Slavonic bloc, stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic'. But, in reality, what they were thinking of was not Slavism, but liberty.

This liberty was to be restored to them by the treaties of 1919–1920. Truth compels us to say that they owed it as much to the collapse of Imperial Russia as to the victory of the Allies. 'Russia', Dostoievsky had predicted, 'will have no more venomous enemies than these Slavonic nations, as soon as she has liberated them. They will immediately begin by seeking from Europe, from England, from Germany, the guarantee of their liberty, and it is against Russia that they will take measures'.

Dostoievsky had not foreseen the collapse of Tsarism. But, if the latter 'liberated' the Slavonic peoples, it was not by virtue of any conscious action, but by its own suicide. By disappearing, it did more for the independence of the Slavonic nations than the Slavophile Romanticism of three Muscovite generations. Old Imperial Russia, at her collapse, was to bequeath to the resuscitated Slavs what remained of the Slavonic idea. She might have repeated to them the beautiful words spoken by Cyril, on his death-bed, to his brother Methodius: 'We were like a yoke of oxen ploughing a field of corn; my days are over, I am going away, and you must carry on our joint task'.

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The first result of the Russian Revolution was, indeed, to remove the reactionary fetters which Muscovite Slavism had imposed on inter-Slav relations. Henceforth, all the Slavonic nations were ranged behind one and the same democratic ideal.

But a new Slavonic problem was brought to the forefront—the 186*
problem of the Ukraine. A Ukrainian National Committee was 648 •
formed, and began to negotiate with the Allies. Its action divided 578
the Slavs; Poles and Russians greeted it with equal hostility; the Yugoslavs displayed disapproval or indifference; the Czechs adopted a half-and-half attitude, advocating the administrative and cultural autonomy of the Ukraine within the framework of the reviving Slav solidarity.

Moreover, it was quite natural that, once in possession of 186*
their ethno-linguistic frontiers, the Slavonic peoples should cease 668
to have any other horizons than these frontiers, within which they still had to build up a political, economic, and social organisation. They sought their vocation in their own history. We are continually forced back to this fundamental fact—Slavism has been, in its essence and from the force of circumstances, a revolt of the nation against the State, whether the latter was called Germany, Austria, Hungary, or Turkey. In Russia itself, the Slavophile school maintained the rights of the country (*zemlia*) against the encroachments of the State. With this tendency is connected the tinge of anarchy which the West is apt to associate with the word 'Slav'. The nation, in the spirit of the 1919–1920 treaties, being identified with the State, the Slavonic idea was doomed to lose the centrifugal opposition, the dissolving power which had long characterised it, and under whose action the Habsburg Empire had collapsed.

And in fact, the triumph of the nationalities, ratified by the treaties of Saint-Germain and of Trianon, restored Slavism to its academic origins. Reminders of racial fraternity now seemed to serve no other purpose than to warm up the atmosphere for after-dinner speeches, or for inaugural meetings of congresses. The Slavonic nations lacked that basis of common culture which gives to Hispanism, for instance, the only positive value to which it can lay claim.

In the political order the counter-indications showed up all 186*
the more clearly, inasmuch as the territorial settlements were no 728
longer made in virtue of force, but on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination. Now there were some populations which were caught between two opposing Slavonic currents; the Teschen district of Silesia, Macedonia, the Ukraine. A cynic has remarked that, the farther the distance between Slavonic

Anglo-Saxon, or Latin nations. The treaties of the earlier war 728
had thus sanctioned a traditional exclusiveness in this respect. 131

On the other hand, Slavism scored a point—the only one— 175
in an acquisition of territory. This was achieved by the clauses [186]
which allocated to the Czechs Sub-Carpathian Russia—an ethnical mosaic, with predominant Russian or Ukrainian elements, which was to form an autonomous unit within the framework of the Czechoslovak Republic. This allocation, demanded by the Ruthenians of America, was decided upon chiefly because the signatories to the treaties considered the Prague government as the best mentor they could give to a dangerously backward Slavonic population. Indeed, Czechoslovakia was, within a few years, to improve Sub-Carpathia, that Cinderella of the Slavonic world; at the cost of heavy budgetary sacrifices, she turned this territory entrusted to her into a real 'Civilisation Front'.

As is well known, at the Peace Conference the Czecho- [563]
slovaks intervened—another gesture of pure Slavonic inspiration —to try to secure for the Serbs of Lusatia the benefit of the protection accorded to minorities. These Lusatians are the remnant of a powerful tribe who people a corner of Saxony and Brandenburg, with its centre at Bautzen. Theirs was for long the *terra incognita* of the Slavonic world; they were discovered by the learned circles of Czechoslovakia and Poland in the nineteenth century.

The return of Poland to an independent life, and the 648 •
Sovietisation of the Russian State, modified the nature of the 829
relations between the two peoples. Immediately after the earlier war and the Treaty of Riga, one could not say that these relations had been clarified. It is certain that the Government of Moscow was then pursuing a Eurasiatic policy, which drew it away from European affairs. But no one could imagine that this disinterestedness would last very long. In Moscow they still, as under the Tsars, spoke of the 'Jesuitism' and the 'Jagellonism' of the Poles; in Warsaw, they talked about the hegemonic appetite of Russia, and her propaganda. 'Atheism' and 'Marxism' had replaced 'Orthodoxy' and 'Panslavism' as passwords.

The Polish-Sovietic War of 1920 complicated inter-Slav rela- 648
tions. The Poles bitterly reproached the Czechs with having refused 578

648 578 to allow the passage through their territory of reinforcements which the Poles were expecting from abroad. They complained no less bitterly at seeing the Czechs, like the Yugoslavs, model their attitude towards them on their own behaviour towards Moscow. It is true that Prague and Belgrade had enthusiastically greeted the resurrection of Poland, following the Allies' victory—a very different result from the changes in 1916, which, for the Poles, had substituted the duty to fight beside the Central Empires, for the right to do so. But in 1920, in these same capitals, they were wondering whether Poland was fighting Bolshevism or the Russian nation, and this differentiation, which inspired many newspapers, was regarded in Warsaw as definitely unfriendly. The ex-Minister of Poland in Yugoslavia, Erasmus Piltz, felt it necessary to address this warning to the Yugoslavs: 'Nothing separates us: on the contrary, everything unites us. . . . There is not a Pole who does not consider the alliance with Yugoslavia as a most highly fruitful and desirable achievement. But, if one of the most popular Serbian propagandists does not hesitate to claim that Polish-Yugoslav relations must depend on our relations with Russia, then I feel I may say, without fear of contradiction, that no Polish government, no Polish party, will accept such reservations, or such a presentation of the question'.

The leader-writer of *Przeglad Wisczorny* mournfully summed-up the origins of this misunderstanding: 'In Warsaw, we have been in the habit of viewing Serbia through Viennese or Budapest spectacles, whilst the Serbs have observed us through Russian spectacles. And the result is that each side has a false picture of the other'.[3]

[829] Finally, a conception of their own greatness, dear to the Poles, helped to foster a feeling of friction between them and the sister nations, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—which the Poles considered as being on a lower hierarchical plane than themselves —for were they not a Great Power? Perhaps we shall not be far wrong in affirming that between the two wars the Poles maintained more regular, if not more cordial, relations with the Rumanians and the Hungarians than with the other Slavonic states.

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[3] Of May 22, 1920.

Nothing is more interesting, more decisive perhaps, for the 186*
history of Slavism than to recall the attitude adopted by the 829
Czechs and the Yugoslavs respectively with regard to Russia, 648 •
immediately after the establishment of Bolshevism.

The Yugoslavs maintained an unshakeable fidelity to the Russian nation. In Belgrade the state of things arising from the 1919–1920 treaties was considered somewhat precarious, owing to Russia's non-participation in these treaties. It was not that the Government welcomed the coming of the Soviets. The hailing of Trotsky by their representative, Spalaïkovich, with the words: 'I spit in your face!' shows the hostility felt, and that hostility was fomented and kept alive by grievances of a dynastic order. But, side by side with this official behaviour, there were numerous manifestations which revealed the instinctive repugnance of Yugoslav opinion to allow the Russian people to suffer the consequences of being black-listed. The Belgrade Government was obliged to take this into account; they bluntly rejected the requests of the Great Allies, who were pressing them to co-operate in Wrangel's campaign against the Red Army. These negotiations and the support given by the Entente to Poland against the Russians, aroused, in part of the Yugoslav press,[4] reactions whose echo never reached France, but which were eminently symptomatic. 'Russia', declared the *Balkan*, 'whether she be Tsarist or Bolshevist, is for the Serbian people, for all Croats and Slovenes, "Holy Russia", the country of our Slav brothers. Where is the Serb who would raise his hand against a Russian soldier?' Or this, from *Progress*: 'It is clear that our future policy will be Slavonic. Russia will gradually abandon both extremes, and become a democratic State. This Russia will be the centre of the Slavonic world, and the Slavonic world will, in the future, make war impossible'. The same note was struck in Zagreb, where the newspaper *Rietch* raised its voice against the possibility of a clash between Russians and Yugoslavs. 'Our people have always believed in Russia. We believed in Tsarist Russia, we still believe in the Russia of today, not because she is Bolshevist, but simply because she is Russia. . . . The West has disappointed us, whereas the Russia of today seems to us more and more Slavonic. . . . We cannot have worse than what the West gave us'.

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[4] Of July 26 and 27, 1920.

that in neither of these capitals did they suspect that the big Slav 186*
brother would one day re-awaken from the dead, and become 829
once more a factor of prime importance in world politics.

Already, at the Genoa Conference, Chicherin and the Yugo- 186*
slav Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nintchich, had, unknown to 648 •
their colleagues, held conferences *in camera*, discussing the 829
international situation, not as plenipotentiaries, but, according to Chicherin's own expression, 'among Slavs'.

The question of official relations with Russia was brought forward for the first time in July, 1924, by the ephemeral government presided over by the democratic leader, Davidovich. In his ministerial declaration the latter alluded to the expediency of contact 'with Sister Russia' (*bratska Rusija*). But it was then only a pious hope. This question was complicated by the [563]
presence in Belgrade of a powerful 'white' emigration (to which Wrangel belonged),[7] and of a 'legation', directed by Strandtman (the former Chargé d'Affaires of Tsarist Russia), in his capacity as 'General Delegate of Russian Emigration'.

A few months later, on the orders of Moscow, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw, Bessiedovsky, approached Simich, the Yugoslav Minister in that capital. These overtures seem to have been the result of the visit which Stiepan Radich, the Croat agrarian leader, made to Moscow during the summer of 1924. The Muscovites had visualised Radich as the possible artisan of a peasant revolution in Yugoslavia, but he disappointed them by his muddle-headed fluency of speech and his absence of positive views. They dubbed him a 'little Leftist Bourgeois, hopping all over the place'. Nor did they derive more benefit from the Simich-Bessiedovsky discussions, revived shortly afterwards by the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin with Balougdjich, the representative of Yugoslavia. Nothing came of these private talks. It needed the Hitlerian nightmare and the Czech drama to restore—too late—the official relations between Belgrade and Moscow to their historical setting.

On the Slavonic side Czechoslovakia was the State most 829
ready to give prompt recognition to the Soviet State. In this

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[7] Generals, Slavophiles, prelates like the ex-Metropolitan of Kiev, Mgr. Antoine, had fled to Belgrade, where rest the ashes of General Alexeiev and of Wrangel. Philosophers and scholars sought shelter, for preference, in Czechoslovakia.

829 connection, the Czech Government had to reckon with the influence of the Socialists, the sympathies brought back from Russia by numerous legionaries, the fact that the Russian emigration in Bohemia was composed of elements with much greater Leftist tendencies than those who had sought refuge in Yugoslavia, and, finally, the needs of a reviving industry in quest of external outlets.

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• 648 But these influences were countered by the National-Democrat Party of Dr. Karel Kramár. The latter, married to a Russian, had preserved an inflexible attachment to Imperial Russia. He prevented the acceptance of the proposal for official recognition which had been suggested in the spring of 1922, at the time of the Genoa Conference, during an interview between Benes and Chicherin. On the other hand, economic relations between the two countries were multiplied, despite the ill-will of the Zivnostenska Banka, the banking stronghold of the Kramár Party, which controlled powerful undertakings.

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648 And now for the curious phenomenon which differentiates the evolution of Slavism among the *membra disjecta* of the former Austria-Hungary. Just as the Yugoslavs endeavoured to maintain, on a plane of Slav solidarity, their relations with a Russia whose régime their Government persisted in ignoring, so the Czechs endeavoured to clear of all Slavonic ideology the relations they sought to establish with that régime. 'Slavism', in Prague, still had a reactionary sound, whereas in Belgrade they maintained their faith in its emancipating virtue. The contradiction is worth pondering over.

186* 'The fact', says Masaryk, 'that the Slavonic peoples are henceforth liberated and are reorganising themselves politically, involves no increased influence for political Panslavism. Each Slavonic nation receives, in virtue of its liberation, a task which is proper to it and in whose realisation the other Slav states can only be of incidental assistance'. Analysing, with the serenity of the historian, the progress of the Slavonic idea through the centuries, Masaryk discovers in it no constructive virtue; it is a sentimental *leit-motiv* which, while it has inspired the poets with moving strains, has ceased to have any place in the political realities of international life. 'Czech civilisation is founded on the Reformation and on learning; the Yugoslav Messianists, too, are the product of the age of learning (*i.e.*, of the West); the

life; it is a reflex *sui generis,* an intangible factor; it changes 186*
weight and direction according to whether it is studied in one country or in another, on the level of official life or on that of the populace. So that the rather scornful judgement of the Czech statesmen seems to us to be inspired by a too exclusively historical interpretation of the facts. To find a solution to the controversy 186*
which opposed the Yugoslavs and the Czechs, it is sufficient to 648 •
recall their own relations. From 1919 to 1939 these relations were, for confidence and cordiality, unequalled between any two Latin or Germanic peoples. Naturally, they benefited by memories still present in all minds. No man, more than Masaryk, had contributed by his person to the formation of the generations which supplied their *cadres* to the emancipated nationalities. His courageous attitude during the trial of Friedjung—the author of the false documents on which the leaders of the Serbo-Croat Party had been charged with high treason—had won for him the gratitude of all Yugoslavs. During the crisis over the annexation of Bosnia, martial law had been proclaimed in Prague because the town rang with cries of 'Long live Serbia!' At the time of the Albanian crisis of 1912–1913, the 28th and 102nd Infantry, two entirely Czech regiments, on their way to the frontier, had been greeted in all the stations with cries of '*Slava Srbum!*' (Long live the Serbs). In the First World War, the Czech soldiers and officers of the Army of Occupation in Serbia had treated the inhabitants with all possible consideration.

But, once we have admitted this, we shall not wrong either the [157]
Czechs or the Yugoslavs if we affirm that they have very few traits of character, even very few sentimental affinities, in common. The Czech is hard-working, positive, a deliberator, economical. The Serb is a fatalist, emotive, spontaneous, lavish. Resistance to oppression—the common denominator of their history—has been expressed by very different reactions, masked among the Czechs, explosive among the Serbs. So that it is difficult not to put to the credit of Slav solidarity—that solidarity judged by Czech statesmen politically inoperative or out-of-date—the close relations between two countries connected neither by geography nor by tradition nor by psychology. It will be said that they have the same enemies, which is sufficient reason for an understanding. Arguing on these lines, the relations between

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648 Prague and Belgrade should be of the same quality as those existing between Warsaw and Bucharest, or between Belgrade and Warsaw—which no one can claim to be the case. Rather, it is precisely regarding the manner of averting the Teutonic peril that Czechs and Yugoslavs have held views which, if not conflicting, were at least divergent: in Prague they feared a restoration of the Habsburgs more than the *Anschluss*, while the reverse was the case in Belgrade.

To the credit side of the relations between Belgrade and Prague must be put the action, both sentimental and positive, of the Slovene statesmen and propagandists, many of whom, [665] moreover, had studied in Bohemia. Immediately after the First World War, Abbé Korochetz' Popular Party (Catholic), which had come under the influence of the Czech Popular Party (*Lidova Strana*), was the one which, in its organ, the *Slovenets*, dealt most fully with questions relating to the Serbo-Bulgarian reconciliation and with Soviet Russia. The Czech Government was for a time tempted to intervene as mediator in the dispute between Belgrade and Sofia. It wisely abstained; the Serbs would certainly have been offended. At least its press always treated this dispute with tact and discretion.

Summing-up, let us say that, between the two wars, the atmosphere of the Czech-Yugoslav relations was one of the positive factors in the spirit of Slav solidarity.

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If the Russo-Polish relations (and, in a certain measure, the Polish-Czech) are the touchstone of this solidarity in Central Europe, in the South-East it is through the Bulgaro-Yugoslav relations that crises are manifested. We have defined the place that Bulgaria, a Slavicised rather than a Slav people,[12] holds in the ethnical community, and the alternations of Russophilia and Russophobia through which she has passed. In 1915 she

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[12] It will be remembered, however, that in 1933, when MM. Gömbös and Kanya, respectively Hungarian Chairman of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, returned from Sofia (where Gömbös had conferred, in the Serbo-Croat language, with Mouchanov, the Bulgarian President), they declared to the Hungarian newspapers that they had 'visited Bulgaria, a country related to them by blood'. The Bulgarian press was unanimous in protesting against this expression; Bulgars and Magyars can be friends, but not relatives. The argument of ethnical relationship (Finnish) had nevertheless been put forward by certain Bulgarian propagandists in 1916–1917; it was the time when the poet Cyrille Kristov called himself a 'Tartaro-Bulgar'.

In 1915 she declared war on Tsarist Russia, but refused to do so in 1940 on Soviet Russia, although she owed much to the former and nothing to the latter. Even then, in 1915, she was obliged to intern a good many politicians and generals before embarking on her campaign, a campaign which, in actual fact, both sides conducted in 'slow motion'. The Russian Black Sea Fleet fired fifty-nine shells on Varna; in the Dobrudja, the Bulgarians were opposed to the Rumanians and to the Serbian Corps, while the Germans were engaged with the Russians of Chtcherbatchev. This realist nation, little given to passionate or ideological enthusiasms, nevertheless showed a curious obstinacy in 'backing the wrong horse'. In 1913, 1915, and 1942, they entered the war with the winners, and came out of it with the vanquished. The 'Macedonian psychosis' periodically pushed them into the arms of 'liberators', only to end by sharing their defeat.

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After the Treaty of Neuilly, the Bulgarian propagandists realised the error made by their leaders. They returned to the theme of Slavonic affinities, to the pro-Russian tradition. 'We Bulgarians', said the *Narodna Otbrana*,[13] 'have been the pioneers of a foreigners' policy, and have pulled the chestnuts out of the fire for others'. 'The future of Bulgaria is closely bound up with that of Russia', proclaimed the Minister, Bakalov.[14] And Stamboliiski entered into a mortal struggle with the Macedonian organisation, to clear the way for an entente with Belgrade. He succumbed in this struggle; his successors realised, after much shilly-shallying, that this policy was a reasonable one, but could not be imposed until the psychological atmosphere it had always lacked had been prepared for it.

And yet, paradoxical as it may seem, in the thick of the fratricidal struggles in which she has engaged, Bulgaria has never stifled her inner feeling of community of destiny with Serbia. When the Bulgarian resistance collapsed in 1918, a Deputy-Prefect of the occupying authorities took leave of the inhabitants of his administrative district in these terms: 'We shall perhaps

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[13] Of June 30, 1920.

[14] The Bulgarian Church, like the Serbian-Orthodox Church, refused to make the religious calendar coincide with the civil calendar when the State adopted the Gregorian reckoning. The two Churches gave, as the reason for this refusal, the fact that it was impossible to come to an agreement with the Russian Church, which then had no competent representative.

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186* fight again, but that won't mean that we shall cease to be
648 brothers'. This sentiment had been heard, or uttered, by millions of wounded or prisoners, during the war. And, when King Boris visited Belgrade in December, 1933, Mouchanov, President of the Bulgarian Council, uttered this remark, which may make a Westerner smile but whose sincerity no one conversant with Balkan affairs will doubt: 'Even when crossing swords, we have always respected and esteemed, even loved, each other'. Indeed, in spite of their proverbial severity, there is nothing in the Serbo-Bulgarian wars comparable to the atavism of hate which hangs like a spectre over the relations between Greeks and Bulgarians. At the conclusion of each of these wars, the notion of Slav solidarity has resumed its place, with the victor as with the vanquished. In the same way, there are families which have periodical skirmishes, without prejudice to the 'family spirit'. If the feeling of Slav solidarity has never averted wars between the Balkan Slavs, it has at least greatly contributed to minimise their consequences. It is especially to this spirit that we owe the reconciliation of two peoples, and the signature of the pact made in Belgrade on January 24, 1937, and prepared by a series of stages (declarations of the clergy, missions of intellectuals, etc.), which assured for it a psychological basis. This document is eloquently laconic: 'There shall be inviolable peace and sincere and perpetual friendship between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Kingdom of Bulgaria'.

Doubtless this 'perpetual friendship', the test of a renewal of inter-Slav solidarity in the Balkans, was to succumb in the cataclysm let loose by the Third Reich. It disappeared in the hecatomb of pacts and alliances which formed the prelude to the war. Here we once more find ourselves face to face with this truth, which has dominated the whole existence of the Baltic States in modern times—their conflicts have always been the result of rivalry on the part of the Great Powers. Born under the shadow of Russo-Turkish antagonism, the discord between Belgrade and Sofia was rekindled by the Austro-Russian dispute, then by the hegemonic folly of Germany. It is very difficult for the historian to reduce the relations between the Balkan peoples to their true factors; at times of crisis, these peoples were simply, whether unwittingly or perforce, the unpaid satellites of the Great Powers, aligned one against the other.

movement in favour of a Green International of Slavonic 186*
Peasants yet merits a place in the chronology of inter-Slav 668
relations.

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At the same period (June 4–8, 1924) a Congress of Slav 186
Geographers and Ethnologists was held in Prague. This 815
too, awakened aspirations, either latent or at least dormant since the era of the great assemblies of the nineteenth century. The very choice of Prague was a reminder that Bohemia had been the 'laboratory' of the Slavonic idea. And it was the occasion of a spectacular return of Bulgaria into the community of peoples inspired by that idea.

But, when the totalitarian States had proclaimed their inten- 186*
tion of attacking the 1919–1920 treaties, it was once more to 829
Russia that all these peoples turned. From Moscow alone could come the watchword capable of rallying their energies—on condition that it should not look like an appeal to a Proletarian Dictatorship.

Just as the exaltation of Teutonism, in the first half of the nineteenth century, had had as a reaction the awakening of the Slav conscience, so the National-Socialist drive, a century later, was to bring in its wake a defensive reaction tending to align, if not to regroup, the Slavonic forces.

The essentially anti-Marxist notion of race had been repudiated by Lenin. In internal affairs, it could not but hinder the work of 'mixing' undertaken by the Moscow government. In foreign affairs it had no *raison d'être,* so long as Russian diplomacy practised a Eurasiatic policy, and guided the country's destinies towards the East. But, after fifteen years, the problem of the allogeneous inhabitants had passed the crisis. The Soviet régime was firmly established. German imperialism obliged them to turn their attention towards the West: the repetition of the recurrent drama of which Europe had been the theatre since the era of Wilhelm II once more reminded the Russian world of its destiny.

The first check to Hitlerian arrogance on the part of the 186*
Kremlin was the signing in London, on July 2, 3, and 4, 1933, 648•
of agreements for the common acceptance of the definition of the 829
aggressor, as formulated by Nicholas Politis. The U.S.S.R. signature appears at the foot of this document, side by side with

186* those of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia—although the
• 648 two latter had not yet recognised the Soviets. The new undertakings
829 marked an advance on the part of Soviet Russia towards a policy of interest, if not of action, in Europe. Western opinion, then entirely occupied with the Economic Conference, gave the matter only casual attention; it did no more than manifest its satisfaction at seeing the question of Bessarabia disappear from the list of outstanding disputes. But the importance of the event lay elsewhere; it represented nothing less than an attempt to regroup forces in Eastern Europe. The territorial statute arising out of the treaties was consolidated by the backing of a power, the U.S.S.R., which hitherto had not been thought to be very favourable to it. Henceforth the Slavs of Central and Southern Europe felt morally obliged to consider recognising the Soviets. The defensive reflexes of the Slavonic instinct came
[665] into play. At the seventeenth Assembly of the Communist Party, in January, 1934—the first to take place after the offensive on the part of Russian diplomacy in Europe—Stalin declared: 'Some people think that war must be prepared by the *superior race, i.e.,* the Germanic race, against the *inferior races,* and, especially, against the Slavs . . .'. This language aroused a world of memories, and an ideology which was believed to have lapsed. It was understood far beyond the frontiers of the U.S.S.R.

There was, however, one obstacle which prevented the Slavonic peoples from seeing in it more than a diplomatic gesture. They had hitherto looked to France for security guarantees. In Prague, as in Belgrade, they were anxious, at all costs, to prevent the development of a situation which might put the country under the obligation of choosing between Paris and Moscow. This was the constant, though unacknowledged, preoccupation of all the Little Entente Conferences. The policy of Louis Barthou, which prepared the way for a Franco-Sovietic *rapprochement,* did away with this possibility, and so the Czech Government recognised the Soviets on June 9, 1934. That summer of 1934 was a period of intense diplomatic activity for the Slavonic nations. In Bulgaria, on May 19, a *coup d'état* carried to power Kimon Gheorgiev with his National Union Cabinet. The first item on his programme was the *entente* with the Yugoslavs, the second the resumption of relations with the Soviets. It was on July 23 that the recognition was made official; it was the work

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of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Batolov. 'A century-old friendship has existed between the Bulgarian and the Russian peoples', declared the *Zaria*. 'Russia liberated the Bulgarian people, and it is no fault of the Russian people that our country was split up. Bulgaria, like the Soviet Union, desires to develop in peace'. On September 3, Benes met Litvinov at Marianske Lazne (Marienbad). On September 27, the Yugoslav sovereigns paid an official visit to Sofia. King Alexander was to fall, twelve days later, shot down by an assassin. His death was not to interrupt the movement of attraction among the various Slavonic nations. It is true that any reference to racial affinities was still avoided. But there was no denying the evidence: it was chiefly the Slavs who were menaced by the Hitlerian expansion. In March, 1934, an article by von Papen lifted the veil of German foreign policy; it showed that the revision of the treaties, and the struggle against the Slavs, were still the basis of that policy. 'Nobody', remarked the *Slovenets* of Ljubljana, 'can henceforth believe that the Germans have in any way modified their opinion of the Slavs; the latter are still, in their eyes, a fallow territory, awaiting Germanic sowers and Germanic seed'.

This observation on the part of the Slovene newspaper turned up again, a few months later, in the mouth of Litvinov himself, who, addressing the Czechs on January 3, 1935, made use of a suggestive pretermission: 'I will not speak of the ties of race and of language which exist between the most important peoples of our Union and the Czechoslovak people. The reason I will not speak of them is that, in the past, these motives have more than once been exploited for imperialist ends, and further, even at the present time, racial theories sometimes serve to cover barbarian ideologies and régimes. Nevertheless, these affinities do exist . . .'.

Unexpected, and moderate as it was, this reminder of family ties had much greater resonance and efficacy than the 'Panslavism' of which the old diplomacies had made a bogy, although it was only an attempt at hierarchised solidarity between Slavs of the Orthodox Faith. For it was inspired neither by a spirit of conquest nor by a desire for hegemony, but by a doctrine of equilibrium. It contained at the same time more authority, and more disinterestedness.

That same year, 1935, saw the visit of Benes to Moscow (June 8–16) and the conclusion of a Soviet-Czech treaty, parallel

186* with the Franco-Soviet treaty, and subject to the application of
• 648 the latter. 'The Russian question', said the Czech statesman,
829 'will always play a large part in our destiny, if only on account of our geographical situation. That is why our conception of foreign policy will never be definitely elaborated until Russia has become an active factor in Central European politics'.

But, in Prague as in Moscow, scrupulous efforts were made to clear the new pact of any Slav ideology. The Czech newspapers insisted on the two events which had rendered possible the conclusion of this treaty—the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League of Nations, and the Franco-Soviet agreement, the beginning of a Paris-Prague-Moscow axis. They reminded their readers that, since the beginning of her history, the Czech nation had developed within the framework of the Western civilisation and had, in modern times, bound up its destiny with that of the democracies. 'Nothing inclines us' (said the *Lidove Noviny*, 'to a collaboration with the Soviets which recalls, even distantly, the old romantic Panslavism, the smug dream of the union of all Slavs and the naïve faith in the possibility of a common international policy, peculiar to all the Slavonic peoples, a specifically Slavonic policy, different from that of the non-Slavonic peoples, even directed against the latter'. At the other political extreme, the *Bohemia* affirmed that 'the new Paris-Prague-Moscow policy is European, and not Panslav'. All the newspapers agreed on this point. Would they have needed to be so insistent, had they not foreseen that Czech opinion would naturally be inclined to see in the pact a manifestation of Slav solidarity? When the Soviet journalists visited Czechoslovakia, they were shown round the whole country, except Sub-Carpathian Russia, where they would have found a population speaking Russian and using the same alphabet as they did. . . . Nothing bears more eloquent witness to the Slavophilia of the Czech people, than the care which their Government and their press took to forestall manifestations of it.

France, who had just made an advance in the direction of Moscow, took fright at her own audacity, and thereafter endeavoured to minimise the extent of the steps she had taken. The Yugoslav Minister in Paris, summoned before Pierre Laval, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, bore a note summarising the arguments which his Government opposed to immediate recognition of the Soviets. He expected a sort of ultimatum on the part of the Quay d'Orsay. How great was his surprise at not 186* hearing, during his audience, any reference to the Franco-Soviet 648 • pact! On the point of taking leave of Laval, he ventured to 829 congratulate the latter on the results of his journey to Moscow. Laval cut in: 'Don't talk of it! I wish I could cut off the hand that signed the pact. Take great care you don't do the same!'

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But, still more than the Western policy of the Soviets, it 186* was their work of 're-nationalisation' which impressed the 538 Slavonic world. The brilliance with which the commemoration of the death of Pushkin was celebrated, in 1937, was the first manifestation of this 'Russian drive' abroad. No poet was more 'national' than Pushkin, despite his African blood. He re-created three centuries of Russian life in a profusion of dazzling images. He rendered, more expressively than any writer, the escapist fever of the men of his time and the nostalgic tonalities of the steppes of his country. Great Russian Literature begins with him, and one of his compatriots wrote: 'In Pushkin lies our whole patrimony'. The *Izvestia* declared that it was only with Sovietisation that the masses of the people got to know the true figure of the poet and the meaning of his work. This paper heaped scorn alike on the 'vulgar sociologists' who made of him a wild revolutionary, and the 'ignoramuses' who found nothing useful for Socialist culture in his poetry. And the Government had his works translated into all the languages of the Union.

The extent of this homage was a prelude to a general policy of rehabilitation of Russian values. In the first Bolshevist ideology, Russia was represented as the nonchalant and sub-lunary being typified by Oblomov, the dressing-gowned hero of a celebrated novel by Gontcharov. Oblomov is a sort of Russian 'Triplepatte',[*] incapable of taking any decision, and established in the lazy, useless life of a country proprietor. We may say in passing that this picture of the Russian people is not a very true one: it confuses the 'moon-struck' state with inertia. Left [157] to themselves, these people do sometimes lack application, or steadfastness, but if well directed, they are capable of prodigies of energy. For having dared to evoke this classical type, and the mentality to which it has given its name, 'oblomovtchina', Bukharin was accused of having borrowed 'a poisoned arrow

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[*] 'Triplepatte' is the hero of a comedy of the same name, by Tristan Bernard and André Godfernaux. (Trans. note.)

Chapter Four

THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE SLAV LIBERATION FRONT

THE historians of the future will be struck by one fact which 721
seems to escape those of our own day, and which we 648 •
consider below. 175

Whereas the wars of the nineteenth century originated in, or had as pretexts, disputes localised in different parts of the globe—Spanish Succession (1823 and 1870), the affair of the Duchies, Italian unity, German unity, the protection of the Holy Places, etc.—the thunder-clouds which foreshadowed the wars of the twentieth century all burst in a Slavonic sky.

The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 created the atmosphere which favoured the germination of the Italo-Turkish War and of the Balkan Wars. The Sarajevo outrage in June, 1914, was the pretext for the First World War. The Sudetenland crisis in 1938, which led to the Runciman mission, was the prologue to the Munich bargaining. The whole of the preliminary phase of the Second World War was enacted on Slav territory.

Contrary to all international engagements, the Munich Conference on September 29, 1938, sanctioned the mutilation of Czechoslovakia, in whose history this Conference will remain as a 'second White Hill'.

Then occurred various 'Slavonic episodes', as preludes to the general conflagration. Poland occupied Teschen on October 2, 1938. A few days later Slovakia proclaimed her autonomy. On November 2, the Ribbentrop-Ciano arbitration award, pronounced in Vienna, transferred the eastern part of Czechoslovakia (Sub-Carpathia) to Magyar rule.

On March 15, 1939, 'President' Hacha handed over to the Führer the fate of Bohemia; Hitler entered Prague—Czechoslovakia was wiped off the map.

On August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a ten-year pact of non-aggression. Reassured on the Russian side, Germany turned against Poland. Incidents were multiplied

721 in Danzig; German criminals, dressed in Polish uniforms,
• 648 attacked German villages in Upper Silesia to provide Hitler with
175 the pretext for an invasion. This was launched on September 1, at 5.45 a.m. The curtain was raised for the greatest drama in history.

186* But, beyond this, the historian who, with these
578 facts as his starting-point, sought to establish synchronism
648 between the feeling of a common destiny among the Slavs and the great wars of the twentieth century would very soon conclude that no such feeling existed. At all times of threatened crisis, there have appeared more or less general impulses towards *rapprochement*; the first result of all actual crises has been to set the Slavs one against the other. In this Second World War, as in that of 1914–1918, we were again to find the Bulgars, the Croats, and the Slovaks ranged with Germany, Bohemia trampled upon, Poland quartered, Serbia crucified, Russia at grips with the Teutonic colossus.

Much more: the Slavs participated in the spoils. Poland rewarded herself at Czechoslovakia's expense, Russia at Poland's, and Bulgaria at Serbia's.

175 Just as the 1914–1918 war had started with the crushing of
648 Serbia, so that of 1939 had as its prologue the carving-up of
721 Czechoslovakia. The latter succumbed to the fate which had forced her to look for support to the Western Democracies, with whom she had no territorial connection, and whose diplomacy, wavering or swept along by the back-wash of internal policy, had been able neither to ensure peace nor to provide for war. The inconsequentiality of France, signing a pact with Moscow, then hastening to evade its consequences, encouraging Yugoslavia to be on her guard against Fascist megalomania, then signing the Four-Power Pact and observing it no more than she had done the previous pacts; all this culminated in the Munich Pact, which—whether justified or not by our military unpreparedness—completed the state of confusion among the nations for whom France was the greatest asset in peace as in war.

It was not only by its inaugural phase—the dismembering of Czechoslovakia and the aggression against Poland—that the war once again seemed destined to become a reckoning between Slavs and Teutons. In *Mein Kampf* Hitler had reproached

William II for never having acquired new lands in the east. 175
It was not, at that time, a question of fighting Communism, but 648 •
of 'living space'—a theory which, in Nazi ideology, was directed 721
at the States bordering Eastern Germany and, beyond them, the 'fabulous resources' (*unerhörte Möglichkeiten*) of the Ukraine. Once more the Teuton resumed his age-long vocation of 'consumer of Slavs'.

But, looking closer into the matter, this was not, any more 186*
than in 1914, the essential cause of the Pan-Germanic explosion. 829
Hitler's Germany was aiming higher, and farther. Actuated by 721
what she considered to be a prime necessity of her geographical situation and of her 'racial pre-eminence', she regarded herself as the providential elaborator of new syntheses calculated to regenerate the world—but which were, in reality, simply the oldest of hegemonic appetites. It was not upon the Slavs that she declared war; it was upon a form of civilisation made up of Humanism and Christianity which the centuries had identified with the habitable world. The Slavs were the first victims of the *Wehrmacht,* simply because they were considered to be the easiest obstacle to overcome, owing to the inferiority complex which, from time immemorial, the German school had attributed to them. Their geographical position condemned them to be the target for the first onslaught. But the Slavonic world was subjected to unprecedented trials in all the different phases of the war—Czech, Polish, Balkan, Russian. Therein lay the real, the only 'Slavonic' aspect of this war—the recurrence of the periodic catastrophe which crushes these nations as soon as Europe is unleashed against herself.

So March 15, 1939—the date of the occupation of Prague 186*
by Hitler's troops—aroused deep emotion among the Southern Slavs, who realised that the dyke which had hitherto held back the German drive on Eastern Europe had collapsed. There were manifestations of sympathy in Belgrade and in Sofia, especially among the students; messages flowed into Prague from all the Slavonic regions in the Balkans.

Germany herself seems to have had some obscure realisation of 186*
her crime. A curious article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of 829
April 23, 1939—an article whose author foresaw the opprobrium that this 'operation' was to cast upon his country—endeavoured to reconcile the policy of the 'Protectorate' of Bohemia with the

186* conceptions of romantic Germany, and with Herder's 'Slavo-
829 philia'. He made every effort to show that a nation's interest does not necessarily lie in its elevation to the rank of a sovereign State, but that it may find its development in a subordination of national aspirations to political necessities. 'Geographical and historical facts, and political realities', he said, 'today play their part on an equal footing with the principle of nationalities'.

What the author meant by 'political realities' was to be judged in the light of the volleys of firing which mowed down the students of the University of Prague, guilty of having manifested their attachment to the Czech fatherland.

• 648 The subsequent course of events is too recent to need recal-
175 ling here. The whole edifice of guarantees, built up to support peace, collapsed like a house of cards; twenty years of vague conceptions of security were swallowed up into the abyss that was to engulf the ruins of a world built up by ten centuries of patience and human genius. The Pacts of the Little Entente, gradually voided of their contents,[1] remained inoperative; Article 16 of the Pact of the League of Nations—rendered optional at the request of Poland—did not have to be put into operation; the Polish-Soviet Pact of non-aggression of July 25, 1932, extended in 1934 to December 31, 1945, and reaffirmed on November 26, 1938, remained a dead letter; the 'constant peace and eternal friendship' stipulated in the first clause of the Hungarian-Yugoslav pact concluded on December 12, 1940, and ratified on February 27, 1941, lasted five weeks; as for the 'perpetual friendship' sworn between Bulgarians and Yugoslavs on January 24, 1937, it lasted fifty months, to say nothing of the Salonica Pact concluded on July 31, 1938, between Bulgaria and the Balkan Entente. The multiplication of security-pacts ended in making them completely ineffective. *In corruptissima republica leges plurimae.*

If Germany's designs on Bohemia and Poland were clear—too clear—the same could not be said of her position in the Balkans. At the most she claimed to put an end to what she called 'the state of anarchy created by the 1919–1920 treaties in the Balkan-Danubian region'.

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[1] In February, 1940, the minutes of the Balkan Conference contained no reference to the territorial *status quo*.

The first pawn she moved upon the chess-board was Bulgaria. On March 1, 1941, the Government of Sofia adhered to the Tripartite Pact with a ceremonial which had the Belvedere in Vienna as its setting. A communication from the *Political and Diplomatic Correspondence* of Berlin announced the news to the world, and added: 'Henceforth Bulgaria is numbered among the nations who enjoy equal status, who will in future serve only their own interests, to the exclusion of all others'. The terms of this adhesion had been 'discussed' on the previous November 17, during an interview between Hitler and King Boris at Berchtesgaden. At least one of the conditions was learned on the day the pact was signed; that very day, the Bulgarian Government notified the U.S.S.R. of the entry of German troops into Bulgaria 'to maintain peace within the country'. It was the first manifestation of a policy which the Bulgarian press was to designate 'passive belligerence'. 648 175

In face of pressure from Germany, what could the Bulgarian Government do? Three solutions were open to them—to resist by force, to make a diplomatic protest, to give way. The first was out of the question, the second would have added the drawbacks of a refusal to those of actual acceptance. In Sofia they judged the third solution to be the most 'realistic', and the only one that could save what remained to be saved.

In order to appease public opinion, the President of the Council, Bogdan Filov, declared in the Sobranje that 'Berlin had not demanded anything which ran counter to the obligations arising from the treaties concluded between Bulgaria and her neighbours'. And the *Zaria*, of Sofia, summed up its commentary as follows: 'Bulgaria has just decided her fate of tomorrow'. The press was almost unanimous in seeing in the country's adhesion to the Axis the road which should lead her to the revision of the Treaty of Neuilly, to the realisation, so often glimpsed, so often lost again, of a Great Bulgaria.

But the Macedonian psychosis did not prevent thoughtful people from remembering the evil genius of Bulgarian crises and their antecedents—the Balkan Wars and the catastrophe of 1918. Russia was still the ally of Germany. But who could believe that this *entente*, already beginning to show signs of wearing thin, would last until the end of the war? And if not, would it not be Moscow who would act as arbitrator for the destiny of Eastern

[I. Germany – Analyst]

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Europe? In November, 1939, on presenting his credentials, the first Soviet diplomat accredited to Sofia had made an unusual and emphatic allusion to the 'historical relationship' of the two countries. Consequently, in Moscow they expected an understanding, if not deferential, attitude on the part of Bulgaria. And so the population was profoundly moved on learning, on March 3, 1941, that the Soviet Government had just indicated, in a fairly stiff note, that they did not share the opinion of the Filov Cabinet, and that the latter's attitude seemed directed rather towards territorial expansion than to the consolidation of peace.

Bulgaria's position then became more and more critical. A Soviet note blamed her adhesion to the Axis. And, with the German-Russian War, began a series of incidents which strained to the utmost the relations between Russians and Bulgarians. In July, the Moscow Government denounced concentrations of troops on the Turkish frontier and preparations, co-ordinated with those of the Axis Powers, for an attack on the Straits.

Sofia denied these accusations. Moscow returned to the attack on September 12 with a note enumerating seven 'facts which the Soviets declared they considered as so many acts of hostility towards them' (movements of German troops, utilisation of aerodromes, ports, railways, etc.). On September 15 the Filov Cabinet again proclaimed their innocence: they had never exceeded the bounds of neutrality.

This diplomatic duel was accompanied by a chorus of violent press polemics concerning incidents, real or imaginary, alternately announced and denied over the air—the projection of Soviet bombs on Bulgarian territory, descent of 'Red' parachutists, acts of sabotage, acts of violence, etc.

And, in the background, was a continual, dogged propaganda tending to strengthen diplomatic action by exploiting both the economic difficulties of the Bulgarian people and the old theme of Russophile affinities. The note of September 12 had discreetly distinguished between the Sofia Government and the 'country'. Agitation was organised in working-class circles. The governing classes retorted by reinforcing the law for the protection of the State. There were executions.

Within a few weeks, Bulgaria saw herself faced with a problem no less social than national.

If the Soviet reaction left any room for doubt, this was 648 • entirely removed on the occasion of the drama which was 175 played out in Belgrade in the last week of March, 1941. On the 25th of that month, the Yugoslav Premier, Tsvetkovich, and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tsintsar Markovich, were received by Hitler and signed Yugoslavia's adhesion to the Tripartite Pact in Vienna. Forty-eight hours later a *coup d'état* put General [669] Simovich in power. Rising magnificently, the Serbian people, more clear-sighted than their leaders, and faithful to their tradition of independence, had swept away the pusillanimous ministers who had just put the country at the feet of the oppressor. War was inevitable. At Vichy, when Pourich, the Yugoslav minister, announced his King's decision to Admiral Darlan, the latter said to him quizzingly: 'How many divisions have you, for resisting Germany?' And Pourich replied: 'Sir, that is a question we never ask in my country. We fight first, and count afterwards'.

There you have the whole heroic philosophy of the Serbian people. Russia greeted Belgrade's *coup d'état* by signing, on April 5, a pact of friendship and non-aggression with the new Government. She could not do more to indicate where her sympathies lay. *Pravda* recalled the fact that the relations between the two countries had steadily improved since May, 1940, when diplomatic contact had been resumed. But Belgrade learned the news of this pact simultaneously with that of the German attack, which took place a few hours later. To justify this aggression, Hitler enumerated a certain number of complaints, the first of which was a reminder of the Sarajevo outrage. That day, he had no doubt forgotten one of the sentences in *Mein Kampf*: 'It was the hand of the goddess of eternal law and of inexorable punishment that struck down Austrian Germany's most deadly enemy, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand'.[1]

Bulgaria took advantage of the German victory to reoccupy 186* Macedonia, and on May 18[1] the Bulgarian flag was hoisted at 175 Skoplje. She announced that she would limit her occupation to 648. the lands she considered as *irredenta*. Needless to say, the appeal which the Yugoslavs broadcast from London, on the following

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[1]. French translation (1934), p. 26.

[1] [1941 -- Analyst]

186* June 9, in the name of 'Slavonic fraternity', met with no
175 response in official quarters. The *Dnes*, of Sofia, replied that
648 Slavism was a myth, and that, moreover, Russia was not
Slavonic.

But, even supposing that Slavism was a myth, Russia was a reality. Once again Slav solidarity appeared in its negative aspect. Bulgaria declared war on the United States and on England; to the very end, she maintained her diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R., thus showing herself more 'Russophile' than King Ferdinand's Government had been in 1915.

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648 Mistress of the Balkans and of Danubian Europe, Germany
175 set up her 'order' in those parts. None of the formulas on
which the structure of the Balkan world had been modelled in the past had succeeded in conciliating national aspirations with the tranquillity of Europe. The notion of equilibrium had condemned the Balkan-Danubian States to chronic readjustments, under cover of which the small nations had been made to pay the cost, first of the disputes and then of the reconciliations, of the Great Powers. The hegemony of the large empires (Turkey, Austria-Hungary) had perhaps improved material living conditions for the masses, but it had led to *irredentism* and terrorism. The principle of the *nationalities* (1919–1940) had achieved empirical justice, but had split Europe up into atomic units at the very moment when the progress of communications would have rendered desirable the economic equipment of vast areas. In the crisis that followed the failure of the Creditanstalt, the standard of living of certain Balkan populations fell below what it had been during the Turkish period.

The tangle of races, religions, and historical affinities represented in this region makes any 'rational' solution impossible. Hitler said so himself, in a speech of April 28, 1939: 'I have never left in doubt the fact that it is intrinsically almost impossible to harmonise political and ethnical frontiers to every one's satisfaction'.

But Hitler did more than say this—he proved it. If his principles had triumphed, the Balkan-Danubian world would have been permeated by more irredentism than there had been in the time of the 'Diktat'.

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In the first place, the 'Balkanisation' or splitting up with which the Europe of 1920–1938 was reproached was not reduced under German domination, but rather aggravated. The number of small States had increased by three (Slovakia, Croatia, Montenegro). The 'corridors' and 'wedges' were more numerous, the general configuration more irregular than ever.

In the second place, the number of malcontent countries, too, had strangely increased. Before the war there were only two, Hungary and Bulgaria. In 1942 there were five—Greece, Serbia, Croatia, Rumania, and Slovakia; Bulgaria herself, disgusted at losing the western borders of Macedonia to Albania, was threatening to join the ranks of the malcontents. Exercising violence, cynicism, and corruption by turns, Hitler's Reich succeeded only in creating two phases of antagonism, first setting the Balkan nations one against the other, then regrouping them all against itself. The Reich gave the name of 'allies' to nations which were all hostile to it, including some which only joined it in order to secure its support against their neighbours when the time came for a final reckoning. The essence of civilisation is a certain ability to forget; the most backward nations live on a heritage of resentments which forms an obstacle to any policy of unification. And, on the other hand, the régime of conquest ruins the psychological foundations of the reorganisation which it claims to make. Although no European region stood in greater need of rationalisation than the Danube Basin, the nebulous declamations of the Nazi prophets regarding the economic systematisation of the continent missed the mark. In the autumn of 1943, to remedy the disastrous consequences of Italy's volte-face, Neubacher, the representative of the Reich's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Balkans, endeavoured to arrange a Conference of the Peninsular States in order to establish a Balkan Confederation within the framework of the 'New Europe', but he met with refusal or scepticism everywhere. Even those of the Balkan-Danubian States who were fighting side by side with the Reich were only awaiting an opportunity to come to blows. Not a day passed but brought news of riots accompanied by bloodshed in the transferred territories—Bulgars versus Albanians, Greeks versus Bulgars, Rumanians versus Hungarians. And all this turbulence was taking place on the margin of resistance to the oppressor—at first masked, then open.

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There was something else they forgot in Berlin—the fact that the prestige of the Reich, in the whole of this sector, was doubly handicapped—handicapped by a generalised scorn of death and by the state of mind of peasants who, having seen, in one and the same generation, the collapse of Ottoman Turkey, Tsarist Russia, and the Habsburg Empire, instinctively failed to consider any hegemonic experiments as permanent. The majority of these nations have been hardened to defeat, as well as to recovery; consequently they believe neither in lasting adversity nor in the permanence of strength. They are the uncertain factor in the European pattern.

In short, in the brief historical parenthesis represented by the domination of the Axis in Eastern Europe, there was no elimination, but first transfer and then coalition of irredentisms. We may say that the incoherence of the concepts elaborated by the Axis Powers and their inability to remedy it, were the best retrospective justification of the treaties which had put an end to the previous war, though this should not lead us to underestimate their errors and omissions.

The decisive turning-point of the war—Russia's entry into the campaign—will remain a key-event in the history of the Slavonic peoples. At the moment when this occurred, some tens of millions of Slavs were perishing under Nazi oppression. It was impossible for this mortal duel between two giants not to flood their hearts with tremendous hope, replacing the discouragement that the unnatural *entente* sealed in Moscow had caused them. The war of which Russia was, for several years, to bear the heavy burden was a real 'war of liberation'. For the first time, in a political speech, made to the Soviet Assembly in Moscow on November 6, 1941, Stalin used the expression 'Russian people' (*Rouski Narod*) in preference to 'Soviet Union'. 'These people (the Nazis), devoid of conscience and honour, have the cynicism to summon the nations to the destruction of the great Russian nation, the nation of Plekhanovs, Lenins, Bilenskys and Tchernichevskys, Pushkins and Tolstoys, Gorkys and Tchekhovs, Setchenovs and Pvalovs, Rapins and Surikovs, Suvorovs and Kutusovs'. To this panorama of Russian genius he added a solemn pledge, calculated to reassure the nations of Eastern Europe, as to the price of the liberty he promised them and which he was to bring them. 'We have no intention of

conquering foreign territories or of annexing other nations. . . . 648
Nor do we intend to impose our will and our régime *on the* 175
Slavonic peoples or on the other oppressed nations of Europe
who are awaiting our aid'.

Russia, Slavonic peoples, liberation—these words sounded 186*
like a rallying-call around notions long vague and confused, 175
suddenly taking shape in the Titanic conflict in which the 648
destiny of the civilised nations was the stake. Bethmann-Hollweg's war-cry: *Germanentum gegen Slawentum* took on an entirely new meaning. The Teutons had conquered the territories where the first Slavonic tribes had camped; Ferdinand II had broken Czech independence; Frederick had annexed Silesia and Poland; Hitler appropriated Bohemia, Poland, Slovenia, Serbia, and the Ukraine. He chained Croatia and Slovakia to his ephemeral chariot of victory. He was the greatest spoliator of Slav territory that history had ever known. In a sketch broadcast in America, the two Czech comedians, Voskovec and Werych, were discussing the war. 'Who is the greatest man humanity has produced?' asked one. 'Opinions differ', said the other. 'No, no doubt about it, it's Hitler'. 'How can you say such a thing?' 'Yes, Hitler. He is the first statesman to make the Slavs agree among themselves'.

This *entente* was strengthened during the following months, as a result of Russia's policy towards the various countries in revolt against the Hitlerian occupation and also as a result of the Congresses which were held from 1942 to 1944, both in Soviet territory and in the New World.

The old Slavonic instinct of rebellion was rediscovering its traditional weapons—bombs and meetings—and their efficacy increased as German power, undermined by revolt, collapsed. Out of the 5,000,000 Slav 'workers' mobilised by Sauckel, only 200,000 were volunteers.

If we leave out of account the German occupation régime, which in Czechoslovakia took the name of 'Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia' and in Poland that of 'General Government', if we ignore the case of Dalmatia (Zara, Spalato, Cattaro) attached to Italy by a decree of May 18, 1941, and that of Montenegro, which proclaimed its 'independence' on July 13, 1941, but five months later was placed under the authority of an Italian governor, there remain two Slavonic States, Slovakia and

186* Croatia, to bear witness to the 'European Order' dreamed of
175 by Hitler and Mussolini.

• 648

Slovakia was for long the most outcast of the Slavonic nations. From her went out the first call for Slav solidarity, and it was one of her sons, the priest Jean Kollar, who founded romantic Slavism. Kollar had studied in Jena with the historian, Luden. He had participated in the Wartburg Festival. Every one knows of the disputes the Slovaks had, between the two wars, with the Czechs, whom they accused of practising exaggerated centralism. The anti-Czech elements took advantage of the Czechoslovak crisis to proclaim the independence of Slovakia on March 14, 1939—the same day as the notification of that of Carpatho-Ukraine, immediately occupied by Hungarian troops. Ten days later the country, presided over by a priest, Joseph Tiso, signed the so-called 'protection treaty' (*Schutzvertrag*) which placed it under the domination of the Reich. The latter guaranteed for twenty-five years the 'political independence' and the territorial integrity of the Slovak State. The head of the Government, Tuka, gave to the German-Slovak friendship the name of *Schutzfreundschaft*. A very active Germanophile minority had always existed in the country: the Popular Party of Hlinka (another ecclesiastic) had maintained close relations with the German Party of the Sudetes, whose propaganda, organised by Conrad Henlein, was one of the immediate causes of the war. As far back as September, 1939, Slovakia was represented by a few modest contingents in the campaign against Poland. Her Government was to pride itself on having been the first to bank on a German victory, and for this reason was to claim a sort of 'right of seniority' among the allies of the Hitlerian Reich. It adhered to the Tripartite Pact on November 28, 1940, and appeared to feel it a great honour to see Slovakia, with her two and a half million inhabitants, put on the same footing as Italy and Japan. 'By receiving us', said President Tuka, 'the German Reich has openly and solemnly placed us in the company of independent states'.

This honour was worth a few sacrifices—particularly of the patriots who had formed a different idea on the matter of independence. On his return from Salzburg, where he had seen the Führer, Tuka announced that it would be a National Socialist State. It was necessary to bring to reason certain elements who were resisting the spirit of the *Schutzvertrag* and following divergent paths. 186* 175

We may therefore consider Slovakia as a State which, from that time onwards, realised all Hitler's hopes. 648 • Better still, it had anticipated them. 'The spirit of National Socialism comes from Hlinka', said President Tuka, 'its methods come from Hitler'. 'Slovakia', he said again, 'must be the vestibule of Paradise'. Racial laws were applied in Slovakia with the same rigour as in Germany, and the Government prided itself on administering 'the most anti-Semite country in the world'. Out of 89,000 Jews who lived there in 1939, there remained in January, 1944, according to official statistics, 20,000 (11,000 of whom had been baptised) and these, moreover, were destined to be eliminated, down to the last man. 'Slovakia was the first country to feel the beneficial effects of the great purification to establish a just world order'—this testimony from the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* speaks volumes as to the docility with which the Bratislava Government responded to Hitlerian control.

It is never difficult to attach a conception of the State— [208] however fantastic it may be—to historical antecedents. Slovak propaganda discovered 'positive elements' which justified the Government's policy. Its organ, the *Slowakische Rundschau,*[1] recalled that the Slovak State in its first form, the Great Moravian Empire, founded by King Svatopluk, had collapsed because it had proved incapable of collaborating in peace with the Holy Empire.

It was more difficult to reconcile the Hitlerian ideology with the principles of Christianity to which the people were profoundly attached (Slovakia is the European country in which the clergy are most in evidence in political struggles). This difficulty did not deter either the priest, Tiso, or his Government, who enjoy the doubtful credit of having, despite the Encyclicals, combined the teachings of the Church with the Hitlerian creed. This was a favourite subject for official speeches. 'The victory of Germany will be the victory of Christian principles', declared Mach, the Minister of the Interior, in his message for Christmas, 1943.

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[1] Of July 7, 1940.

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175 Needless to say, the masses of the populace saw in these absurdities nothing but a blind submission to Germany. In August, 1944, the Germans physically occupied the country. The Government was reorganised; Stephen Tiso, President of the Bratislava Court of Appeal, replaced Tuka as President of the Council. His first act was to have recourse to the Germans to put an end to the increasingly threatening activity of the Partisans. On September 13 a National Council was formed which sent a message of fidelity to Benes. The latter replied, 'The Czechs and the Slovaks will give the State a new form, based on absolute equality of rights and on a spirit of democracy and fraternity'.

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175 Croatia presents, from the historical point of view, a quite different personality. She prides herself on having safeguarded her juridical individuality through a thousand years, under régimes of personal union and under the rule of foreign sovereigns. The clique which, thanks to the collapse of the Yugoslav State, took the power into their own hands and proclaimed the independence of the country on April 10, 1941, was composed of revolutionaries, most of them *émigrés*, grouped since 1929 in the *Oustachi* (insurgent) organisations, by Ante Pavelich, who revived the Croatian Law Party dissolved in 1918, and was the instigator (with Italian and Magyar accomplices) of the crime which led to the death of King Alexander and of Louis Barthou.

The new 'Independent State of Croatia' (a term calculated to imply that the Croatian State had existed without independence) was represented by the crown of King Zvonimir, who died in 1089—a feature borrowed from the constitutional *mystique* of Hungary, which personifies in the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen the union of people and monarchy.[4]

The ideology of the new régime was reduced to negative elements—a struggle against Orthodoxy, Liberalism, Democracy, Freemasonry, Judaism, and Bolshevism, hitherto combined, according to the official propaganda, 'under the false geographical label of Yugoslavism'. It thus claimed to renew the tradition

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[4] The new Kingdom of Croatia had a population of 7,080,000 inhabitants, as follows: Croatia, 5,000,000, Serbs, 1,500,000, Hungarians, 70,000, and Slovenes, 37,000. It covered an area of 71,958 square miles.

which had made of Croatia the bulwark of Christianity (*Antemurale Christianitatis*). 186* 175

But, while Slovakia was the testing-ground of Germany's 'European' conceptions, it was from Mussolini's Italy that the Croatia of Pavelich took her watchwords.[5] It was to Mussolini that Pavelich, condemned to death by the Aix-en-Provence Assize Court, fled for protection. It was in the Doges' Palace in Venice that Pavelich signed Croatia's adhesion to the Tripartite Pact on June 15, 1941. Moreover, the 'oustachi' had not awaited the arrival of the Germans and the Italians before rallying to the Axis. The first step towards adhesion to the Tripartite Pact dates from the interview which took place in January, 1940, between Pavelich and Count Ciano, in the latter's home. 175 648 •

Moreover, the independence of the new State had, from the time of its constitution, been seriously mortgaged, for the Duke of Spoleto, son of the late Duke of Aosta, was to reign over it, with the title of Tomislav II. However, he never appeared in Croatia, and notified his abdication on August 27, 1943.

Italy had counted on Croatia to play the same role in the Balkans as Germany had assigned to Slovakia in the Danube Basin—that of a testing-ground for the New Order. 'Croatia represents the touchstone of the system which the Axis Powers wish to establish in Europe'.[6] As soon as it came to power, the pro-Hitler minority which governed by terror at Zagreb (or at Bania-Louka) had, in the name of racialism no doubt, abolished the word 'Slav' from their terminology. In the propagandist work (*The Croats*) published in Zagreb in 1943, we read (on page 75) that the Croats are of Iranian stock and 'derive their origin from the ancient cradle of the best European races in the Caucasus', while on page 78 we learn that Professor H. M. Chadwick's theory 'completes and corroborates the thesis concerning the Gothic origin of the Croats'. No doubt these two opinions are somewhat contradictory, but the Gothic connection was calculated to rejoice the hearts of the theorists of Nordic pre-eminence. Pavelich himself declared to a German journalist that he wished the German origin of his nation could be proved 186* 175 countries and bring peace and liberty to men'. In the following 186* September the Slav delegates to the Washington Congress of 668 anti-Fascist Students passed a resolution calling upon their Anglo-American comrades to bring pressure to bear on their Governments with a view to opening a second European Front. In April, 1943, the Central Committee of the Congress of Slavs in America, sitting at Chicago, declared that if efforts were not made to crush Germany quickly, 'there will be nothing left to liberate but cemeteries'. They organised a 'Panslav Day' for June 22, and demanded the re-establishment of free circulation for Slav newspapers in Brazil.

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[5] The Croatian National Socialist Party amalgamated with the 'oustachi' movement on July 13, 1941. 648

[6] Broadcast from Radio-Rome, April 27, 1942.

Needless to add, there were reactionary or dissident movements, and certain Slav groups maintained contacts with the pro-Axis Governments, or pursued an anti-Soviet policy.

Their case was raised at the Congress of Slavs in America, which was held in Pittsburg on January 24, 1944, and was attended by seventy-five delegates from New York, Buffalo, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Saint-Louis, and even from Canada. This Congress studied reports on the activities of a hundred local committees during the year 1943. The chief subject for discussion was the attitude of the Committee of Americans of Polish Origin, of which Colonel Matuszewsky was the head, and of their newspaper, *Nowy Swiat,* which was unanimously censured. Then the Congress applauded a resolution approving Roosevelt's war policy as well as the Teheran, Moscow, and Cairo agreements. A second meeting was held in Pittsburg on September 23 and 24. Like the previous one, its chief object was to create a 'Slavonic electoral front' in favour of Roosevelt's candidature, to speed up the American war effort,[1] and to combat the action of the Matuszewsky Committee, a Polish breach in Slav solidarity. (The Congress of Americans of Polish Origin held in Buffalo in the preceding month had included this action on its agenda.)

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A few months earlier, the Poles in America had been deeply 648 moved by a strange episode, the journey of Father Stanislas 793 Orlemanski to Moscow. This unassuming priest, of Polish 159

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[1] The sale of bonds for the Fourth American War Loan by the Slav Committee of New York served to build, among other things, a bomber, 'The New York Slav', and a chaser, 'Spirit of Stalingrad'.

648 793 159 origin, was in charge of a little Massachusetts church, the Holy Rosary, in the diocese of Springfield. Was he first sounded, and then invited to Moscow, as he himself was to allege, or did he improvise a mission? The facility with which he moved about in Russia, at a time when travelling was subject to severe restrictions, argues in favour of the former hypothesis. He was absent from April 17 to May 11, 1944, the object of his journey being, according to him, 'to see what he could do for the Catholic Church in Poland, Ukraine, and White Russia'. On his return he declared that he had twice been received by Stalin, and had obtained from him assurances, both verbal and written, in favour of religious liberty on Soviet territory. 'Future events will prove', he said, 'that Marshal Stalin nourishes very friendly sentiments towards the Roman Catholic Church. He wants a really democratic, independent Poland, capable of defending herself against any fresh aggression. The religion of the Polish people will be that of our ancestors; he will not tolerate any change. All he asks in return is a Poland animated with fraternal feelings towards the U.S.S.R.'.

Four hours after Father Orlemanski's return home, his bishop imposed the penalties provided for cases of unauthorised absence; he was forbidden to say Mass. After an attempted protest to the Apostolic Delegate in Washington, he submitted and solemnly promised never again to meddle with matters outside his priestly functions, upon which the bishop raised the interdict pronounced against him.

648 793 159 208 But his journey nevertheless aroused tremendous interest. The Soviet Radio called it a 'great international event', and the press published Orlemanski's declarations in full. As there are very few Catholics in Russia proper, the assurances given by Stalin referred especially to the liberated territories of the Ukraine and of Eastern Poland. The Tass Agency, emphasising the reality of these assurances, accused (though in moderate terms) the Hierarchy of the United States of having, in this matter, adopted a not very favourable attitude towards the Soviets. Whilst the *Christian Science Monitor* expressed satisfaction at the Orlemanski mission, and did not doubt that the Vatican would take advantage of the conciliatory attitude of the Soviets, the *Chicago Sun* placed its trust in the Catholic clergy's common sense to reject 'the poisoned advice of the agitators',

seeking to encourage the Church in her traditional opposition 648
to the Soviets. But the *Post Dispatch* regretted that the Kremlin 793
should have chosen such an unimportant person as Orlemanski 159
for such a demonstration. The *Louisville Courier* deplored the 208
censure passed on this priest by his bishop; no doubt the latter tolerated disparagement of the Soviet Union, but not efforts to understand it.

The truth seems to be that Father Orlemanski's initiative, whether concerted with Moscow or not, aroused in Slavonic circles reactions calculated to handicap the Government and prejudice Roosevelt's electoral campaign. While the Slavonic Committee of America approved this initiative, the *émigré* Poles threatened to launch a campaign which would have brought Washington and Moscow into opposition. It happened that Orlemanski's superiors were of Irish origin—which, obviously, did not predispose them to regard his journey with a favourable eye. In any case, the episcopal decision and the priest's submission cut short any attempts at propaganda, thus rendering a very opportune service to the Government, but postponing or compromising the perspective of a possible easing of the situation, if not of a *rapprochement* between Poland and the Soviets, and between the Soviets and the Vatican.

In Latin America the headquarters of the permanent Slav 186*
Committee were at Montevideo, where, in April, 1943, three 668
hundred and ninety-four Slav delegates assembled at a Congress which established the Union of Slav Nationals (they were estimated at two millions), to organise the struggle against pro-Hitlerian activities.

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This sketch of the recovery of the Slavs in the Old World 186*
and the New brings out two features: the gravitation of all the Slavonic nations round the Muscovite colossus, and the repugnance of a sector of Polish opinion to this method of regrouping.

As was to be anticipated, German propaganda affected to see 186*
in this the execution of a plan tending to 'Bolshevise' Europe, 648
and even America. Germany again launched her old common- 723
places about the inferiority of the Slavs. A Radio-Paris broadcast (February 21, 1943) assured listeners 'that about one-quarter of the American population is composed of Slavonic elements, of

186* Negroids, and of Jews, and that this degeneracy warrants our
648 suspecting American morals'. Remarks which were not very
723 flattering for the Slovaks, the Croats, and the Bulgars, whose
Governments were still allies of the Axis. 'Naturally', Radoslavov, a Bulgarian minister was to say, 'we belong to the Slavonic race. But we are, first and foremost, Bulgars. We act in accordance with our own interests and not with the interests of the Slavonic peoples in general'. And the *Zora,* of Sofia, went one farther, reproaching Stalin, a Georgian, who had always rejected racial concepts, for posing as the head of the Slavs, and for rallying to racial theories. 'With God's help', this paper concluded, 'the Soviets will never be able to overthrow the Eastern front'.

Other objections kept polemical discussions alive. M. Benes one day expressed to the Czechoslovak Council his desire to see Poland 'independent, democratic, and friendly', joining the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement. 'This', he said, 'would mean the definite settlement of all the differences outstanding between our three countries and would assure their future by guaranteeing peace in this part of the globe; Germany would never again dare to start a world war'.

186* This declaration aroused unfriendly or sceptical comments
829 in part of the Turkish press. For a long time that press had been
204 watching the development of the Slavonic orientation in Soviet
policy. 'The new Panslav movement', the officially-inspired *Ulus* had said, 'will be followed with the greatest attention, especially by those non-Slavonic nations which were formerly the object of that policy'.[9]

This time it was the *Tanin* which asked why, since the expression 'Pangermanic Imperialism' applied to the union of Germans, that of 'Panslavonic Imperialism' should not describe the union of Slavs? An article in *Pravda,*[10] an obvious reflection of Moscow's ideas on Slav solidarity, refuted this assertion at great length. The Soviet leader-writer recalled that, for a thousand years, the history of Eastern Europe had been that of the defence of the Slavonic peoples against the German invader. 'The historical atmosphere has changed', he said, 'but the object of the German conquerors is unchangeable—to separate the Slavs by force'. There were, he added (for the benefit of the

[9] August 13, 1941.
[10] February 19, 1944.

Turkish journalist) some people in Eastern Europe who would 186*
like to return to the old policy of oppression of the Slavonic 829
peoples. . . . The new friendship among these peoples, related 204
to each other and bound by century-old ties of a common culture, was being tempered in the crucible of the war of liberation. . . . Their *rapprochement* would displease none but those who dreamed of seeing them dominated once again'.

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The Orlemanski affair has shown us an attempt at Slav 186*
solidarity in the domain of religious tolerance. In the same 659
order of things, but this time in connection with the Orthodox 796
Slavs, we cannot omit to mention the deep impression produced by the restoration of juridical personality to the Russian Orthodox Church (September, 1943) and the elevation of the Metropolitan Serge to the office of Patriarch, abolished in 1721 by Peter the Great and which enjoyed a brief restoration in 1917. With its hundred and fifty million followers, the Orthodox community, placed at the cross-roads of the war, was undergoing one of the most tragic crises in its history. Its suffering was all the more serious, inasmuch as the Orthodox Churches are organised on national lines, in contrast to the hierarchical unity of Roman Catholicism. These churches are bound together by identical doctrine and canons. But, in the course of the centuries, they have progressively relaxed the bonds of dependence which used to attach them to the Œcumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Religious autonomy has advanced side by side with the emancipation of the nationalities. In restoring the rights of the Church, Stalin not only indicated his desire to reawaken the traditions of Russian national life, within the framework of a social renovation; he also tightened the historic bonds between his country and the Balkan nations of the Orthodox religion, thus reinforcing, by new spiritual affinities, sympathies founded on community of race, of oppression, and of destiny.

Germany tried to foil this policy by summoning to Vienna, 648
on November 5, under the presidency of the Metropolitan of 793
Belgrade, the Orthodox prelates adhering to the Axis cause, and 795
especially the Metropolitans of Berlin and of Paris, who declared the election of the new Patriarch to be null and void. This demonstration was of no effect; the vast majority of the Serbian, Rumanian, Greek and Bulgarian hierarchies either had nothing

● 648 793 795 to do with the protesting prelates,[11] or openly dissociated themselves from their attitude.

771 626 795 By way of retort, the first number of the *Moscow Patriarchy* published a message from the Council of Russian Bishops, assembled for the election, inviting Christians to pray for the victory of the Red Army and the fulfilment of the scriptural text invoked by Alexander Nevsky: 'He who strikes with the sword shall perish by the sword'. On September 8, this same Council had excommunicated 'as adversaries of the Cross of the Lord, all who have been guilty of treason to the common cause of the Church and gone over to Fascism'; the bishops and clergy guilty on this head were removed from their sacred office.

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186* 563 To conclude, the only obstacles to a general reconciliation of the Slavonic peoples came from the Poles. To summarise here the vicissitudes of Soviet-Polish relations since the pact of December, 1941, would mean not only relating the most stormy chapter in the Allies' war diplomacy, but also recalling the relations of the various groups among the Polish exiles, the antagonism between the London Committee and that of Lublin, the frontier problem, and also the perhaps more tragic problem of the political, religious, and social concepts on the basis of which the Polish State was to be re-born. Once again it was made very clear that Poland occupied a place apart on the map of the Slavonic world, and formed an obstacle to the realisation of full Slav solidarity.

727 177 Like the other Slavonic States, however, she had been caught up in the advance of the Russian armies sweeping across Eastern Europe—an onrush which settled the fate of the Slav nations, with or without their consent, as a consequence of their liberation. For three or four years Germany had been the second Slavonic power in the world. She had imposed on her Serbian, Croatian, Slovak, and Bulgarian satellites not only the horrors of the occupation, but also ideologies strongly opposed to their temperaments and their history; an impersonal and tyrannical idea of the State, a 'New Order' which was nothing but a hypocritical subjection, anti-Semitism which—with the exceptions of Poland and Imperial Russia—the Slavonic nations had always regarded
000 with horror. When the collapse came, all these nations turned

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[11] Among these, however, we must include the head of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Argentine.

[J. Poland - Analyst]

When the collapse came, all these nations turned
against an aggressor who had not only trodden their sovereign 186*
rights under foot, but even violated their consciences. The 648 •
Governments which had been at his beck and call were either 727
handed over to popular justice, or taken along with the baggage of the defeated army. On September 7, 1944 Bulgaria broke with the Reich; a few days later the Pavelich Government was dispersed; Slovakia gradually passed under the control of the partisans; Belgrade was occupied by the Tolbukhin army on the following October 20, the day that Tito liberated Ragusa. In the last few weeks of 1944 the map of war operations reflected the real political positions of the Slavonic world, based on Soviet victory. 'Fraternal union with Russia is one of the most deeply-rooted sentiments of the Slavonic peoples', declared King Peter of Yugoslavia in a communiqué dated from London on January 11, 1945.

Within this Slavonic world, relations were entering upon a 186*
new phase. They were ceasing to be a speculation of the learned 668
world, a poet's dream, a field for sentimental outpourings. They had become a reality of international life. The resisting elements in the Slavonic community had at first represented a complete range of specimens of the struggle against oppression—the Czech's masked militancy, the Poles' street-fighting, Serbian guerrilla warfare, Bulgarian terrorism. They had made contact, concerted their action. Early in 1945 it was possible to speak of a 'Slavonic Front', a thing unknown to history. Something had changed in the destiny of the Slavs. The representative of Pavelich's Croatia accredited to the Vichy Government was one day lunching with some French ministers. He went so far as to say, in an expansive moment: 'All the same, the time has come to give the Slavs their place in the sun!'

A very unexpected remark in the mouth of the envoy of an Axis Government, and, moreover, an envoy who had officially repudiated his ethnical ties.[12] It passed unnoticed by the guests, who were not very well acquainted with the historical laws of European evolution; but it revealed the depth and unanimity of the Slavs' faith in a revival of their fortunes as the result of the Second World War.

[12] It should be noted that the visit to France of Croatia's 'diplomatic' representatives seems to have inspired them with a clearer feeling of realities. The first of them, Kokotovich, went to Switzerland, whence he sent a letter to the French Foreign Minister, begging him not to pay any attention to what his successor did. Moreover, the latter, Krenik, joined Kokotovich in Switzerland a few months later.

[i. Slavonic nations - Analyst]

'Young Brigade', and by the predominance of the 'social' over 177
the 'political' and even over the 'national'. .64

This revolution was in the logic of events; was there any 177
need to invoke the ascendancy or the presence of Russia to .18
explain it? On emerging from an upheaval unprecedented in 181
their history, the little nations, stupefied by the blow and completely helpless, saw their recent past only as error or treason.

We cannot even reproach Russia with having bound up her action with a policy of patronage or aimed at an ideological synchronisation of the régimes born on the territories she had liberated. In Hungary, for example, she was very careful not to recreate the atmosphere of the time of Bela Kun, whose sinister memory, she found, was still alive.

But, in the Slavonic countries, the parties of the extreme 662
Left, almost everywhere identified with the Resistance, took advantage of the presence and the prestige of Russia in order to get into power and stay there. This led to a misunderstanding which, by associating the Russian authorities with the Governments which they were believed to favour, risked one day exposing the popularity of the Soviet Union in these countries to a turn in the tide of internal politics.

Obliged henceforth to gravitate in the orbit of the powerful 186*
Russian State, the Slavonic nations could not consider the future 829
from the same angle as they had done in 1918. At the conclusion of a devastating war, Russia would never again allow neighbouring States to serve as a diplomatic or military jumping-off ground for a possible adversary. She regarded them as her security ramp.

One might be tempted to see in this Muscovite hold over 648 •
Eastern Europe a revolution of an international order.. In truth it was a revolution only in relation to an abnormal state of affairs—that of the 1920–1940 period, which rested on Russia's inertia in Europe. It could not reasonably be expected that this state of affairs would last indefinitely. The Europe of 1945 was more logical than that of 1918—at any rate, more in conformity with the classic play of international forces.

The slogan of Slav solidarity, which formed the *leit-motiv* 186*
of the Moscow Congresses of 1942–1944, had galvanised and 668
co-ordinated the movements for resistance to the invader. In 000

mediatisation. In the past, Slavism had mobilised more feeling 186*
than will-power, animated more Congresses than Crusades. It 668
now reassumed the academic, 'poet and professor' form it had
exhibited a hundred years earlier.

So that Russia's first acts as a liberating power were 186*
not particularly Slavonic. In virtue of the ethnical principle, 668
exercised in her own favour, she annexed to the Ukraine 725
Carpatho-Ruthenia, which had been a Civilisation Front for another Slavonic power—Czechoslovakia. As far as Poland was concerned Russia drew the logical advantages of her victory. Poland's annexation of Prussia's Eastern Marches was simply compensation for the amputations she suffered in favour of the Ukraine and of White Russia. The support discreetly given by Moscow to the Bulgaro-Yugoslav claims on Aegean Macedonia reflected less concern for Slav solidarity than the desire to liberate the outlet from the Straits.

The award of the Teschen Basin, once more disputed between Poland and Czechoslovakia, provided Russia with a very delicate arbitration task, in which the necessity for compensating the sacrifices demanded of the Poles weighed more heavily than the memory of Czech fidelity; had not Czechoslovakia, for ten years, been considered as the 'aircraft-carrier' of Soviet military power?

In reality—and a large dose of ingenuousness was required in order to believe that it could ever be otherwise—the territorial changes over which the Russians presided were all inspired by Russian interests, in the historical and traditional sense of the word.

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Let us briefly recall the evolution of the Slavonic peoples 648 ●
immediately after their liberation. 175

Poland was, during the war, represented by a Government- [829]
in-exile in London, which negotiated with the Allies, to whom they gave valuable military assistance. In Moscow this Government was regarded as 'reactionary' and incompatible with a policy of good Polish-Sovietic relations. So it was constantly attacked by the Russian leaders and the Russian press.

As long as the war was conducted outside Polish territory, London and Washington classed this dispute with those that are

•648 175 only settled by being shelved. The English and the Americans were in a delicate position with regard to Poland; the former because it was difficult for them to forget that they had entered the war in order to safeguard Poland's independence, the latter because in the United States there is a large Polish emigration, whose electoral influence is by no means negligible. (It should not be forgotten that Roosevelt was the candidate of the minorities, the allogeneous groups, and the Catholics.)

But the entry of Soviet troops into Polish territory put an end to all hopes of postponing until the end of the war the solution of the dispute between the Polish exiles in London and the 'Association of Polish Patriots' set up in Moscow to tie the future of Poland to that of Russia. As in the case of the Baltic peoples, the Kremlin intended to deal only with a Polish authority constituted on her territory and consisting of members not suspected of any anti-Sovietic affiliations or tendencies.

Yet M. Stanislas Mikolajczyk, leader of the Peasant Party, who, on July 5, 1943, had replaced General Sikorski at the head of the Polish Government in London, sought to gain time. The Soviet press conducted a violent campaign against him and his collaborators, representing them as survivors of a retrograde Poland, the inheritance of the 'Colonels' Government', and as reincarnating the anti-democratic, anti-Russian tradition of Pilsudski.

On the day when Radio-Moscow announced the entry of the Red armies into Chelm, the communiqué was followed by the Soviet anthem, then the Polish. From this entry of the Reds into Poland dates the formation, on Russian-occupied territory, of the 'National Liberation Committee', whose first act was to repudiate allegiance to M. Mikolajczyk's Government. Thenceforward there were two Polish authorities.

642 175 The National Committee issued a manifesto to the 'People of Poland', announcing that in the Committee was invested the 'sole legal authority' existing in Poland, since it was actuated by the spirit of the democratic constitution of 1921, whereas the London Cabinet had resulted from the authoritarian constitution of April, 1935. The Committee considered itself, thenceforth, as the sole provisional legal organ of the executive power; moreover, this claim was supported by a Soviet communiqué announcing that the administration of the Polish territories

6: Mounet H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16

occupied by the Russian armies would be entrusted to the 642
Committee. 175

It will be noticed that in both documents the word 'Govern- 648 •
ment' was avoided. No doubt that explains why neither London 175
nor Washington received notification of the establishment of this 578
new organism. But the Poles in London reacted indignantly. For them, this new institution was juridically valueless and, in practice, without authority. They declared that out of the fifteen members composing this Executive Directory seven were unknown, while eight were notorious Communists. The President, M. Osubka-Morawski, was a thirty-five year old workman, excluded from the Socialist Party in 1940 on account of his affiliations with Moscow. They therefore asked London and Washington to disavow these 'usurpers'.

Russia's might, and the role of the Soviet armies in the joint military effort, scarcely permitted an unfriendly attitude in regard to an initiative to which the Soviets had already given their sanction. London had not, for years, 'hedged' over misunderstandings which set the London and the Moscow exiles at loggerheads, only to take a final decision just when the Russian armies were achieving advances which left their allies far behind. So London simply announced that Great Britain continued to recognise M. Mikolajczyk's Government, whilst hoping that it would find some way of coming to an agreement with the organisation which had been set up in opposition to it. In the United States, where the Polish question caused very violent discussion during an election year, Mr. Cordell Hull entrenched himself in the silence which was his usual refuge when he was questioned concerning Eastern European problems.

In view of this negative attitude on the part of London and Washington, M. Mikolajczyk decided to seek an interview with Marshal Stalin. He went to Moscow, accompanied by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Romer. But his interview only served to make him realise the insurmountable prejudices which Soviet circles cherished against the London exiles.

Yet the Allies could not allow the Polish question to remain in this state of uncertainty just when a general settlement of the war was within sight. So this question was included on the agenda of the Crimean Conference in February, 1945. The Three Powers decided that the evolution of the international

•646 situation necessitated the creation of a new Polish Provisional
175 Government on a wider democratic basis than that which had
578 governed the establishment of the organism which functioned in the liberated regions of Poland (first the Lublin, then the Warsaw Government). M. Molotov and the ambassadors of Great Britain and the United States received a mandate to carry out this reorganisation in conjunction with the members of the Provisional Government and the Polish democratic leaders both in Poland and abroad. This new Provisional Government would, as soon as circumstances permitted, organise free elections with a secret poll.

The Yalta decision provoked a split in Polish circles in London. The Government-in-exile, at the head of which M. Arciszewski had replaced M. Mikolajczyk, declared that neither that Government nor the Polish nation would recognise the decision; but M. Mikolajczyk and the Peasant Party, the majority of the Christian Democrats, and nearly half the Socialists, immediately signified that they would have nothing to do with this uncompromising attitude.

On April 21, 1945, whilst awaiting the application of the Yalta decisions, the Warsaw Polish Government, presided over by M. Osubka-Morawski, signed a treaty of friendship and mutual aid with the Soviet Government. This confirmed the Russian point of view, according to which the Warsaw Cabinet remained the nucleus of the future reconstructed Government. 'This reconstruction', said Marshal Stalin in a declaration to *The Times*, 'will have the effect of favouring a policy of friendship towards the Soviet Union instead of a policy of a "sanitary cordon" directed against her'. Moscow remembered the experience of 1919 and the 'barbed wire fence'.

At Yalta, the desire for prudence by which Mr. Roosevelt was inspired meant that the procedure in connection with the enlarging of the Polish Government was left very vague. Hence Mr. Hopkins' mission to Moscow in order, among other things, to set this procedure in action. As the result of the Stalin-Hopkins interview, a Soviet note was sent on June 13 convening in Moscow the Three Power Commission and the representatives of the Warsaw Government, together with the Polish leaders abroad.

The forwarding of this note had been speeded up in the hope

of enabling Poland to be admitted, at least *in extremis*, to the 648•
San Francisco Conference. For as the result of London and 175
Washington's refusal, on April 18, to allow an invitation to be 578
sent to the Warsaw Government, it looked as though Poland, the first victim of German aggression, might be absent from the discussion of the statute destined to preserve the world against the recurrence of similar attacks.

The invitation found the London Poles divided. Of the three organisations invited, M. Mikolajczyk, ex-President of the Council, and M. Stanczyk, Vice-President of the Central Executive Committee of the Polish Socialist Party, accepted; M. Witos declined the invitation on health grounds, and M. Zakowski, the representative of the Socialist Party, reflected the discord which had apparently developed in that party by refusing to join the delegation.

The trial of sixteen Poles who had been detained in Moscow 687
for several weeks, charged with sabotage and anti-Soviet activities, 661
interfered with the negotiations. In vain did the Poles in 175
London try to secure their release, by emphasising the role these men had played in the Resistance; Marshal Stalin declared that the Conference must not prevent the trial from taking place. At the hearing certain of the accused pleaded guilty to acts of terrorism directed against Soviet troops, and attributable to the *Armija krajowa* (Armed Forces of the Interior), which had been recognised on the previous August 30[1] by the English and the Americans, and to a political organisation called *Niepodlegosc* (Independence). The verdict returned on June 21[2] was mitigated; the chief offender, General Okulicki, was condemned to ten years' imprisonment, while the remaining accused were either acquitted or received very light sentences.

The objects of this trial, synchronised with the Conference from which, on principle, was to come the reconciliation of the Warsaw Poles and the London Poles, seem to have been as follows. Firstly, to discredit the leaders of the Government-in-exile and their staffs; secondly, to give (by the verdict) an example of the Russians' spirit of moderation; and thirdly, to emphasise their unshakeable determination to put an end, once for all, to anti-Soviet propaganda on Polish territory.

So the agreement reached on June 23[2] found the atmosphere 648
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[1] [1944 -- Analyst]
[2] [1945 -- Analyst]

648 175 cleared, and awakened a reasoned optimism in English and American circles.

642 175 Twenty-four hours after the arrival in Warsaw of the Poles invited by Moscow to join the new 'National Unity' Government the former Osubka-Morawski Cabinet resigned, and was reconstituted with the addition of these elements representing the exiles or the home Resistance movements.

The new Government included representatives of the Communist Party (which were not, as the London exiles maintained, in the majority) as well as of the Socialist, Peasant, and Democratic Parties. For the greater part it was composed of the ministers who had resigned from the Warsaw Cabinet. It kept at its head the ex-President, Osubka-Morawski, supported by two Vice-Presidents, MM. Gomulka and Mikolajczyk.

At the same time, the composition of the National Council—a sort of pre-Legislature—was also modified. Its Presidium, which played the role of provisional Chief of State, was under the leadership of M. Bierut, a Communist, who was, however, given two Vice-Presidents—M. Witos, leader of the Peasant Party, and Professor Grabski, National-Christian.

This Government declared that the first question on its agenda was that of repatriation of the Poles still residing abroad.

648 175 As soon as the formation of the National Unity Ministry was known, the British authorities negotiated with the former exiled Government in London, with a view to its prompt dissolution.

[578] But on June 25[1] the Government-in-exile published a declaration, affirming that it refused to acknowledge any transmission of power, and proclaimed the new Warsaw Government to be 'illegal'. At the same time, it issued a manifesto to the Polish people justifying its attitude of protest, and declaring itself willing, as far as the fate of the country was concerned, to abide by a free election.

On July 5 London recognised the new Provisional Government, already approved by Moscow and Washington. This meant a break between the British authorities and the Cabinet-in-exile, which England had for so long supported and encouraged. The B.B.C. ceased to broadcast Polish programmes, and the various services installed in London were invited to wind up as quickly as possible.

[1] [1945--Analyst]

The English press greeted this news philosophically, emphasising the fact that recognition was subject to the promise of free elections as soon as Poland's material situation would allow. 208 829

Isolated protests were made; as, for example, that of William John Rose, Professor at the School of Slavonic Studies in London, who wrote to *The Spectator*:—

'The solution adopted is the very one which was rejected by our House of Commons—the co-option of a minority of Poles from London and from Poland to a majority of Lublin Poles, the latter occupying all the chief posts.

'Great Britain and the United States have recognised this Government without any precise information having been given regarding the elections and their nature, though they were the condition on which recognition was granted.

'The renouncing of the principles for which the Allies fought for six years is deplorable. Whatever may be its significance for Poland, it is humiliating for the Western democracies. Obviously, we have an excuse; we are busy with our own elections. Unfortunately, however, while we were inactive others were not. What has become of the anger shown by Mr. Eden and M. Stettinius when M. Molotov exploded the "bombshell" (to use the expression of nearly all the journalists) concerning the fate of the Polish politicians?'

In Washington Senator Vandenberg declared to Mr. Grew, interim Secretary of State, that the settlement of the Polish question was inadequate and unsatisfactory for millions of citizens, himself included. 'This settlement does not appear to give a clear assurance that the Polish people will be able to express themselves freely under this Government, which is imposed on them by the Big Three, within the limits of frontiers likewise fixed by these same powers'.

In Moscow, on the contrary, the solution of the Polish crisis was considered as a victory for the democracies and a guarantee of European peace. The Soviet Government hastened to regularise its relations with the new State. On July 9[1] it signed a commercial treaty with Warsaw, in order to 'develop and consolidate to the utmost the economic relations between the two countries, in a spirit of friendship and collaboration'. 648 ● 175

[1] [1945--Analyst]

• 648 175 And, on August 15, Warsaw and Russia signed a treaty covering the frontier-delimitation of the two States, and war damages. M. Osubka-Morawski welcomed the agreements, which restored to Poland her 'historic frontiers' on the Neisse, the Oder, and the Baltic shore. For his part, M. Stanczyk, Minister of Labour, addressing the Polish troops, endeavoured to dispel their hesitation: 'The new Poland is free and independent. Naturally, in the event of a fresh aggression, Russia would be our ally, but the fact that her line of defence coincides with our western frontier has nothing to do with our independence. If you return you will find, it is true, plenty of work—but you will be working for Poland. That is why I advise you to return as soon as possible'.

162 175 In October, 1945, the President of the Polish National Council, Borislav Bierut, still estimated at six million—a quarter of the total population—the number of Poles remaining outside the national territory. This was a major obstacle to the carrying out of the undertaking given in respect of an early and conclusive election.

But it was not to be doubted that many Poles would, once more, prefer exile to returning to a country whose independence was hopelessly mortgaged.

186* Her geographical position, which condemned Poland to be dominated either by Germany or by Russia, had just fixed her destiny in the East. For a long time anti-Russian (and, since 1920, anti-Sovietic) feeling and ideas had been for Poland a political trend—and, even more, an axiom of international ethics. They had been considered as the fundamental criteria of patriotism—a sort of moral urge, the preliminary condition for the exercise of civic rights.

So that a new era was opening in the history of the Polish people. The previous one was called 'romantic', the present one being designated 'realistic'. But there was a deep-seated uneasiness in the soul of this nation, which—as her history has a hundred times borne witness—has never hesitated to rush into a catastrophe rather than restrain the impulses of a very sensitive patriotism.

186* 795 Poland's strong attachment to the Catholic Faith also opened up possible difficulties. It was natural that the partisans of an *entente* with Russia should be recruited in extreme-Leftist and atheistic circles. But the international crisis which swept the country was complicated by a religious crisis. This became evident when the Council of Ministers decided, on September 17, to denounce the Concordat, accusing the Vatican of having violated its clauses by the publication, during the occupation, of laws contrary to its engagements (an allusion to the nomination of bishops of German nationality in Posnania). 186* 795 [648] •

Poland had lost the liberty of choice which, for so long, had enabled her to seek her equilibrium between the Teutonic and the Russian world. Willy-nilly, she had to accustom herself to the new state of affairs; but she brought to the situation the germ of serious civil discord. And her exiles, maintaining a more than century-old tradition, were to keep alive, especially in Anglo-American and in Catholic circles, an atmosphere of opposition—not to mention the clandestine resistance, all the centres of which were not extinct in Poland itself. Our grandchildren will talk of the 'Polish Question' just as our grandparents used to do. [578]

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In her foreign policy Bulgaria has a 'spare ideology' which enables her to reverse her international situation according to whether she is at peace or at war. Thus she periodically takes her stand beside the Power which seems able to help her to realise her territorial aspirations. This is the effect of that 'Macedonian psychosis' of which we have spoken. But her evil genius has invariably inspired her to 'back the wrong horse'. 648 175

In the Second World War, she passed through three phases.

Feeling sure that Germany was invincible, but profiting by her previous disappointments, she first tried to gain Hitler's support at the lowest possible price. This was the period of so-called 'passive belligerency', limited to platonic manifestations—adhesion to the Tripartite Pact and to the anti-Comintern Pact.

But the Axis soon saw through this ruse. In April, 1941, it allowed Bulgaria to settle in Western Macedonia (Serbia) and in Eastern Macedonia (Greece). In return, it expected its troops to have right of passage through and of quartering in Bulgarian territory. Such was the *leit-motiv* of the three interviews which took place between Hitler and King Boris, between March, 1941,

• 648 175 and March, 1942. The Führer considered Bulgaria as his strongest card in the Balkans.

King Boris's Government capitulated, but ensured for itself a strategic withdrawal—the maintenance of its diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. This was the reverse of its 1917 policy, when Bulgaria, then at war with the Russians, kept her representatives in Washington. She was the only European signatory to the Tripartite and anti-Comintern Pacts who did not send even a token legion to fight on Russian soil. Are we to credit this fact to Slavism? In that case, we may liken it to the curious intimacy which during the war marked the relations between Croats and Bulgars: cultural agreements of October, 1942, periods of training spent by Croat officers in Bulgaria, contacts between labour organisations, etc.

The third phase of Bulgarian 'neutrality' opened with the bombardment of Sofia by the Americans (November 14, 1943), which showed the Bulgarians that their declaration of war on the United States was not the harmless operation they had expected it to be. 'Wretched Bulgaria!' Churchill was to say. Thenceforth the Sofia Government lost all hope of deriving nothing but advantages from the war. It entered into the struggle at the very moment when the fate of Germany seemed irrevocably settled.

This aggravation of the external situation coincided with an internal crisis.

King Boris having died on August 28, 1943, in circumstances which have not yet been cleared up, on September 9 following the Sobranje appointed three regents, who, on the 11th, took the oath to King Simeon II and the Bulgarian people. Thenceforward Bulgaria was not fighting simply to satisfy her ambitions, but to save her stakes. The difficulty was to redress the situation with the twenty German divisions stationed on Bulgarian soil, and all the country's strategic bases controlled by the Occupying Authorities.

The Allies reiterated their demands. On May 13, 1944, London, Washington, and Moscow launched an appeal to the Bulgarian people to dissociate themselves from a Government which was leading them to disaster. *Pravda* recalled the adage *Quos vult perdere*. It accused the Bulgarians of being 'the stranglers and executioners of their Slav brethren'. 'There is only one way', declared Stalin, 'for Bulgaria to avoid a catastrophe: to break with the Axis and withdraw from the war'. The population heard these warnings over the radio, and gave signs of daily increasing anxiety.

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Naturally, the most pressing—and the most effective—objurgations came from the Russians. Already, on April 17, 1944, Molotov had handed to the Bulgarian chargé d'affaires, Stamenov, a note enumerating the concrete examples of assistance given by his country to military operations against Russia, particularly in the Black Sea.

On April 24 the Sofia Government replied, in confused terms; against all the evidence, it denied the charges, and declared itself ready to verify any facts which the Soviet Authorities might bring to its notice. In addition the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chichmanov, protested his 'very sincere desire to maintain correct, loyal, and friendly relations with the Soviet Union'.

This duplicity deceived no one. The Moscow Government returned to the attack on April 26, proposing the reopening of the Soviet Consulate in Varna, which had been closed since the autumn of 1942, and the creation of fresh consular representations in Burgas and Roussé, to collaborate with the Bulgarian authorities in carrying out the verifications which the latter had just proposed.

Bulgaria adhered 'in principle' to these proposals, but made acceptance of them subject to the resumption of economic relations between the two countries—which was simply a way of postponing matters.

The Soviets showed up this manoeuvre; on May 15 the Sofia Cabinet drew up a reply, maintaining its attitude. But the Soviet notes took on a menacing tone; accusing the Bulgars of endeavouring to evade the issue, under cover of this constant postponement, the Kremlin demanded a final answer from the Bagrianov Government, which, on July 29, decided to give way on the question of the Consulates. Meanwhile the war had advanced more rapidly than diplomacy, and the military situation demanded a clear explanation. On August 12, Bagrianov was called upon to break with Germany. Once more he sheltered behind Bulgaria's 'absolute neutrality'. But he was negotiating secretly to get out of the dilemma. On August 25, the English

• 648 and the Americans were asked for an armistice. On the 29th he
175 announced the evacuation of Greece and Yugoslavia by his troops. And on the 31st an armistice delegation arrived in Cairo.

Too late! On the previous evening Sofia had received a Soviet ultimatum, involving the resignation of Bagrianov, who was replaced (on September 3) by Muraviev. The latter proclaimed his fidelity to the policy of so-called 'neutrality', but denounced the anti-Comintern Pact and dissolved the Legislature which had declared war.

This was not the reply which Moscow had expected. A last Soviet note, dated September 5, announced 'not only is Bulgaria at war with the U.S.S.R. but the latter in her turn will, henceforward, be at war with Bulgaria'—an unusual formula which made the latter country the aggressor and conferred a defensive character on the entry of the Tolbukhin army into Bulgarian territory.

This army occupied Roussé and Varna. Bulgaria then resigned herself to declaring war on Germany (September 8). Consequently for a few hours she was, theoretically, at war both with Russia and with Germany. But at 10 o'clock on September 9, four days after the declaration of war, the Soviet Command gave the order to cease fire. Shortly afterwards it was learned that Sofia had accepted the preliminary armistice terms.

The day before, a Government had come into power under Kimon Gheorgiev, leader of the political party called *Zveno* (The Link). He had been the instigator of the military *coup* of May 19, 1934, which had dissolved the Legislature and guided Bulgarian foreign policy in two directions—*entente* with Russia, and reconciliation with Yugoslavia.

To the new Government fell the heavy task of winding up its predecessors' disastrous policy which had, once again, placed Bulgaria in the camp of the vanquished. On October 28th the Government signed the armistice with the Allies, carried out executions on a large scale, and sought an immediate *rapprochement* with Tito. The *entente* between Bulgars and Yugoslavs, sanctioned by the agreement of October 9 between the Sofia Government and the Yugoslav National Liberation Committee, was facilitated by the solidarity which had been established,

during the last phase of the war, between the 'partisans' of the 648
two countries. This solidarity was increased by the ideological 175
affinities between the two régimes.

On September 15 the Russians made their entry into Sofia. The day before, Gheorgiev had issued a proclamation: 'The Homeland Front will place all its means and all its forces at the disposal of the Soviet Union and her great allies, in order to drive the Germans out of the Balkans. It will immediately do its utmost to establish *an indissoluble alliance with the U.S.S.R. and the new Yugoslavia,* and to form ties of sincere friendship with the great Western democracies, with the United States and with our neighbours'.

It was in her effort to reconcile the Russian 'alliance' with her democratic 'friendships' that liberated Bulgaria made her first blunder on the international stage. The Government had fixed the general elections for August 26, 1945. It was backed by a coalition of five parties (Communists, Agrarians, Socialists, *Zveno,* Radicals), forming the *Otetchestvenni Front* (Patriotic Front); which unleashed against its adversaries a violent campaign of persecutions. It did not seem, either to the English or to the Americans, that this régime represented very sound ideas of democracy. Evidently several members of the Bulgarian Cabinet shared this view, for in the month of August they resigned and went over to the Opposition.

It was then that the London and Washington Governments 648
advised Sofia that they could not recognise the régime that might 175
result from the elections, in view of the atmosphere of oppression 666
and constraint under which these promised to be held.

The Gheorgiev Government haughtily rejected this communication, while the press denounced the old 'colonial policy' habits, of which it bore the stamp. But to the general surprise it was learned, on the following day, that the elections were adjourned indefinitely. And a few hours later the President of the Council explained that the incident was due to a misunderstanding; that, in Bulgaria, democracy was of the 'Balkan' type, and that the chief thing for Bulgaria was to conclude a peace treaty by the quickest possible means. On the next day but one (August 27) the American Government agreed to the restoration of diplomatic relations and received the new Bulgarian representative in Washington, General Vladimir Stoïtchev.

• 648 175 666 The sudden volte-face on the part of the Sofia Cabinet was very easy to explain. Trusting entirely to Russian support, the Bulgarians had never for a moment doubted that Russia would consider the Anglo-American attitude as negligible. They therefore contented themselves with invoking the necessity of consulting the Inter-allied Control Commission, in which the Soviet representative's influence was predominant. Judge of the Government's surprise on learning, from the mouth of that representative (General Birousov), that the Commission had been unanimous in recommending the postponement of the elections!

They had been put off until November 18. The day before, the Washington Government renewed its warning of the month of August, to the effect that the conditions under which the election promised to be held would no doubt prevent it from considering the resulting Government as being the authentic expression of the 'popular will'.

It was difficult to know whether the American attitude arose from the conviction that the Bulgarian electoral law was less 'correct' than the Yugoslav electoral law, or whether the discrimination followed from the fact that Yugoslavia was an allied, and Bulgaria a vanquished, country.

But this time the Sofia Cabinet held out and the elections took place on the date fixed. They gave 75–85 per cent of the votes cast to the Patriotic Front, the Opposition parties having decided to abstain.

However, the Government wisely refrained from giving to this poll the appearance of a retort to the American veto. On the contrary, it advised Washington of its intention to enlarge the basis of the Government on democratic lines.

[829] It is certain that the rivalry between the Agrarians and the Communists offers prospects of internal crises. But, from the external point of view, Bulgaria's policy is fixed *ne varietur*. It will depend on Moscow's goodwill. The Bulgarian people, profoundly Russophile, will find little difficulty in accepting this new state of affairs. There is more doubt as to whether the same thing will be true of the leaders, who will always find it difficult to resign themselves to having only one card in their diplomatic game.

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186* The Slavonic problem presents quite a different appearance

in Yugoslavia, where it has two aspects: one external—that 186*
concerned with relations between Moscow and Belgrade, the other internal—the *entente* between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

The personality of Marshal Tito, who had the confidence of 648•
the Russians and was the animator, first of resistance to the 175
Germans, then of the liberation movement, considerably sim- 578
plified the question of relations between Yugoslavs and Sovietics.

Before the soil of Yugoslavia had been liberated, a Government-in-exile (presided over, at the end, by Dr. Ivan Choubachich) continued to function in London, whilst in Yugoslavia Marshal Tito directed the war of liberation. During the winter of 1944–1945, King Peter II tried to bring about an agreement between Tito and the exiled Government. Various obstacles retarded the conclusion of the agreement, and they were later on to paralyse its enforcement.

These obstacles included the conduct of the King during the 643
war. He was reproached with having lived far removed from his 175
people and with not having imitated the example of his grandfather, King Peter I of Serbia, who in 1876 under the name of 'Peter Mrkognich', led a detachment of rebels in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or his father, the Regent Alexander, who had fought in 1917–1918 on the Salonica front.

He was further reproached with his inopportune marriage, contracted far away from the country, and against the advice of his friends and counsellors. On March 21,[*] 1944, at the Yugoslav Embassy in London, he had married Princess Alexandra of Greece, who, on July 17 of the following year, gave birth to a son.

Now, in Serbia, dynastic loyalty is not (as in Croatia, for example) founded on any fundamental attachment to the monarchical idea. It exists simply in respect of the monarch's patriotic function—what the Serbs call *narodni rad* ('national work')—a name which takes on its full significance only in a country which is periodically reduced to slavery.

The authority of King Peter II was also weakened by the 725
support he had given to General Draja Mihaïlovich. The latter 648
had been the first to rise against the occupation, and his heroic 175
resistance had rallied the best elements of the old army in Southern Bosnia and in Montenegro. But he was reproached

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[*] March 20, according to Keesing (trans.).

725 •648 175 with 'Great Serbian' and 'reactionary' tendencies. Subsequently a much more serious charge was made against him; carried away by his struggle against the Communist elements, he was said to have parlied with the Occupying Authorites and with the agents of Nedich, the Serbian 'Quisling'. General Mihaĭlovich was nevertheless the War Minister *in partibus* to the London Cabinet, where the accusations brought against him were never seriously considered until Churchill[1] echoed them. They were the basis of the case brought against his partisans in July, 1945, and the severe sentence passed against them.

[829] Then there was, between the London Government and the 'Tito Movement', the psychological opposition between the exiled politicians (except those of Czechoslovakia) and the insurgents, who, remaining within the country, risked their lives day in and day out. The latter were inclined to see the 'London people' as theorists, if not profiteers of the Resistance, who, in assured comfort and relative security, carried out a paid task with the pen or by radio.

[668] Finally, Tito's partisans merged, in many cases, with the Communist or extremist elements, for whom the old Yugoslav political formations and their staffs embodied a régime of despotism, patronage, and reaction, whose return to power would have constituted an historical retrogression.

643 661 648 175 However, the break did not come immediately. Although King Peter agreed, under pressure from the Allies and especially from Russia, to disown Mihaĭlovich, he showed greater hesitation in negotiating with Tito, whose republican trend and attachment to the Soviet régime were well known.

On June 16, 1944, he resigned himself, rather against his convictions, to authorising Choubachich to sign an agreement with Tito, which provisionally safeguarded the rights of the Crown. On the following November 1 he agreed to the formation of a National Union Government in liberated Yugoslavia. But he reserved his approval as to the nomination of a Regency and the exercise of political power by one single party, the National Liberation Front, until a Constituent Assembly should have met. On this point he even entered into conflict with his

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[1] 'General Mihaĭlovich, I regret to say, has gradually adopted a changed attitude, and certain of his leaders have parlied with Italian or German troops'. (Speech in the House of Commons on February 22, 1944.)

own Government, which he forced to resign. The Choubachich 643
Cabinet disregarded this and on January 23, 1946 published 661
a communiqué, according to which the sovereign would not 648 •
return to the country until a Constituent Assembly had 175
pronounced on the question of the régime. In his absence, the royal power would be delegated to a Council of Regency whose members would be chosen from the London Government and from the Tito Government.

On January 30 the King finally agreed to this formula, as recommended by Moscow, London, and Washington.

Then Choubachich went to Belgrade to agree with Tito on 642
the names for the new Government. Prolonged and painful hag- 175
gling resulted in the formation of the Provisional Cabinet on [695]
March 7,' in which Tito kept the Presidency and the War Ministry, while Choubachich assumed control of Foreign Affairs. A Serbian democrat, Milan Grol, and a Croat Agrarian, Choutei, entered the new administration.

Yugoslavia was to be reconstituted on a federative basis; the State itself officially took the name of 'Democratic and Federal Yugoslavia'. So the constitution of the 'Yugoslav' Government was followed by the formation of 'National' Governments, six in number—Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia. Care had been taken not to give this federal organisation a statute and frontiers, on account of the conflicts these would not have failed to provoke; the National Assembly would, in due course, decide upon the internal structure of the State.

It remained to be seen whether Tito would bring to the 000
management of affairs the eminent qualities of which he had given proof in the Resistance. Would history salute him not only as a detached figure in the epic background against which the tragedy of the Serbian nation is played, but also as a reconstructor of the State?

Born in 1893 in the Croat village of Klanyets, Joseph Broz 175
was the son of an artisan. He had known hardship in his youth, 643
and soon exhibited a revolutionary temperament. At seventeen he engineered a strike, and showed himself to be an agitator. It is said that he took his appellation of 'Tito' from the bishop of medieval Crete whose relics rest in the Church of St. Mark in Venice. Taken prisoner by the Russians in 1914, he took part

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175 643 in the Bolshevist Revolution, and distinguished himself in the attack on the Kremlin. He fought on all the Soviet fronts, from the Caucasus to Finland. He married a Russian, who died, leaving him a son of Soviet nationality (who, for his part in the defence of Moscow in 1941, was to win the title of 'Hero of the Soviet Union').

He returned to Croatia in 1924 and took his place as a militant in the Communist and Trade Union ranks. Arrested for illegal propaganda, he served four years' imprisonment. As soon as he was liberated he went to Paris, travelled in various European countries, and returned to France in 1936, charged with the organisation of the so-called 'railway' for supplying volunteers to the International Brigades in Spain.

When he learned of the capitulation of Yugoslavia in 1941, he returned to Zagreb and launched a summons for a general revolt. He had two interviews with Mihaïlovich, but the Communist and Proletarian ideology which he openly professed frightened the Serbian general—no basis for agreement was possible.

176 643 668 The Serbian rising began on July 7, 1941. On that day was constituted, in the region of Belgrade (the seat of the partisans' general staff), the first formation destined to embark upon the struggle with the invader and to continue it until he was crushed. Tito proved to be an irresistible organiser and 'live wire'; his influence grouped around him a veritable army, whose numbers increased daily, and constantly deprived the Occupying Authorities of food supplies and communications.[2] Starting with 35,000 men, Tito's army was to number 700,000 at the liberation. This epic is one of the most glorious pages in the history of the Yugoslav people—and they already possess not a few.

175 648 643 Not only did Tito enjoy the confidence of the Russians, who considered him as one of themselves, but he was in constant touch with the Allies. The first English mission reached him on May 27, 1943, during its fifth offensive. At the very end of 1943 Churchill placed his son with Tito, to assist him during the most

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[2] At Bihach, on November 27, 1942, he declared: 'Our country is enslaved, our people the victims of a fruitful terror. Barefoot, starving, bloodless, they are at the mercy of the occupiers and their acolytes. But their determination to live is unshakeable, because they believe in victory'.

critical hours of the campaign. The liberation army effected its 175
junction with the Russian Army during the final offensive, and 648 •
entered Belgrade with it on October 20, 1944. 643

The next day appeared a communiqué, issued as the result of the Moscow discussions, announcing the agreement of British and Soviet views regarding Yugoslavia, on the following basis:—

Union between the Royal Government and the Liberation Movement.

The right of the Yugoslav people to decide their own future constitution.

The United States Government gave its consent to these arrangements. Marshal Tito, who was in Moscow during the Conference, several times discussed them with Stalin and the Soviet leaders.

On April 11, 1945, Russia and liberated Yugoslavia signed 175
a treaty of mutual assistance and collaboration which preserved 648
their traditional policy of *entente*, as well as their united efforts against Hitler's Germany.[1] It formed part of the system of pacts concluded by the Soviet Union with Great Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia, to raise a barrier against any fresh effort on the part of German imperialism to threaten the liberty of the European peoples. The experience of the past, confirmed by this war, showed that in all German plans for aggression, the conquest of the Southern Slav countries was a step towards the domination of the Continent. The fact that Yugoslavia had awaited the year 1940 to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. had opened in South-East Europe a breach which had enabled the enemy to disintegrate Balkan solidarity and to force his way through to the Eastern Mediterranean. Hence Article 2 of the treaty provided for immediate and effective mutual assistance in the event of one of the parties being involved in military operations against Germany, if that country resumed her

[1] About the middle of December 1943, the Yugoslav Government, exiled to Cairo, and then presided over by Bojidar Pourich, had proposed to Moscow a pact of mutual assistance on the model of that which had been concluded between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic. The Kremlin declined this proposal. At that time Tito was, in their eyes, the sole authentic representative of the Yugoslav nation. On this occasion it was recalled that the Soviet Government had already, in the spring of 1942, raised the question of a pact with the Yugoslav Government in London; at that time it was the latter which had opposed a demurrer.

175 • 648 aggressive policy, or against any other State which might revive this policy, under any form whatsoever.

Backed both without and within by the might of Moscow, Tito's régime seemed to be irresistibly established.

Its[1] first care had been to renew its claim to the territories of which Yugoslavia had been defrauded immediately after the First World War. It raised the question of Trieste and its hinterland. The Yugoslav delegation in London warmly defended a case supported by detailed and absolutely pertinent documentation, based on ethnographic and economic considerations. But they were imprudent enough to allow it to be understood that they would lay claim to Aegean or Hellenic Macedonia—which was bound to alienate the goodwill of Great Britain. They also mentioned the exorbitant sum which they intended to demand from Italy by way of reparations—thereby upsetting the United States, from whom Italy was at the same time seeking material aid to help her out of her desperate financial situation.

642 661 175 Yet, to tell the truth, the distrustful atmosphere which grew up around the Yugoslav claims arose more directly from the form of government and the political principles established by Tito. Under colour of anti-Fascism, the régime exercised the same reprisals against all its detractors. It was accused of borrowing the methods of the totalitarian régimes; the Opposition said that it had introduced the word 'Democracy' into the name of the State in order to dispense with it in reality, as, in the past, Pavelich gave the name of 'Independent State of Croatia' to a political offshoot of the Axis. He governed, on Russian lines, a very sensitive nation, which perhaps had not a very 'Western' notion of democracy, but had always shown itself stubbornly attached to the external forms of its independence. Certainly Tito had succeeded in grouping around him zealous young men, who had been tested under fire and were indifferent to the juridical or constitutional rites which, in the West, accompany the exercise of liberty. Certainly, too, the Yugoslav National Front represented itself not as a single party but as a synthesis of all the various energies resolved to work for the restoration of public life.

656 204 625 Nevertheless to Anglo-American eyes the régime appeared to be a dictatorship. Was not its slogan—'No liberty for the enemies of liberty'—calculated to justify an administration

[1] [Tito's régimes--Analyst]

• 648 It is true that, on resuming possession of the liberated capital,
186 M. Benes affirmed his intention of remaining faithful to the ideas
175 of the new policy of union with the great Russian nation and
643 with the other Slavonic peoples. But such statements need reading in the context of his previous declarations.

Had not the President himself, in an article in *Foreign Affairs* (October, 1944), uttered a warning against any distorted interpretation of his words? 'We must not abandon our old method of evolutive adaptation and our old policy of balance between East and West. Our geographical position does not allow us to make a sudden change in this century-old policy'.[5]

A new fact had previously arisen, which was to turn the scale slightly in favour of Russia. This was the annexing of Carpatho-Ruthenia to the Ukraine. Czechoslovakia thus became one of Russia's neighbours; there arose between the two countries a community of strategic and economic interests, which modified the equilibrium of Central Europe. Benes had always said that Russia's non-participation in the 1919–1920 settlements had distorted the general view of that equilibrium. His judgement was proved correct—probably even more so than he anticipated. When, on December 12, 1943, he had signed the Czecho-Russian treaty of friendship and mutual aid, he had understood that liberated Czechoslovakia would be restored to her pre-1938 frontiers. But, at the time of the treaty on June 29, 1945, which, without any plebiscite or international consultation, transferred Ruthenia to Soviet sovereignty, M. Molotov had put forward arguments based on ethnography, linguistics, folklore, and history, to which Prague could not but submit. Moreover, had they been consulted, the vote of the Ruthenians would not have been in doubt. So Fierlinger, the Prime Minister, recognised that 'the time had come for Ruthenia to return to her homeland, the great Soviet Ukraine'. He forbore to add that she had been separated from it for a thousand years, and he passed over the heavy sacrifices that Czechoslovakia had made

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[5] Compare this declaration with the one Benes had made in February 1944, to the diplomatic editor of *Reynolds' News*: 'Our pact with Russia is a fundamental consolidation of the Czechoslovak Republic. And we consider that, at the same time, it strengthens our independence. . . . Our friendship with U.S.S.R. does not mean that we depend on that country; on the contrary, the pact institutes reciprocal collaboration with our State, which desires to live in real, sincere friendship with Russia, while safeguarding its full sovereignty'.

for twenty years in order to raise the economic standard of this 648 •
'Ukrainian Piedmont'. And in November, 1945, the National 186
Assembly, without any vain recriminations, ratified the transfer 175
of sovereignty. 643

In addition to all that, Czechoslovakia risked losing the Teschen Basin, occupied on October 2, 1938, by Polish troops, and still in dispute between the two countries. But, in the spirit of Slav solidarity (not of conquest) which had, in 1920, installed Czechoslovakia in Carpatho-Ruthenia, she was enabled to cast her eyes on that minority—Serbian or Sorabian or Wend—of Lusatia, whose 80,000 survivors still peopled 1,900 square miles between Bautzen and Cottbus. A Sorabian 'National Committee' was formed in Prague with a view to attaching this territory to Czechoslovakia. But had not the Poles, too, claims to put forward to this detached tribe of the ancient Slavonic community?

In any case, Czechoslovakia could not be reproached with having derived benefit from her fidelity to the Slavonic idea; although, in 1918, that fidelity had ensured for her the rebirth of her national life, in 1945 it brought her nothing but amputations. But was not the good grace with which she accepted the loss of her Eastern province (by a treaty in which M. Molotov saw 'a striking manifestation of the sincere friendship of the Slavonic peoples') a demonstration of her disinterestedness, and did it not prove that her Slavism was free of any expansionist or Chauvinist speculation?

On the other hand, in spite of some rather imprudent expressions on the part of M. Nejedly ('We belong to the great Slavic bloc, controlled by the Russian nation'), the Prague Government endeavoured to protect the individuality of the country from political or ideological domination. It repeatedly asked the Soviet Authorities to hasten evacuation of their troops. It lost no opportunity of protesting against allegations which represented it as a 'satellite' of Moscow. 'A good many people come here with the idea, which is quite unfounded, that the Russians control us', said President Benes to the World Congress of Students. 'The real truth is much simpler; there is no need to seek startling explanations for our decision to conduct our own business as we think fit'. As a more characteristic gesture, and one which requires no commentary, in October, 1945, he

● 648 sent to London a military mission under General Svoboda, the
186 Commander-in-Chief, to renew contacts with the British General
175 Staff, and to ask the latter to co-operate in the reconstitution of
643 the Czechoslovak Army.

In short, of all the liberated Slav nations, Czechoslovakia was the one which had most clearly marked out the contours of her independence in the New Europe. She accepted neither 'synchronisation' nor enfeoffment. Without disavowing either her Slavonic affinities or her traditional attachment to Russia, she restored her relations with the West to their 1938 footing.

[829] An intermediary State, Czechoslovakia is carving out her path between the Russian and the Anglo-Roman worlds; nearer to the former by her security reflexes and her views on the future of Europe, she is nearer to the latter by her spiritual unrest, her philosophy of life and her conception of progress.

* * *

186* The rapid tour which has taken us from Warsaw to Sofia and
829 from Belgrade to Prague is sufficient to clarify speculations
founded on the birth of a Slavonic 'Imperialism'.

Once again, it is official eloquence which has nourished these speculations. There was not a Polish, Czech, Yugoslav, or Bulgarian statesman who did not see, in the issue of the Second World War, the end of the curse which, for a thousand years, paralysed the expansion of the Slavonic world. Not one who did not celebrate the establishment and the benefits of an inter-Slav *entente*. Let us quote a few of these heroic declamations at random.

In the first rank was Poland—no doubt because this was the nation which, from the Slavonic point of view, had the worst memories to atone for. Commenting on the signature of the Polish-Sovietic agreement, the head of the Government of the Polish Republic regretted that his country had not, at the time of the German aggression, frankly taken her stand beside the Soviet Union, in order to form a 'Slavonic bloc'. 'This grave political error', he declared, 'caused a great deal of suffering to the Slavonic peoples and, most of all, to Poland'.[*]

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[*] **When, on July 15th, the new Polish Ambassador handed his credentials to the Regent of Yugoslavia, he alluded to 'Germany, the eternal enemy of the Slavs'. This was an undeniable historical truth; but how fail to recall, on hearing it invoked, the importunate shadows of Beck and Stoyadinovich?**

186* 829 create an indissoluble union of Slavs which will be a bulwark against the repetition of catastrophes similar to that of 1941'.[8]

On October 2, addressing a group of Polish journalists, Tito used the expression 'Slavonic era'. But this expression must be understood in a constructive, not an imperialist sense. 'United spiritually, the Slavs form a barrier against medieval [*sic*] ideas directed against culture and humanity. . . . The Slavs will bring peace and security to Europe'.

There were the same oratorical outpourings among the Bulgars. Kimon Gheorgiev's programme included 'a cordial friendship with the Soviet Union and an eternal friendship with the sister nation of Russia'. Nikolov, President of the Slav Committee in Sofia, also protested against the legend of Slavonic imperialism, but announced a 'union of the Slavonic peoples for the protection of their liberty and of their independence'.

[795] In the same spirit the Bulgars, walking hand in hand with Tito's Yugoslavia, affected an ostentatiously detached attitude to the question of Macedonia. They abolished the schism caused by the Exarchate, which had been created solely for the purpose of propaganda on behalf of annexation. Formerly the Macedonians were divided into Orthodox (Serbs) and Exarchists (Bulgars). Once this distinction was abolished, Bulgaria could, according to international circumstances, proclaim her disinterestedness or extend her claims to Macedonia.

• [648] The Slavonic Governments backed one anothers' reciprocal claims. Marshal Tito approved the Czech policy with regard to the Hungarian minorities; Poland and Czechoslovakia handed to the London Conference notes supporting the Yugoslav territorial claims, which ran counter to those of Italy. Bulgars and Yugoslavs conducted a joint campaign against Greece regarding Aegean Macedonia.

[668] There was another manifestation of this general fraternisation. A Slav Congress was held in Bratislava in July, 1945. It passed a motion favouring the conclusion of a regional pact of friendship and mutual aid among all the Slavonic nations. The speakers indulged in striking forecasts of the possible effect, in international life, of a bloc of 205 million Slavs, *i.e.*, one-third of the total population of Europe, covering two-thirds of its surface.

[8] Speech made at Bela Tsrkva on July 8.

Chapter Six

THE SLAVONIC WORLD AND THE PEACE TREATIES

186* 668 THE negotiation of the peace treaties, which occupied the whole of 1946, was both a testing-time for the solidarity of the Slavonic States, faced with international problems, and the period of their internal consolidation.

In an article published on February 3, 1947, by *Pravda,* the Russian Professor Voznesensky, Vice-President of the Panslav Committee, defined these two aspects of the post-war period for Slavs.

'The present Slav movement has no precedent in history. Our peoples have undertaken two main tasks. The first is the struggle against the traces of Fascism and the struggle for peace against political reaction. The second consists in a fraternal collaboration in the political, economic, and cultural domains, the bases of development and progress for any country'.

During this 'second phase' of the post-war period, demonstrations of Slav solidarity were to be based on two watchwords:—

(1) An almost ritual affirmation of gratitude and attachment to Soviet Russia.

(2) The external 'democratic' and 'pacific' aim of this solidarity—hence the strict avoidance of the words 'race' and 'bloc'.

In the diplomatic field the unity of view of the Slavonic peoples followed from an elementary postulate—the collapse of Teutonic power, a collapse with which their common security was bound up.

186* That is why, on April 25, 1946, the eve of the opening of
• 648 peace negotiations by the meeting in Paris of the Ministers for
728 Foreign Affairs of the four Great Powers, the Diplomatic Editor for the Moscow Radio, Yermachov, thought it well to recall that the struggle against Teutonism was the common denominator of the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. and of the other Slav peoples:—

'In liberating the Slavonic peoples, the Red Army has accomplished a mission of great historic import, for if they were not freed from the German yoke there could be no question of lasting peace in Europe. The relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Slavonic countries are based on common interests of defence against the revival of the German forces of aggression which have caused such prejudice to these peoples. And it is beyond doubt that their development on truly democratic bases constitutes the best pledge for peace in Europe'. 186* 648 • 728

On various occasions moreover, Russia, unwilling to place her cards on the table before her great Allies did so, was known to have her views on the German problem put forward by the Poles or the Czechs, while Yugoslavia, more combative or less wary, launched, now against the English now against the Americans, offensives calculated to put them on a false scent, diverting attention from the real objectives of the diplomatic moves.

In all the discussions raised by the peace treaties, at all the meetings of the United Nations and their Commissions, the Slav delegates voted with the Soviet Union or with its Republics, whether in matters concerning general problems (such as the right of veto or disarmament) or in national 'cases', such as the ban on Franco or the Greek question; so much so that it was always possible to forecast, as soon as a debate opened, which way these delegates would vote.

Conversely, where Russia did not herself inspire the claims put forward by the small Slav States, she supported them. She backed the Yugoslavs in the dispute between Rome and Belgrade regarding the fate of Trieste and Julian Venetia, the maintenance of the Polish-Germanic frontiers on the Oder and the Neisse, and the Bulgarian-Yugoslav offensive against the Athens Government.

Ideologically, the joint attitude of the Slav Governments rested on the theory that they alone were imbued with the real democratic spirit and that the Western Powers represented a survival of reaction and of *bourgeois* Liberalism. 186* 829

This naïve attitude is evident in the speeches of nearly all the Slav diplomats during this period of European reconstruction.

A Polish newspaper, *Robotnik* (of April 14, 1946), took a census of Slavonic strength on the continent of Europe:— 186* 162

186* 'How many do we number? In Poland, there is only one
162 single nation, the Polish nation, if we ignore the artificially "inspired" separation of the Kachoube branch, and the Hitler-invented "nation" of the Gourals; in Bulgaria, one single nation also, the Bulgarian; in Czechoslovakia two, the Czechs and the Slovaks. In U.S.S.R. three, Russians, Ukrainians and White Russians; in Yugoslavia five, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins and Macedonians. There exists, too, a Lusatian nation. In all, thirteen Slavonic nations'.

186* And the *Zycie Slowanskie* (Slav Life) attempted a numerical
161 estimate of this force:—

'The events of the Second World War have, of necessity, brought about displacements on such a large scale that an estimate based both on the pre-war census and on the theory of probability is liable to prove quite inaccurate. However, simply as a rough guide, we may work on the following table:—

1.	Russians	100,000,000
2.	Ukrainians	41,000,000
3.	Poles	25,000,000
4.	White Russians	10,000,000
5.	Czechs	8,000,000
6.	Bulgars	6,000,000
7.	Serbs	5,500,000
8.	Croats	4,000,000
9.	Slovaks	3,000,000
10.	Slovenes	1,500,000
11.	Macedonians	750,000
12.	Montenegrins	400,000
13.	Lusatians	200,000

In all about 205 millions'.

186* During this period the anthology of Slav solidarity was
•648 enriched with a number of striking official speeches, broadcast declarations, and editorials. Inter-Slav relations were organised on the basis of mutual aid pacts, such as those of March 19, 1946, between Belgrade and Warsaw, of the following May 10 between Belgrade and Prague (completed by both economic and cultural agreements) and that of March 7, 1947, between Prague and Warsaw.

ooo Solidarity between Slavs in Europe and those in America—

Solidarity between Slavs in Europe and those in America

among whom the attitude of a part of the population, Polish in origin, maintained a dangerous schism—was revived by a mission sent to Moscow, at the end of 1946, with M. Leon Krycky, Leader of the United States Panslav Congress, as its President; he was received by Stalin. The latter is reported to have declared to him that the Soviet Union and the United States were the only two countries capable of guaranteeing world peace. This was the outcome of the Third Congress of Slavs in North America (held in New York on the previous September 23), during which the meeting had cheered the name of Stalin and booed that of Mr. Byrnes, who had recently, in Stuttgart, made a speech reopening the question of Poland's western frontiers.[1] At this meeting the Polish delegate, M. Lange, emphasised the role the Slavs could play as permanent links between the United States and their countries of origin. But this American-Slav Congress failed in its task; prepared during the Roosevelt era, but actually meeting under the Truman administration, it functioned in a very different atmosphere from that which its organisers had anticipated. It was vigorously attacked by a section of the American press.

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After a preparatory Conference of the Panslav Committees, held in Prague in May, 1946, the first great post-war Panslav Congress took place at the Kolarats University, in Belgrade, from December 8 to 12 of the same year. It was attended by delegates from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, the Serbs of Lusatia, and the Slavs of North America.

Its organisers made very marked efforts to prevent the Congress from assuming the aspect of a demonstration of Slav nationalism. On the contrary, they emphasised the benefits which could accrue to the cause of peace and universal democracy from harmony among the Slav States. Consequently the agenda was restricted to very general questions, bound up with cultural propaganda and the struggle against Fascism. Alexander Gundorov, President of the Moscow Panslav Committee, and a veteran of these assemblies, declared that 'the Congress would reveal to the world the truth about the Slavonic peoples and destroy the lies propagated by reactionary circles

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[1] This Congress gave rise to a diplomatic incident, arising out of the refusal of the American visa to eight Yugoslav delegates who owed allegiance to the Communist Party. 648

A sceptic might have observed that, despite the oratorical 186*
manifestations of harmony and goodwill, three specifically Slav 668
problems which had arisen in 1919 still appeared on the agenda of questions at issue in 1946—the allocation of the Teschen Basin, the definitive status of Macedonia, the fate of the Lusatian Serbs.

Indeed, the Macedonian question does not seem to have been 563
finally settled by the creation of a Macedonian Republic within 578
the framework of the Yugoslav Federation. That is why, at the 648 ●
end of 1946, Yugoslav newspapers demanded the incorporation 175
of the Bulgarian districts (Petrich, Gornya-Djumaïa, Nevrekop) in the Popular Republic of Macedonia, and reproached the new Bulgarian constitution with submitting every project for the transfer of territory to the decision of the legislature—a step which Belgrade considered as a stipulation derogatory to the 'Macedonian minority's' right to self-determination.[2] In other words, in Yugoslavia the Macedonian population of Bulgaria was still considered as non-Bulgarian in character. Latent, but still discernible, it was the old quarrel which had, for half a century, set the two peoples in opposition to each other. It was recalled in the Sobranje on December 12, by an Agrarian Deputy, who asked the Government whether it did not consider the Yugoslav claims as an interference in Bulgarian Home Affairs. And early in 1947 a much-talked-of action brought at Skoplje plainly pointed to the survival of the famous ORIM (Macedonian Internal Revolutionary Organisation) directed by Vanka Mihaïlov—that organisation which had been so widely discussed at the conclusion of the previous war.

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[2] An action which the French Press Agency described (on January 27, 1947) as 'typically Macedonian' was brought against Albanians, Yugoslavs of Albanian or Turkish origin and 'real Macedonians', accused of having organised, in 1945, an illegal society—*National Chiptare Demokratia*—to overthrow the Albanian Government of Enver Hodja and set up a 'Great Albania', including a part of Western Macedonia, with Kossovo and Metova. The conspirators were in league with Mihaïlov's Revolutionary Committee—the famous ORIM (Macedonian International Revolutionary Organisation), whose hand had already been detected in a separatist Macedonian plot which had been judged in November 1946. In this plot was involved no less a person than Metodijé Andorov Cento, one of the most popular figures among the Macedonian 'partisans' and, up to the spring of 1946, President of the Macedonian Liberation Assembly. Cento was sentenced to eleven years' hard labour. Decorated by Tito, he was in opposition to the Government, criticising its Communist affiliations, and in conflict with Lazar Koulichevsky, Prime Minister of the Macedonian legislature. [668]

• 648 175 As for the question of the Polish-Czech frontiers, the Prague Government wanted a return to the pre-Munich *status quo*; it will be seen later that the claim to the Teschen Basin, occupied by the Poles since 1938, delayed the return to normal status in the relations between Warsaw and Prague.

As regards the Serbs of Lusatia (Wends and Sorbs), they sent petition after petition to the peace arbitrators, claiming a hearing and justice. They submitted two memoranda, one on February 1, 1946, to the United Nations, the other in the month of May, to the Four Powers Conference in Paris. They returned to the attack on July 6, to ask for the separation of Lusatia from Germany. They were invariably put off until the German problem should be discussed by the Conference. Czechoslovakia, who had already espoused their cause at the time of the discussion of the Versailles Treaty,[3] signified that she saw in their separation from the Reich a guarantee for her own security.

101 These Lusatians are the remnant of a large tribe which must formerly have been the vanguard of the Slavs on the march towards Bavaria. In the ninth century the country was erected into a principality. But, of all the Slavonic groups, this is the one which has encountered the least favourable conditions for the development of a lasting political unity.

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000 Now a few words on the evolution of the internal and external policies of each of the small Slav States while the treaties were in the negotiation stage.

642 175 On January 15, 1946, Yugoslavia voted her Federal Constitution, which set up the six People's Republics mentioned in the previous chapter. (The 'People's Republic of Serbia' included the two autonomous provinces of Voïvodin and Kossovo). Each of these republics sent twenty-five deputies to the Peoples' Council. They were sovereign States—except for the functions reserved to the central power (peace and war, internal security, basic legislation, currency, transport, postal services, radio, Customs, immigration, etc.)—*i.e.*, essentially in matters of education, public health, and social justice.

As in Russia, actual power lay with the Presidium of the Legislature, composed of thirty members, elected by the Assembly

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[3] See above, p. 41.

common with the Croatian Orthodox Metropolitan, Hermogene 793
Maximov, and the German Lutheran bishop, Popov). 687

Arrested on September 18, 1946, Mgr. Stepinac was tried, 175
on the 30th of the same month, not only on the charge of 659
intelligence with the enemy, but also of having, after the liberation, worked with the opponents of the régime. These charges (as well as that of having forcibly converted Orthodox Christians to Catholicism) were upheld by the judges, who condemned the prelate (on October 11) to sixteen years' hard labour, to the loss of his civic rights for a period of five years, and to the confiscation of all his possessions. In vain had the defence recalled the fact that Mgr. Stepinac had protested against the racial laws and collective reprisals, and that the allied press had, while the war was actually in progress, rendered homage to his courageous stand.[5]

Pope Pius XII, in a public speech, protested against this 829
verdict, denying the compulsory conversions—which, moreover, are contrary to canon law. And, although Tito had declared that the proceedings were by no means the prelude to a campaign against the Church in Czechoslovakia, Christian circles throughout the world protested against what they called a 'religious trial'. The 115 Catholic archbishops and bishops of the United States, assembled in Washington for their annual Assembly, described the verdict as 'an outrage on justice'. The Archbishop of Westminster declared that, during the war, 'in Croatia the only voice raised against Nazism and its works had been that of Archbishop Stepinac'.

The Vatican, in an unofficial note, recalled the Church's 793
sanctions against members of the laity sitting in judgement on 794
a bishop, or guilty of any act of violence upon his person; it 648 •
nevertheless continued to maintain its Nuncio in Belgrade—Mgr. Patrick Hurley, a priest of American nationality, who had entered upon his office at the beginning of the year. In October, 1946, it appointed a co-adjutor to the Bishop of Maribor and another to the Bishop of Ljubljana. (In the absence of a

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[5] A Catholic Agency announced, at the end of February 1947, that the President of the Croatian Government, Dr. Bakarich, was said to have invited the prelate to sign his appeal, giving him reason to hope that he might be liberated and, with American support, go abroad. Mgr. Stepinac refused, not wishing to leave either his people or his diocese.

793 Concordat in Yugoslavia, the Vatican proceeds directly to the
794 ● 648 appointment of bishops, without previous agreement with the
Government.)

648 Relations between the Holy See and Belgrade again became
175 strained when on January 31, 1947, Tito's Government handed
[659] to the Secretariat of State two notes, demanding the handing over of five Yugoslav 'war criminals', said to have taken refuge in the Vatican, and accusing the latter of having facilitated the escape to South America of other Yugoslav nationals, wanted by their country's police. The Pope denied these allegations, but added 'that he distinguished between those who were persecuted for political reasons, and criminals; to the former he gave every assistance in his power, without asking whence they came'.

Yugoslavia's external policy remained unshakeably based on Soviet support. 'The Slav peoples now look to Moscow as, after 1919, they looked to Paris; nothing is more natural', said a semi-official commentary on Tito's tour of Central Europe. Far from endeavouring to gain the confidence of the English and the Americans, whose co-operation a wise diplomacy would have sought, in order to bring their claims on Trieste to a successful conclusion, the Belgrade Government was continually in conflict with those powers.

Its relations with Washington were particularly chequered. On January 8, 1946, President Truman had declared: 'As regards Yugoslavia, recognition of the present Government is still subject to certain conditions'. (Moreover, he put Rumania and Bulgaria on the same footing.)

These 'conditions' were the assurance that the new Yugoslavia would recognise the existing treaties and agreements between the two countries (commercial exchanges, extraditions, naturalisations, etc.). Having obtained this assurance on April 18, he recognised Tito and appointed Mr. Richard Patterson ambassador in Belgrade. 'In granting diplomatic recognition', said the *Washington Post* next day, 'the United States are but looking unpleasant realities in the face'.

And when Sava Kosanovich, the representative of Yugoslavia, presented his credentials to President Truman, the latter said to him, with bantering courtesy: 'The United States are following, with interest and sympathy, the efforts of the Yugoslav people . . . to succeed, individually and in harmony with the United

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Nations, in realising the ideals of liberty and democracy which have borne the United Nations to victory'. The history of the relations between the two Governments proves, on the one hand, that in Belgrade very little sense of diplomacy was shown, and, on the other, that Washington was completely misinformed as to the realities of Yugoslav life.

The most serious incident was caused, in August, 1946, by attacks on American aeroplanes in the sky of Slovenia. On the 9th of that month an American plane, forced to land, had crashed; its occupants had been imprisoned by the Yugoslav authorities. On the 11th, the Belgrade Government had protested to Washington against repeated flights over its territory. On the 19th, a transport plane was attacked by a Yugoslav squadron and its five occupants were killed. Whereupon the State Department addressed to the Belgrade Government an ultimatum, demanding an explanation within forty-eight hours, failing which the Security Council would be informed of 'this offence against international law and the principles of humanity'. After having read the text of the ultimatum to the press, the American Ambassador added: 'Eighteen months ago, United States planes were awaited with impatience and greeted with enthusiasm; today they are shot down'.

The Yugoslav press insinuated that the United States had exaggerated the incident, in order to discredit the Belgrade Government in the eyes of the Peace Conference. That Government hastened, however, to release the American airmen as soon as it got wind of the ultimatum, so that this should be without motive by the time it was officially presented. It then undertook to forbid its squadrons to fire on foreign planes, in order to avoid such 'unfortunate accidents'. Nevertheless, on September 3, a fresh note from Washington expressed the surprise felt by the State Department at not receiving from the Yugoslavs either any expression of regret or any offer of indemnity. The Belgrade Government finally granted $30,000 to each of the families of the five airmen shot down on August 19, but refused indemnity for the lost plane, and maintained its attitude of non-responsibility for this 'accident'. America returned to the attack in a note dated Ocober 8, and the matter was only settled in the following month. On November 5 the dockers of the port of New York, who, as a

648 175 protest, had refused to load the boat carrying UNRRA supplies to Yugoslavia, received instructions from their Union to proceed with the loading.

648 175 661 Hardly had this incident been settled when a fresh one arose, provoked by the American notes of July 26, August 10 and 18, and October 18, denouncing the internment in concentration camps, without any legal steps having been taken, of 165 persons entitled to claim American nationality; ten of these, it was alleged, had died as the result of ill-treatment. The Washington Government 'expressed the deep horror it felt at such practices, which are a violation of the principles of international law regarding the protection of foreign nationals, which amount to instances of unwilling or forced labour, in disregard of the natural rights of human beings, and present no feature to distinguish them from slavery'. Belgrade replied that the persons concerned were members of the German minority, were formerly affiliated to the *Kulturbund*, and had formed part of the fifth column, under cover of a borrowed nationality. The Government agreed to liberate the non-Yugoslavs whose American nationality should be recognised by the United States Embassy, on condition that they should leave the country immediately if they were *Volkdeutsche*.

Yugoslavia, in her turn, lodged a complaint against the United States, when she demanded the return of her river flotilla, detained in the upper reaches of the Danube by the American authorities. The latter recognised Yugoslavia's rights to 161 vessels, but contested ownership of sixteen others. It was not until the beginning of November, 1946, that restitution was ordered.

Another incident—omitting the arrests or charging of American nationals or members of the United States Embassy staff suspected of spying[*]—was caused by the closing, on September, 26, 1946, of the American Information Bureau in Belgrade, accused of circulating information prejudicial to the safety of the State. In this matter, the State Department appeared to disapprove of the zeal of Ambassador Patterson; after an exchange of notes, the Bureau was reopened in the following month.

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[*] Especially in January 1947 in connection with the Trifounovich case.

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These periodical misunderstandings revealed, rather than created, an unfriendly atmosphere. The truth is that the United States had never ceased to regard the established régime in Yugoslavia as a totalitarian organisation, on Russian lines, in which no civil rights or individual liberty existed. And this impression made itself felt in the peace negotiations, without—let us repeat—Tito's diplomacy making any serious effort to dispel it, thereby taking its share in responsibility for the failure of Yugoslav claims on Trieste.

The diplomatic tension between Belgrade and Washington was reflected in the recall (in March, 1947) of Mr. Patterson, United States Ambassador in Yugoslavia, when America rejected the demand for cereals formulated by Marshal Tito's Government. Mr. Patterson was replaced, but his severe judgements on the Yugoslav régime fixed the policy of the State Department towards Tito.

Although less full of incident, relations between London and Belgrade were scarcely more gracious. An English note of May 20 protested against the attitude of the Yugoslavs in Julian Venetia and the 'unfriendly policy' of their Government. British newspapers did not conceal their bitterness on finding that, despite Anglo-American sacrifices made in order to assist the populations of the new Yugoslavia to get on their feet again, the press of that country had nothing but suspicious or damaging comments to make on the Western Democracies.

Yugoslavia refused, for instance, to take part in the Victory Parade held in London on June 8, 1946, bluntly stating that the relations between the two countries did not justify such participation.

The attitude of the Yugoslav delegation at international conferences or Commissions, and in the United Nations, was not calculated to dissipate prejudice. This was fostered by exchanges of subacid notes—particularly those of January 10, 1947, in which the Yugoslav Government protested at the slowness of the British authorities in handing over war criminals of Italian nationality, and of January 29 regarding the murder of the Yugoslav consul, who had, on 25th of the same month, visited a *tchetnitsi* camp in the Naples district.

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On the other hand, relations between Belgrade and the other Slav States gave rise to demonstrations of confidence and

•648 175 enthusiasm. On March 12, 1946, Marshal Tito went to Warsaw, where, on the 17th, he signed a cultural agreement and, on the 19th, a treaty of friendship and mutul aid, valid for twenty years, which was unanimously ratified by the Polish National Council on April 28. Yugoslav and Polish statesmen agreed on a joint line of action in the matter of either country's armed forces abroad, stationed in territories occupied by the Allies.

From Warsaw Tito went, on March 21, to Prague, where, after discussion with MM. Benes and Fierlinger, he announced the conclusion of a pact on similar lines, to be signed on May 10 in Belgrade by the Czech Premier, without reference to the United Nations pact. In accordance with the new line of policy, statesmen and journalists did their utmost to prove that these agreements were not to be regarded as the inception of a bloc of the Eastern European States.[7]

On May 28 Tito was in Moscow, where he remained until June 10. There he worked out the details necessary to bring Yugoslav diplomacy into close harmony with that of the Kremlin. And, as an immediate outcome, economic agreements sealed these exchanges of opinion; one of these agreements covered the arming and equipping of the Yugoslav Army by the Moscow Government.

On October 18 Tito's visit was returned by the President of the Polish Republic, Boleslaw Bierut, who toured Yugoslavia in company with the Marshal. The Premiers exchanged assurances of mutual assistance in their territorial claims. 'I promise you', said Tito, 'that the very utmost shall be done in order that your country may obtain satisfaction. If we don't succeed today, we will do so tomorrow'. President Bierut, in his turn, undertook to back up the Yugoslav attitude in the question of Trieste and the Julian March.

This question of Trieste was for twenty months the stumbling-block in the way of peace negotiations and harmony among the Allies. It gave rise to innumerable incidents, and was the object of keen, bitter discussions. The Yugoslavs maintained their claim with more zeal than skill, threatening at one time not to attend meetings, at others, not to sign, and finally submitting to the *fait accompli,* having presumably over-estimated Russian support, or having forgotten that, for Moscow, Trieste was only one card in a game covering the whole world. It was at one time thought that Yugoslavs and Italians were going to come to a direct arrangement after the visit to Belgrade of Togliatti, the chief of the Communist Party, on November 3, 1946, and his talks with Tito. It would appear that the latter suggested exchanging Trieste (in reality already lost) for Gorizia—a proposal which the Italian Government promptly rejected. Since no arrangement was reached, the Great Powers had to arbitrate; general agreement was concluded between them on November 27. 648 175

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[7] 'The policy of the U.S.S.R.', declared M. Fierlinger, 'succeeded happily in giving concrete expression to the idea of a community of all the Slav states, which remain entirely free and independent, but are united in a desire for common defence and work for peace in harmony with all the nations'.

[829] In reality, it was not a question of deciding whether the Yugoslavs or the Italians should prevail in Trieste; the Russians feared that the Western Democracies would use the town as an economic and political bridge-head for their action in Eastern Europe, while the Anglo-Americans feared that the Stalin-controlled 'Slavonic bloc' would make Trieste the basis for its expansion in the Mediterranean. Such were the real factors in the dispute, notwithstanding the flux of historical, ethnographical, and economic arguments under which they seemed to be submerged.

Yugoslavia abandoned Trieste, but she nevertheless obtained an important part of Istria and Julian Venetia (except the part that was to form the Free Territory of Trieste), as well as Zara and the Isles of Pelagosa and Lagosta. On the other hand, her claims to the Slovene part of Carinthia (which she had lost in the plebiscite of October 18, 1920), as well as to the 'Canalthal' to the north of Gorizia (region of Tarvisio) were rejected.

On January 14, 1946, she was elected a member of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

* * *

Bulgaria, during the pre-constitutional period, was a prey to the objurgations of the English and the Americans, who reproached her with disregarding the political conditions laid down by the Conference of Moscow in December, 1945, by refusing to call two members of the Opposition to power. Gheorgiev's Government was prepared to accept these representatives, but wanted first to see them adhere to its internal and external policy

• 648 175 —in other words, renounce the very principles for which they would have been elected.

Pressed by solicitations or criticisms from London and Washington, M. Gheorgiev placed himself under the ægis of Moscow. He went to Russia on January 7, 1946. 'I am glad', he said on landing, 'to be within the fortress of the Slavonic peoples, which, thanks to the wise direction of Generalissimo Stalin, has become the hope of the whole of democratic humanity'. And to give a yet more decisive proof of the credit which he enjoyed in Moscow, his visit was immediately followed (on January 10) by that of M. Vyshinsky to Sofia.

[661] These manifestations did indeed strengthen the Bulgarian Government majority, but they disarmed neither the English nor the Americans, who protested, in diplomatic notes, against the police tactics of the régime, and the arrests of politicians.[8] In return, the Russians accused the Western Democracies of giving a false interpretation to Moscow's decisions affecting Bulgaria, and of encouraging subversive elements.

642 175 In Sofia, they showed signs of anxiety over the persistence of this lack of harmony on the eve of the conclusion of the peace treaties, on which the future of Bulgaria was to depend. M. Gheorgiev hoped to clarify the situation by resigning on March 22. But the Opposition imposed, as a condition of its accepting office, the exclusion of any Communist from the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office. Agreement proved impossible; another Gheorgiev cabinet, restricted, like the previous one, to the parties of the Patriotic Front, was formed on March 29, 1946.

A few days later, this Government promulgated a decree convening the National Assembly, charged with revising the Constitution on Republican lines. The monarchical régime was denounced to the country as the cause of all its misfortunes—a statement which could, with greater truth, have been applied to the Treaty of San Stefano and the Macedonian psychosis it had

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661 [8] For three months, the arrested men included Assen Stamboliiski, son of the famous Agrarian leader, assassinated in 1923, and a member of the Central Committee of the Agrarian Party. One of the grievances harboured by the Bulgarian Agrarians against the Communists was the attitude of neutrality maintained by the latter at the time of the *coup d'état* of June 9, 1923, which had marked the triumph of 'reaction' over Stamboliiski's régime.

642 175 [662] engendered. For the occasion, they forgot the fact that the monarchy had, more than once, had its prerogatives disputed by dictatorships. Only by assassination did Ferdinand get rid of Stamboulov, and Boris of Stamboliiski. And M. Gheorgiev himself had been able to overthrow parliamentary government only because the army had given him a helping hand. The will of the sovereign had entered little into that event.

However that might be, the fate of the monarchy was settled. By doing away with it, the Bulgarian people were convinced that they were clarifying their destiny. The young King Simeon II, then aged 8, was living in Vranja with his mother and his sister, in an isolation which was practically exile, while the royal duties were performed by three regents appointed by the National Front. On September 8, 1946, the Bulgarian nation, [666] by a huge majority (3,800,000 votes to 179,000), voted in favour of the republic, which was proclaimed on the 15th of the same month. The following week Simeon II, under the care of the Queen-Mother, who was dressed in deep mourning, embarked on a Turkish vessel bound for Egypt, where he was to join his maternal grandfather, ex-King Victor Emmanuel II of Italy. One newspaper *Otetchestvene Front* (Homeland Front) published, by way of farewell, an article by General Hristo Stölkov, reproaching the defunct monarchy for having isolated Bulgaria from the other Slavonic peoples. 'It is no accident if, at the time of the first imperialist war, all the Slavs [*sic*] were on the side of the Allies, whilst Bulgaria alone threw in her lot with Germany'.

648 175 The convening of the electoral body for October 27[1] gave rise to a diplomatic passage of arms among the Allies. The British Government protested against the obstacles put in the way of the Opposition's campaign, and against the persecution to which the Agrarians were subjected. And Mr. Byrnes asked the Allied Control Commission, sitting in Sofia, to take adequate measures to guarantee the integrity of the poll. Russia's representative on the Commission, General Birousov, opposed the consideration of this request, which he denounced as foreign interference with Bulgarian home affairs.

666 175 The elections gave the anticipated results; the Home Front secured 346 seats (of which 277 went to the Communists) as against the Opposition's 101 seats. It would appear that this

[1] [1946 - Analyst]

666 175 result even exceeded the expectations of M. Gheorgiev, who took fright at the excitement stirred up in the country by the Communists—hence this appeal to the population: 'Victory often intoxicates men, and defeat makes them lose their self-control. Tension resulting from elections, if not rapidly mastered, may help to foster a state of excitement prejudicial to order and tranquillity. The Government earnestly exhorts all citizens strictly to observe the laws'.

Spectacular as was the triumph of governmental coalition, it did not reach the overwhelming majorities of which Russia and Yugoslavia held the secret. In particular, the ministerial fraction belonging to the *Zveno* was beaten, so that the country had modified, to the advantage of the Communists, the relative strengths within the coalition. Now, in a nation which had neither capitalism nor trusts nor large industrial concerns nor *latifundia*, the word *Communist* had a meaning which was much more political than social.* It was above all the victory of the 'Russianisers', long held in check by the official policy.

[563] It must moreover be admitted that, renewing the gesture of the liberating Tsar, the Soviet Union had just saved the Bulgarian people by protecting them from the consequences of their rulers' collusion with the Axis. The question that still remained was whether Russia would not have preferred to be defended in Sofia by traditionally 'national' elements, rather than by a party too openly connected with Moscow, and whose leader, George Dimitrov, the hero of the Leipzig trial, was thought to be a tool of Russia.

642 175 As a logical consequence of the elections, a new Government was in fact formed by Dimitrov on November 23.[1] It included ten Communists, five Agrarians, two Socialists, two members of the *Zveno* and one Independent. The ex-President, Kimon Gheorgiev, held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. The semi-official press saw it as 'the most democratic Government Bulgaria has ever had', whilst the Opposition emphasised the complete hold on power which the Communists had obtained.

648 175 This Government's vital tasks were to be signing the peace and voting the Constitution. On February 12, 1947, it secured

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[162] * The working-class strengths, on which the Communists rely, are very small; indeed, 80% of the population are engaged in agriculture, not to mention tradesmen, civil servants, and members of the liberal professions.

[1] [1946 - Analyst]

648 175 from England the legal recognition which she had refused to a non-Communist Ministry. However, the Foreign Office felt bound to state that this recognition 'by no means implied that Great Britain considered the methods previously employed by the Bulgarian Government to consolidate its position, or the conditions under which the elections had been organised, as conforming to the spirit and the letter of the Yalta declaration concerning Liberated Europe'.

The Bulgarian reply dismissed these objections, but expressed the Sofia Government's satisfaction and its desire to respect the peace treaty.

642 175 [182] The Constitution submitted to the Legislature had to reconcile the exigencies of a very Leftist democracy with the specific traits of the Bulgarian nation, and the laws of its historical development. It was not federal, like the Russian or Yugoslav constitutions, but unitary. Bulgaria was to be a parliamentary republic, in which authority belonged to the people, whose will was expressed by means of elections or a referendum. The President was elected for four years (by a two-thirds majority) by the Legislature, plus one representative from each Cantonal Council and five representatives from each Departmental Council. The Legislature was elected for four years, on the basis of one member for every 25,000 inhabitants.

The Constitution sanctioned the right to private property and the right of inheritance, but placed in the hands of the State the country's natural resources, its sub-soil, transport, marine and fluvial navigation, communications, radio, and external trade. The new Bulgarian economy was inspired by the co-operative principle as understood in the Slavonic tradition (*mir* or *zadrouga*) rather than by pure collectivism. [181]

648 175 In his ministerial declaration M. George Dimitrov had defined friendship with U.S.S.R. as 'the corner-stone of his foreign policy', but promised to endeavour to normalise relations with London and Washington. He expressed his gratitude 'to the sister nations—and particularly the new Yugoslavia[10]—for the help they had rendered to Bulgaria at the Peace Conference'.

Indeed, Bulgaria had no reason to complain of the Con-

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[10] Who, on the previous June 15, had wiped out certain Bulgarian reparations.

• 648 175 ference, which, while treating her as a conquered country, nevertheless left her Southern Dobrudja which she had obtained from Rumania under a friendly agreement concluded under the auspices of the Axis.

728 175 By her memoranda addressed to the Four Powers on May 7 and June 20, she had asked to be designated in the peace treaties, not as an Axis 'Satellite State' but as a 'Co-belligerent Ally'. Her delegate to the Paris Conference maintained that the moral responsibility of the Bulgarian people had not been involved in the policy of collaboration with Germany,[11] that, moreover, no Bulgarian soldier had borne arms against the Red Army, and that the country's heroic resistance, at the critical moment of the war, entitled her to the Allies' sympathetic consideration.

This request was rejected, however, as well as that which aimed at securing access to the Aegean Sea (the famous 'outlet' of Article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly) or, more clearly, that part of Western Thrace which had been under Bulgarian sovereignty between 1913 (Treaty of Bucharest) and 1919 (Treaty of Neuilly) and which, at the time of which we are speaking, formed part of Greece. This request, as well as the claim for indemnity for 'investments and improvements' effected by the Bulgarian troops on Greek soil during the occupation, at the Luxembourg Conference provoked vigorous reaction on the part of the Greek Premier, M. Tsaldaris, who reproached the Bulgarians with having attacked his country three times in the space of a single generation.

[648] Much more: Messrs. Byrnes and Bevin took the opportunity of M. Kolarov's visit to Paris to intimate to him the dissatisfaction their Governments felt at the way in which the [563] Opposition was treated in Sofia. Moreover, the British delegate demanded the insertion of a special clause intended to protect Jewish minorities, although it was well known that—except in the last war, and even then, not without the exercise of great restraint[12]—the Jews had never been the object of discriminating measures.

[11] Almost word for word, this was the thesis maintained at the end of the previous war by M. Mollov, the Bulgarian delegate to the League of Nations: 'Bulgaria . . . was drawn into the war by events contrary to the manifest will of the majority of the people, and of the political parties'.

[12] The opposition of the Bulgarian people to racial laws spared the Jews the atrocities to which they were subjected in other Eastern European countries.

131 war, now had only three—Russia, Germany, and Czechoslovakia.
175 One aspect of her new position which represented an innovation was her transformation into a great maritime nation, thanks to the three ports, Stettin, Gdynia, and Danzig, and to her 312 miles of coast-line. Nevertheless, her destiny would henceforth be more closely bound to that of Central Europe, while remaining subordinate to the *entente* with Moscow.

666 The western frontiers were approved by the plebiscite of
June 30, which covered not only the frontier-ratification, but also
the abolition of the Senate and the economic organisation of the
[471] State (Agrarian reform and nationalisation of key industries).
[423] The first ballot gave 10,534,697 in favour and 995,584 against; the second gave 7,844,522 in favour and 3,686,029 against; the third, 8,896,106 in favour and 2,634,446 against.

578 This popular referendum did not have the tranquillising
• 648 effects that had seemingly been expected. Poland continued to
661 be a prey to 'terrorist' agitation, the repression of which, in
175 turn, gave rise to scenes of violence and to exactions. While dissociating himself from the extremists, the leader of the Polish Peasant Party, M. Mikolajczyk, himself protested against the way in which the referendum had been carried out (except in Cracow, where the 'Noes' had been in the majority). So the British Government reserved its opinion on the legitimacy which this poll conferred on the régime, and awaited the general elections before giving legal recognition to the new state of affairs. And the whole of 1946 was taken up with exchanges of subacid notes between London and Washington on the one side and Warsaw on the other. The Anglo-Americans denounced the persecution to which the Opposition was subjected, and considered that the Polish Government was failing in the undertaking given in execution of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, to guarantee the liberty of elections. But the Russians interpreted quite differently both the scope of these agreements and the meaning of the word 'liberty'. And so the most obvious result of the diplomatic offensive on the part of England and the United States was to intensify Polish-Sovietic solidarity.

648 The formation, in June, of a National Unity Government
175 under the Presidency of M. Osubka Morawski seemed, for the
[642] time being, to dissipate the apprehensions of the Anglo-
Americans, although the dissident Polish Government in London

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had refused to recognise this new Cabinet. But the truce was a short one. The preparation of the electoral law, voted on September 23, revived the controversy[18] and occasioned a fresh diplomatic assault. The Foreign Office and the State Department sent to Warsaw, on August 19, concerted notes, couched as 'warnings'. They recalled the irregularities known to have taken place on the occasion of the referendum, and suggested a series of measures calculated to prevent their repetition in connection with the elections. When handing over the American note, the United States ambassador felt the need to justify such an unusual step: 'In departing from its traditional policy', he said, 'and in assuming responsibilities in the affairs of another State, my Government is obeying a conviction that its important role in the liberation of the European peoples imposes on it very particularly the duty to assist the Polish people, so sorely tried by the Nazi occupation, to be quite free to elect the government of its choice'.

M. Osubka Morawski took this double admonition very badly. His embassy in Washington declared to the press that the American note 'constituted a violation of the sovereign rights of Poland and an interference in her internal affairs'; the Warsaw press spoke of 'vassalisation'; and the two notes received no official reply.

A few days later the Polish leaders went to Minsk, where, on August 29, they met Generalissimo Stalin, with whom they discussed the question of the elections. They received assurances which enabled them, thenceforth, to resist the Anglo-American offensive.

Meanwhile a disagreement which had arisen between London and Warsaw a few weeks previously was being settled. This concerned a protest made by the Polish Government against

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[18] A memorandum was sent, in August 1946, to the representatives of the United Nations taking part in the Peace Conference in Paris by the 'Polish Socialist and Workers' Associations Abroad'; its authors recalled the sufferings of Poland during the war, demanded the re-establishment of civic liberties, and declared that the Government had against it 'about 90% of the public opinion of the country'. The Conference was also notified of a protest on the part of the Central Union of Poles in France and of the Union of Catholic Polish Societies in France. In the following month, the Congress of Americans of Polish Origin addressed to Mr. Byrnes a memorandum suggesting that the problem of Poland should be laid before the United Nations, and asking for recognition of the western frontiers.

•648 175 certain items which had appeared in the News Bulletin published by the British Embassy in Poland, and judged by official circles to be tendentious. At the beginning of September the Foreign Office announced that the Bulletin would publish no more reports concerning Poland's internal affairs. But semi-official commentators felt obliged to emphasise that this assurance, at variance with British practice, had not been given without hesitation; it had been largely prompted by fear that the Bulletin's collaborators would be arrested by the Polish authorities. So that the settlement of the dispute, by its very nature, contained the germ of future unpleasantness.

Moreover, Warsaw cherished many other bones of contention as far as the English were concerned. The latter were first accused of wanting to keep the gold belonging to the National Bank, and then reproached with supporting the Polish 'reactionaries', with refusing to repatriate General Anders' army *en bloc,* and with lending too sympathetic an ear to the complaints and recriminations of the Peasant Party. Although it was for Poland that England had entered the war, it may be said that it was against the British cabinet that the most bitter criticisms were directed by the Polish Government and press.

The attacks reached their culminating point in the autumn, after Mr. Byrnes's speech at Stuttgart on September 6, and Mr. Bevin's declaration in the House of Commons on October 22.

648 175 728 Mr. Byrnes had said: 'As regards Silesia and the other Eastern German territories, their allocation to Poland by Russia, for administrative purposes, had taken place before the Potsdam meeting. . . . As the minutes of the Conference plainly show, the heads of the Governments did not undertake to support, on the establishment of peace, the cession of any particular territory. . . . The extent of the region to be ceded to Poland must be determined at the time when the final settlement is made'.[14]

Taken in conjunction with Mr. Bevin's speech, these words could bear the interpretation that Great Britain and America would, at the time of the final Peace Conference, make the

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[14] The relevant paragraph of the Potsdam agreement is worded as follows: 'The heads of the three Governments reaffirm the opinion that the final delimitation of Poland's western frontiers must be made at the time of the peace settlement'.

question of the Oder-Neisse frontiers dependent on that of free 648
elections. M. Molotov at once challenged Mr. Byrnes's declara- 175
tion, affirming that Russia considered the Polish-German 728
frontiers as definitive. If, on the one hand, this intervention alienated the German Communists from him, and contributed to their defeat at the municipal elections, on the other hand, it secured for him enthusiastic approbation in Polish circles. In most of the large towns popular meetings were held, and the crowds booed the name of Mr. Byrnes, and even of America.

The tension lasted right up to the elections. The arrest of 648
members of the Polish Peasant Party had its echo in the House 175
of Commons, where, on October 22, Mr. Churchill drew a 'sad picture' of the situation in Poland. 'We must', he said, 'take great care to distinguish in our minds between the present Polish Government and the feelings of the Polish nation, whose affliction and sufferings seem to be never-ending'. The Minister of State, Mr. McNeil, emphasised once more the fact that England was a joint signatory to the undertakings given by the Warsaw Government, and thereby bound to see that they were carried out.

So, when the legislative elections had been fixed for January 19, the Governments of London and Washington considered the time had come to repeat their representations on behalf of a free poll. On November 22, they handed over, through their representatives in Warsaw, two simultaneous notes (identical, as regards contents, with those which had been handed to Rumania and Bulgaria on previous occasions). These two documents referred to the previous warnings, and concluded by mentioning that it would be impossible for the Anglo-American democracies to recognise any Government which might be based on elections carried out with violence, or whose results had been falsified.

No reply was made to the American Department of State. That destined for the Foreign Office was delayed for a month. It answered Great Britain's arguments by setting out a complete accusation, intended to show that that Power had herself deliberately violated the Yalta and Potsdam agreements in seven respects, as under:—

1. Role of 'advisers to the British Government' played by Polish exiles in London.

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2. Reorganisation and re-equipment of the Anders Army.
3. Control exercised by the exiled Polish Government in London over property wrongfully left at its disposal, together with that of the Polish Consulates abroad.
4. Retention of the Polish gold deposited in London during the war.
5. Retention of the Polish battle-ships placed at the disposal of the British war-fleet during the occupation.
6. Financing by Great Britain of the campaign to dissuade Polish refugees and deportees from returning to their country.
7. Reduction of the quota of Germans from the western territories of Poland that England had undertaken to admit to her occupation zone in Germany.

This fruitless exchange of notes continued until the eve of the elections. In the end, England realised its futility, whereas, on January 5, 1947, America laid before her two major Allies a proposal for joint supervision of the electoral proceedings. Russia rejected this proposal, once again refuting its motives, and a further American note of January 9, was described by the Polish chargé d'affaires at Washington as 'very regrettable'.

[666] The elections, held on January 19,[1] resulted in 9,003,682 votes for the Governmental bloc (*i.e.*, 80.1 per cent of the voters) as against 1,154,847 for the Polish Peasant Party (*i.e.*, 10.3 per cent).

The comedy of the Anglo-American protests did not end with this poll. It had its epilogue in a note from Washington, dated January 29, affirming that the State Department neither considered the elections to have been free, nor Poland's engagements to have been kept, but did not, nevertheless, intend to break off diplomatic relations.[15] The British Under-Secretary

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[15] This did not prevent Mr. Truman from making the following statement to the new Polish ambassador, M. Winieniez, when, on February 4, the latter presented his credentials. 'We, the American people and myself, were very much upset to find that the Provisional Government of Poland had failed to fulfil its undertakings with regard to freedom of elections'—which was contrary to the conventional optimism with which these ceremonial occasions are usually surrounded. And, in the *New York Herald Tribune* (European edition), the ex-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, published this violent commentary: 'The results of the elections in Poland have been even more fantastic than was to be expected. The P.S.L. (Polish Peasant Party) have been allocated one-tenth of the man-

[1] [1947--Analyst]

for Foreign Affairs spoke in similar vein in the House of 648 •
Commons. And the final result of all this fuss was simply that 175
England and the United States were not represented at the inaugural session of the Third Polish Republic, held on February 4. Moreover, that did not prevent those two countries from offering their congratulations, the next day, to M. Boleslaw Bierut, President of the Republic. London and Washington had never had any other concern than that of 'saving appearances'. They knew quite well that these platonic manifestations of displeasure would have no other effect than to consolidate Muscovite influence in Warsaw.

The Presidency of the new Government was entrusted to a 643
young member of the Cracow bar—M. Joseph Cyrankiewicz, 175
General Secretary of the Socialist Party, and a survivor of the Auschwitz Camp. In May, political life was gradually becoming normal. The President of the Republic compared it to a river 'which, after having been diverted from its bed by a cataclysm, was finding its true course again'.

To the new Cabinet was to fall the mission of getting the 648
Oder-Neisse frontier sanctioned by the Peace Conference. In 728
its own view, as well as that of the whole of Poland, the question 175
was settled by the fact that transfers of population had already taken place, without any protests from London or Washington. It was difficult to conceive that millions of Displaced Persons would be compelled to undergo a fresh exodus. The Anglo-Americans would therefore be obliged, in Mr. Churchill's phrase, 'to write off Eastern Europe on the Profit and Loss account'. Moreover, France supported the Polish viewpoint; on February 19, 1947, she signed a cultural agreement with Warsaw—the preface to a new political pact, it being understood that Poland would support her claims on the Saar, as she would back up those of Poland to the maintenance of her western frontier. The question of the frontiers gave rise, in April, 1947, to a bitter and sterile passage-of-arms between Americans and Russians at the Moscow Conference.

Another and no less redoubtable motive of discord between 000

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dates which fell to the Socialo-Communist bloc which backs the regime of Bierut and Osubka-Morawski. So the Moscow-controlled parties get 400 out of the 444 seats in the Polish Diet. . . . The last vestiges of Polish liberty, for which General Sikorski is still fighting, will tend to disappear'.

•648 Another and no less redoubtable motive of discord between
175 Poland and the Western Allies was the existence in Italy of an army (the former Second Polish Corps), under the orders of General Wladislaw Anders, who had not recognised the Warsaw Government—because, he said, it had not been freely chosen by the Polish people. His troops did not refuse to enter Poland, but they were not prepared to do so until the Russians had gone. On this question, as on that of the elections, a diplomatic duel took place—the initiative, this time, lying with the Warsaw Cabinet. The incident began with a note, of January, 1946, in which this Cabinet accused England of equipping and supplying these forces, and with a protest to Washington against the functioning, in the American zone, of a liaison between the Anders Army and the secret organisations of the interior. General Anders opposed a categorical denial to this assertion; according to him, it was nothing but a false scent, to divert attention from the political crisis existing in the country.

Yugoslavia intervened abruptly in this affair, by submitting to the General Secretariat of the United Nations, through M. Vyshinsky, a memorandum destined for the Security Council, claiming that the Polish Army in Italy, executing manœuvres which brought it near to the Julian March, and recruiting Yugoslavs, was considered as 'aggressive and manifestly dangerous' for the Belgrade Government.

England, quite justifiably, was surprised to find the Yugoslavs adopting this roundabout method of lodging a complaint directly aimed at her. She immediately denied the allegations.

But thereupon, a communication from the Warsaw Government, February 14, declared that, from that date onwards, it ceased to consider the Polish forces abroad as units of the national army. The Government therefore demanded that such troops should no longer be permitted to wear Polish uniform or badges, and that they should be demobilised. A few days later, Radio-Warsaw broadcast an appeal to Polish soldiers abroad, urging them to arrange for repatriation. And, on March 20, Mr. Bevin submitted to the Commons the text of an Anglo-Polish agreement for the demobilisation of these soldiers (at least 200,000 men), half of whom constituted the total strength of the Anders Army stationed in Italy. No judicial action was to be taken against the returned soldiers, unless they had served in the German Army, or in the Todt organisation. Those who

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were unwilling to go would not be forced to return to Poland, but their right to remain in England would be considered individually.

It goes without saying that the 'Polish Government in London' protested against this decision, on which they had not been consulted. On June 1 General Anders bade farewell to his troops. 'We must', he said, 'leave Italy on the eve of the peace treaties. We have traversed this country from South to North, waging against Germany a battle for the liberty of the nations. Polish hearts will never forget that we have fought also for the liberty of the Church. . . . Tomorrow, by an unknown road, we shall go to Poland—to a Poland for which we have fought, and which no Polish heart can imagine without Lwow and Wilno'. At the end of October he left Italy for England, where he joined the unarmed Resettlement Corps.[18] Shortly before (on September 28) and as the result of this incorporation, a decree of the Council of Polish Ministers had withdrawn his nationality, as well as that of seventy-four other officers, of or above the rank of general.

The exact figures of those who were voluntarily repatriated have never been given. But it is certain that a large number of Poles, especially among those whose home district had passed under Soviet control, preferred the risks and the misfortunes of exile to returning to their birthplace.

Relations between Warsaw and Moscow were maintained on the lines laid down for them by the Polish-Sovietic pact of August 18, 1945—of which instruments of ratification were exchanged on February 7, 1946.

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But, as M. Cyrankiewicz himself had remarked, 'Many Poles still suffered from an anti-Russian complex'. This persistence of hostility towards Russia was, according to him, attributable to the memory of the Tsarist oppression and the anti-Bolshevist propaganda which had been ceaselessly carried out between the two wars.

The visit of President Bierut and the Polish statesmen to

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[18] A British M.P. having asked (on February 18, 1947) why the general's salary figured on the army budget, Richard Stokes, a Labour M.P., divulged that the military authorities admitted that, without the collaboration of the Anders Army, the Italian campaign might have ended in disaster.

• 648 175 Moscow (May 23–26, 1946) was due to the necessity for a fresh exchange of views on the international situation, on the strengthening of the Polish Army to protect the rear of the Soviet occupation forces in Germany, and on the conclusion of economic agreements. Arrangements were in fact reached. They stipulated the cancelling of the financial engagements contracted during the war for equipping the Polish Army; the supply of Russian arms and munitions; the opening of a credit and the furnishing of food supplies.[17] On August 16 the U.S.S.R. and Poland signed a frontier treaty, ceding to the Poles the region situated east of the Curzon line, between the Western Boug and the River Solokia, to the south of the town of Krilow, to a maximum depth of nineteen miles, together with a part of the Forest of Bjalowiez, likewise to the east of the Curzon line, to a maximum depth of eleven miles.

A fresh interview between Stalin and MM. Bierut and Osubka-Morawski took place in Minsk on the following August 29. It dealt principally with the Anglo-American notes relating to the elections, and with the relations, on the eve of the poll, between the Socialist Party and the Labour Party. It was a fortnight later that, replying to Mr. Byrnes's Stuttgart speech, M. Molotov reaffirmed the Soviet point of view, according to which the western frontier of Poland was sacrosanct.

On February 24, 1947, M. Cyrankiewicz arrived in Moscow to confer with Stalin on the prospects opened up for Poland by the Peace Conference for Germany, convened in the Soviet capital for March 10.

648 175 457 Connected with the question of 'free elections', still further incidents arose between Poland and the Anglo-American democracies. On April 25, 1946, the Warsaw Government had obtained a loan of fifty million dollars under the following double arrangement: Forty million dollars would be supplied by the Export-Import Bank for the payment of purchases effected in the United States; surplus army material, stocked in Europe, would be supplied to the Government on credit, up to a limit of fifty million dollars. America had stipulated, as conditions of her financial aid, that the Polish Government should organise free elections, should inform the people of the terms of

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[17] It was only on November 21 that the Polish Minister of Foreign Trade disclosed the tenor of his agreements with Russia.

the agreement, and should furnish the United States with full 648•
details of treaties concluded with other Powers. 175

Since these conditions had not been fulfilled, America 457
announced, in the month of May, that she was reconsidering the matter. Warsaw then communicated the text of the commercial treaties concluded with the neighbouring countries. The fact that, after this, the United States restored the credit of ninety million dollars shows that they did not consider these treaties as incompatible with their collaboration in Polish economic recovery. In January, 1947, Polish assets in America—including gold—were 'de-blocked', in consideration of an agreement fixing the indemnification of American nationals who owned nationalised Polish concerns.

But the question of the elections remained as a background to the feeling of strain which hung over the relations between Washington and Warsaw. In March, 1947, it came to the fore again, when the United States ambassador, Mr. Arthur Bliss Lane, resigned as an expression of the disapproval he had never ceased to exhibit towards a régime resulting from an electoral consultation which he had designated 'a farce'. Far from disowning him, Mr. Truman, in accepting his resignation, declared his regret that 'his skilful representation of the American Government's views had not attained its object'.

The financial negotiations with England experienced similar vicissitudes. The agreement of June 24, 1946, for the grant of a loan, subject to the repayment of the debts of the former London Government, was at first postponed; official Polish circles accused Great Britain of retaining the greater part of their compatriots' assets as security for her claims, and especially the 4,800,000,000 francs (gold) belonging to the Bank of Poland. On December 19, the English Embassy in Warsaw was obliged to protest against the manner in which these questions were presented by the Polish press, who took pleasure in contrasting the British claims with Russia's gesture in wiping out Poland's war debts.

We have recalled that one of the sore points in Slav solidarity 648
was the question of the allocation of the Teschen Basin, 728
occupied by the Poles since October 2, 1938. The question had 175
already, between the two wars, caused a lot of ink to flow. It had grafted itself on to attacks made by the Polish press against

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Prague's policy with regard to the Slovaks, and by the Czech press against Warsaw's treatment of the Ukrainian minorities.

At the end of 1945 the Polish Government had proposed a general settlement of matters outstanding. Prague had agreed in principle, but excluding territorial questions. Poland rejected this reservation. Negotiations opened in Prague on February 7, 1946. The Czechs again refused to have the question of Teschen reopened; they were anxious not to jeopardise the promise made by the Allies to restore their frontiers as they were before Munich.

So the matter was adjourned. But neither of the two Governments neglected any occasion of reaffirming their country's rights to Teschen.

'The Government of Poland' (said M. Rzymowski, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on March 8) 'most emphatically condemns the violence of Munich exercised by Hitler in common with Beck, Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1938–1939, towards Czechoslovakia, a friendly country. I cannot, however, forbear to mention the fact that Silesian Teschen is peopled by a mass of 100,000 Poles who, for some decades, and especially during the six years of the German occupation, by their attitude affirmed their desire to be reincorporated in the mother country'.

To which the President of the Czech Council, M. Fierlinger, replied, recalling that this territory contained the richest coal-mines of Czechoslovakia, that the country's industry had been particularly developed there, large capital sums having been invested, and that along the Polish-Czech frontier passed the most important of the railways joining Bohemia and Moravia to Slovakia. 'So', he concluded, 'any cession of the territory of Teschen to the Poles would prejudice the most vital interests of our country. For these motives, as well as for ethnical reasons, we cannot discuss with the Polish Government the cession of any of these territories. Naturally, we are ready to come to an agreement with the Poles on the most friendly basis, regarding any other arrangement which would suit them, particularly for a reciprocal exchange of population which might finally settle this very complicated problem, to the interest of both countries'.

The most curious part was that the two Governments, equally intractable on this point, showed themselves none the less disposed to conclude an alliance, even a federal pact. Poland would have seen in this a way of submerging the importance of

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the Teschen affair. But Czechoslovakia kept the two matters distinct, and was not prepared to raise the question of the pact until the frontier dispute had been settled.

Marshal Tito was either asked, or was tempted, to offer his mediation. He met with no better success than M. Benes had encountered when, immediately after the previous war, he had tried to intervene between Belgrade and Sofia to appease the Macedonian quarrel. It was obvious, moreover, that the real arbitrator of the dispute could be none other than Stalin. And so the question of Teschen headed the agenda of the conversations that took place in Moscow, in June, 1946, between M. Fierlinger and the Russian and Polish chiefs. The last-named maintained that the territorial sacrifices they had made to Russia should be compensated with the territories partly populated by Poles. The Czechs showed themselves adamant. Had not they, too, ceded Sub-Carpathia to the Russians, and without any compensation? They formulated, or allowed to be formulated, other demands—a frontier-rectification, to do away with the two salients of Glatz and Ratibor, the incorporation of Lusatia with Bautzen, Loebau and Cottbus, and the incorporation of the Austrian town of Gmünd (already occupied).

The Soviet representatives dismissed both parties non-suited. Probably they were not sorry to preserve a possible means of bringing pressure to bear on both sides. They did, however, assure the Czechs that the question would not be settled by Moscow without their consent. As for the Poles, they saw in the Czech claims to Glatz a move to give them a possible basis for bargaining.

The Western Allies prudently refrained from intervening in this dispute, although it affected both the political and the economic balance of the Continent.

Eventually on March 10, 1947, Poles and Czechs concluded a treaty of alliance that stabilised their relations, but, trusting to the effects of time, left them until 1949 to settle the matter of Teschen—the very one whose settlement was of paramount importance for those relations!

The Polish delegation to the Peace Conference expressed very precise views on the fate of Austria and Germany. They demanded guarantees against a fresh Anschluss, the unity of the Reich to be subject to effective demilitarisation and denazifica-

*648 728 175 tion, and the reconstruction of German economic life subordinated to the reconstruction of the devastated countries.

648 175 On the United Nations' Security Council the Polish delegation fastened on the Spanish problem, displaying all the more energy inasmuch as none of their positive interests was at stake. They backed the views supported by France and the Soviet Union on rupture with Franco, and decided, on April 5, 1946, to recognise the Giral Government--an eminently platonic gesture, for Franco's Spain and Poland had no diplomatic relations.

*186 659 [798] The religious question, too, was a serious preoccupation of the Government, which refuted the widespread accusation of wishing to persecute the Catholic Church. It had, moreover, always included 'practising' Catholics among its members, for Poland is certainly one of the few countries where 'Leftists' are just as good Catholics as 'Rightists'. Cardinal Hlond, Primate of Poland and Archbishop of Warsaw, himself declared that, in spite of the denunciation of the Concordat of 1925, and the absence of relations between Chruch and State, there was no question of a Kulturkampf in Poland.

[586] There is no doubt; however, that the law (which came into force on January 1, 1946) rendering civil marriage compulsory and authorising divorce conflicted with the consciences of a large section of the population. The education reforms had dealt a death-blow to the religious schools. In the face of these measures, the Church adopted an attitude of restrained disapproval, in order not to make the situation worse; moreover, she had her 'Red Bishops', such as Mgr. Adamski, Bishop Katowice, whose sympathies were known to lie with the Soviet Union.

One of the reasons why the hierarchy avoided clashes was the fear of reviving accusations brought against certain of their members as the result of their attitude during the occupation; this in spite of the courageous conduct of the enormous majority of the prelates, and the murder by the Germans of four bishops and two thousand priests.

*186 659 798 It was, moreover, evident that the Warsaw Government's hostility was directed less against the Polish Church than against the Vatican, which they reproached with its policy during the war and its attitude in certain actions brought against agents of the occupying authorities. Yet M. Osubka-Morawski likewise

186* 175 From the external point of view, Czechoslovakia remained within the orbit of the Soviet power, on which, henceforth, depended her security and her conception of the balance of power in Europe.

But the maintenance of national unity, the agreement of parties, the conciliatory realism which they brought to the control of the State, revealed a spirit of discipline and a maturity such as could not, at that time, have been found in any other Slavonic State. Perhaps we must give equal praise to the clearsightedness with which M. Benes, in his Christmas message for 1946, denounced the weaknesses and the blemishes which still remained to be eliminated from the régime; how many other countries might have profited by his warning!

'In all political parties there lurk elements that are bad, morally tainted; products of the great wars and of the revolutionary periods. Such individuals must disappear from our political life. We must wean our young people from tendencies to indiscipline, to idleness, to immorality in relations between the sexes. We must combat the growing scourge of alcoholism, the black market, and clandestine trade. We must encourage a [163] family policy; whereas, in 1938, the excess of births over deaths was 80,000, in 1945 it is only 7,828'.

642 175 Elected for two years, the new Constituent Assembly met for the first time on June 18.[1] The next day it acclaimed Edward Benes as President of the Republic, in that same Vladislas Hall where he had been elected for the first time, in 1935. The Government, constituted on the following July 2, was presided over by M. Clement Gottwald, Leader of the Czech Communist Party. It included six Czech Communists, three Czech Social Democrats, four Socialists of the Benes Party, four Czech Catholics, five Slovak Democrats.

• 648 In the next chapter the reader will find an outline of the religious problem, seen from the angle of the Orthodox offensive. Faithful to their pre-war tradition, Czechoslovak official circles renewed with the Vatican relations which they did their utmost to render as trusting as possible, in spite of the agnosticism of the régime and its Hussite sympathies. The first chargé d'affaires to the Holy See, Dr. Schwarzenberg, was appointed in January, 1946. Since the previous autumn, the Vatican had already been represented in Prague; in March, Mgr. Ritter was

[1] [1946 -- Analyst]

sent as Papal Nuncio. In November, Mgr. Joseph Beran, a 648
Dachau deportee, was appointed Archbishop of Prague.
Czechoslovakia was then the only Slav State having accredited
diplomatic representation with the Holy See.

In Slovakia the clergy had to suffer from the fact that a 798
priest, Joseph Tiso,[21] who succeeded Father Hlinka as Leader of
a Peoples' Party, had controlled the so-called 'Independent'
State under the Nazi occupation. In some cases, proceedings
against 'collaborators' took on the aspect of an anti-Catholic
drive; some Associations, and even some religious communities,
were dissolved.

As regards foreign policy during this period, it was dominated 648
by two questions, the claim on Teschen and the 'liquidation' 563
of the Hungarian minorities. The Teschen problem has been 728
dealt with above, in connection with Poland; we will simply 175
remind the reader that the Prague Government was adamant in
its claim. 'Czechoslovakia will not give up one scrap of
Teschen', declared President Benes on July 18, 1946. The treaty
of alliance of March 10 left the matter in suspense until 1949.

The evacuation of the Hungarian populations raised a bitter and prolonged dispute between Prague and Budapest.

An agreement concluded on February 27, 1946 provided for an exchange between Hungarians in Slovakia and Slovaks in Hungary, on a parity basis, to the number of 150,000 persons. The Government of Budapest was to make this agreement widely known amongst the Slovaks placed under its jurisdiction.

But the intention of the Czechs was to expel from their territory the whole of the Hungarian minority, which was far more numerous than the Slovak minority in Hungary.[22] And so they asked that country to take over 200,000 other members of the Magyar minority, and a further 60,000 Hungarian minority subjects, expelled as war criminals or political offenders. The Hungarians in Czechoslovakia who might escape these various transfers would be 're-Slovacised', and would cease to enjoy any minority privileges. Prague emphatically insisted that

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[21] His trial opened on December 2, 194(5?) before the High Court of Bratislava.

[22] Out of the 645,000 Magyars who lived in Czechoslovakia in 1939, 110,000 were in Carpathian Ruthenia, ceded to the Russians. There remained 435,000, more than half of whom were considered to be 'inassimilable'. [728]

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the minorities had been the instrument which had upset and dismembered Czechoslovakia, and that their complete elimination was an essential condition for the security of the new State.

Hungary resisted this claim. Apart from general humanitarian considerations, she maintained that it was economically impossible for her to meet the needs of such an increased population. First she asked for a frontier revision, which was categorically refused by Prague. Later on, the two Governments accused each other of sabotaging the February agreements. A joint commission was set up, to accelerate the exchange. Its work was interrupted in September, when the Czechs presented a demand for the expulsion of a further 70,000 persons. In that same month the matter was taken before the Political and Territorial Commission, charged by the Peace Conference with the preparation of the treaty with Hungary; it was connected with a Czech request for frontier rectification (extension of Bratislava on the right bank of the Danube)—a request which was naturally resisted by the Hungarians. The Commission, setting aside forcible solutions, urged the two countries to come to a direct understanding on the problems of the minorities; should such an agreement not be reached within six months, Czechoslovakia would be authorised to lay the matter before the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.[23]

The dispute broke out again in November, when the Hungarians remaining in Czechoslovakia were requisitioned and transferred, for the most part, to the Sudetenland, in virtue of the law for the mobilisation of man-power. A demand from Budapest for an explanation, dated March 23, was left unanswered by Prague, where it was considered that a general measure needed no justification. On November 21 the Hungarian National Assembly registered a solemn protest against these forcible displacements. This protest was echoed abroad, particularly in London, in the House of Lords, and in a section of the English and American press, which felt obliged to remind

[23] The *Magyar Hirlap*, the organ of the Prime Minister, Nagy, published an article on the Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations containing the following remarks: 'Between the two World Wars, the Government of Hungary considered that it ought to be the ally of the power which was the enemy of Czechoslovakia; but later on, it was realised that this power was the common enemy, and had enslaved Hungary as well as Czechoslovakia'.

the Prague Government that the sufferings inflicted on the Hungarians did not compensate for those the Slovaks had endured; they simply increased the total amount of suffering.

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Negotiations between the two Governments were resumed in January, 1947, following the visit of the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Gyöngyösy, to Bratislava, where he met the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, M. Clementis, and had with him a preliminary discussion in view of a general settlement of the problem. At that time a total of 11,655 Slovaks (as against the agreed figure of 40,000) had returned to Slovakia from Hungary; of these 3,535 had not been officially transferred, but had simply fled.

Exchanges of population were resumed from April 11 to 18, but on a very small scale, while settlement was taking place, in Bratislava, of the financial problems raised by these operations.

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In the whole matter, Czechoslovakia had had Russia behind her. 'We have the support of the Soviet Union in the question of the minorities', said M. Gottwald. But we should fall short of the truth were we to omit to mention that Czechoslovakia's conduct was rather severely judged in the Anglo-American countries, where people were not very familiar with minority disputes, and attached too much importance to respect for the individual, to approve of these mass exoduses—at least in Europe.

The case of the German minority had been the object of Czechoslovak declarations, even before the end of the war, and on this point the Potsdam agreements had merely had to sanction the decision taken by M. Benes and his Ministers to create a homogeneous national State. Consequently, the expulsion of the Germans from the Sudetenland did not give rise to any disputes—eliciting, at the most, humanitarian recommendations on the part of the Western Allies. The 'ceiling' for the expulsions had been fixed at 2,500,000 by the Potsdam agreements; in October, 1946, 750,000 had been sent into the Russian zone, 1,415,135 into the American zone, and 310,000 were authorised to remain on Czech territory; these were skilled workmen, miners, anti-Fascists, relatives of Czechs, old or sick people.[24] There is no

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[24] It should be noted that Czechoslovakia adopted a special treatment for Germans of Austrian nationality residing or temporarily domiciled in her territory. She did not class them with the Sudeten Germans as necessarily to be expulsed, unless they had been members of the Nazi Party.

• 648 563 728 176 doubt that, although their departure corresponded to a legitimate policy of internal peace and security, yet it created in Czech economic life a void that was difficult to fill.

648 457 175 The Americans' remarks on the subject of the deportations were not the only cause (and, in any case, they were passing ones) of the frigid relations between themselves and the Prague Government. The latter had negotiated and obtained a loan of fifty million dollars from the Export-Import Bank—a loan which was to help to finance the 'two-year plan' for Czechoslovakia's economic reconstruction. On October 16 the State Department notified that they had blocked this credit for an indefinite period, because the borrowing country had not provided any compensation for American nationals dispossessed by nationalisation. Another argument advanced was the cutting and, at the very least, injudicious tone adopted by certain Czech newspapers which, at the very moment when their Government was seeking financial aid, accused the United States of using credits as an instrument of economic imperialism. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs blamed the Russians for the latter accusation and expressed regret at Washington's decision.

On the other hand, in November, 1946, England granted a loan of two and a half million sterling, spread over four years, to enable Czechoslovakia to buy surplus British materials. So that Prague's fears of a synchronised Anglo-American policy in the matter of loans were allayed.

[186] Like those of Poland, Czechoslovakia's aims in the discussion on the German treaty were chiefly directed towards disarmament and denazification of the Reich. For the Czechs, the problem of their security was partly settled by the presence of Soviet Russia in the Danube Basin. The dream of one of their thinkers had come true: 'The lime, our Slavonic emblem,[25] is supported by the powerful Russian oak'. And, celebrating the anniversary of the pact of December 12, 1943, between Stalin and Benes, the *Nurodni Ozvobozeni* declared: 'Treaties are usually entered into for a fixed period. Afterwards, they are extended, or they lapse. This one must stand for eternity'.

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[25] The lime was the emblem of the Slavs. At the time of the riots which took place in Ljubljana at the beginning of this century between German and Slovene students, the former sported a cornflower and the latter a lime-leaf.

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Relations between the two countries, intimate in the political domain, developed mainly in the direction of a closer economic collaboration. To this end, commercial agreements were signed at Moscow in April, and especially in July, 1946, between Gottwald, the Prime Minister, and Marshal Stalin. It was during this interview that the Czech statesmen communicated the text of their proposals for the Peace Conference.

These proposals included demands for frontier rectifications, already formulated on May 31, 1945, and reproduced in a memorandum of January 20, 1947, especially as regards the German districts of Glatz and Ratibor, occupied by the Poles. It was an attempt to do away with the two 'notches' formed in the frontier by the upper valley of the Oder (Moravian Gate) and that of the Neisse (Nahod Gap) which had been used in 1866 by von Moltke's army. Thus the roads of approach from Prussian Silesia towards Moravia would be closed. As seen above, these claims had aroused unfavourable reaction in Warsaw.

A few words on the relations between Prague and Paris. As early as October 7, the Czech Government had been in touch with General de Gaulle, who declared the Munich agreements void . . . on the following September 29. On August 22, 1944, the French and the Czech Governments agreed that, when the time was ripe, they would adapt their former pact of alliance to the needs of the existing situation. A 'joint declaration', communicated to the press on February 14, 1947, announced the early conclusion of the new pact.

The peace treaties signed in Paris on February 10, 1947, established a fresh balance of forces on the Continent.

If, treating the territorial alterations occurring between 1938 and 1944 as accidents, we superimpose the 1947 map on that of 1938 (which resulted from the treaties that settled the First World War), we find that this new balance results much less from territorial changes than from a reconstitution of influence.

The territorial changes are indeed unimportant, in comparison with the transformations which the treaties of 1919–1920 made in the map, when the dislocation of Austria-Hungary resuscitated two historic States in the heart of Europe. It is not impossible that, in times to come, the short period between the

•648 728 175 two wars may be regarded as the golden age of the nationalities—the brief realisation of an age-long dream.

If we take the Continent as a whole, although one independent State (Montenegro) then disappeared, eight new nationalities acquired their sovereignty—Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary. And Yugoslavia formed a unitary monarchy around Serbia.

In 1947 the Baltics disappeared from the map as independent States. No fresh creation arose from the treaties, which were limited, as far as Austria and Hungary were concerned, to restoring the *status quo*.

So we might perceive, cast over the new state of affairs, the shadow of Munich and of the decisions taken at the time when the Axis was all-powerful; the amputation of Poland was provided for by the Moscow Treaty of August 21, 1939, that of Rumania stipulated in the ultimatum of June 26, 1940, and in the Treaty of Craïova of September 7, 1940; Poland had been established in the Teschen Basin since October, 1938.

The only countries to come out of these treaties with enlarged territory were Yugoslavia, who advanced in Istria and in Julian Venetia, and Bulgaria, who, getting out of an unlucky adventure very well for once, annexed Southern Dobrudja.

The other nationalities of Central and Eastern Europe were seriously amputated. Rumania lost, with the Dobrudja, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Moldavian district of Herzea—at least one-fifth of her territory. She could, it is true, console herself with the thought that Poland—for whom the Allies went to war—lost just as much (her area was reduced from 242,875 sq. miles to 195,000 sq. miles) and that Czechoslovakia, the victim of Munich, found herself, by the loss of Carpatho-Ruthenia, reduced by one-tenth of her pre-war surface.

So that, out of five Slavonic States, three (counting Russia) were enlarged, two others amputated.

In flagrant violation of Article 2 of the Atlantic Charter, no referendum preceded these transfers of sovereignty. In cases where the new state of affairs created or maintained, ethnical pockets, this was remedied by transfers of population. So, hundreds of thousands of persons were 'displaced', in order to achieve a racial unity within the framework of the new frontiers.

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Human exoduses afforded the solution of the minority problems, which the 1919–1920 treaties had endeavoured to settle by the establishment of *ad hoc* international law. In short, it was a return to the policy of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. In this conception of European statics lay the sole innovation brought about by the latest peace treaties. Is it progress or the reverse? Whatever we may think, from the humane point of view, of this over-simplified settlement of a complex problem, we are obliged to admit that, as time goes on, it will consolidate the physical bases of the new order and ensure its duration.

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Let us hasten to add, however, that scarcely were the treaties signed, when a campaign for their revision was launched. For perhaps the first time in history, this campaign included victors and vanquished, victims and beneficiaries of the new state of affairs. The Yugoslavs maintained their claim to Julian Venetia, Carinthia, and, more discreetly (at least before the international forum), to Aegean ~~or~~ Greek Macedonia. The Bulgarians returned to the attack, with a view to obtaining a territorial outlet on the Aegean—a claim they had relentlessly pressed between the two wars. Hungary, who again saw Eastern Transylvania eluding her grasp, maintained her traditional attitude on revision. It was difficult for Rumania to forget that, after Germany, she was the chief victim of the war. If Polish official circles, for reasons easily understood, did not raise their voices, it was not because that country willingly accepted the loss of her Eastern Marches, whose inhabitants had been 'invited' to settle on the evacuated borders of Prussia and Silesia.

The 1947 treaties settled the two problems on which formerly depended the peace of Europe—the relative strengths of the Germany-Poland-Russia trinomial, and Balkan equilibrium.

Both these problems were settled, without right of appeal, by Russia, the victorious liberator. The axiom formulated by M. Gyöngösy, a Hungarian Minister, applies here: 'In crucial periods of her history, a small nation has no liberty of choice'.

The first of these problems was solved in such a way as to ensure security for Poland, at the price of her diplomatic liberty. It used to be maintained in Warsaw that the Poles could be fully masters of their fate only on condition that Germany and Russia should be neither allies nor enemies—a formula which was as

6: Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16

● 648 175 illogical as it was precarious. Looked at from the historical point of view, Poland's present situation contradicts all the data of her national evolution—which is not to say that it does not offer prospects of stabilisation and duration.

As for the Balkan world, its equilibrium was, for nearly a century, regarded as an essential condition for continental peace. Yet in actual fact, this equilibrium depended far less on inter-Balkan relations than on the balance of strength among the Great Powers in Eastern Europe.

It was first a factor in Russo-Turkish rivalry, then in the antagonism between Vienna and St. Petersburg. The Balkan States only enjoyed real independence after the First World War, when the triumph of the principle of the nationalities ensured for them all the conditions for autonomous development.

With the 1947 treaties, these States entered upon a fresh phase of their history.

186* From the specifically Balkan point of view, this phase is characterised by the abandoning of the ideal of solidarity in which the nations of the peninsula formerly saw the pledge of their liberty, and which used to be expressed in a famous slogan—'The Balkans for the Balkan nations'.

Doubtless this solidarity was never complete. In 1934, Rumanians, Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Turks had concluded an alliance which neither Bulgaria nor Albania had joined. But, in this district, where the diversity of races encourages so many prejudices and atavistic hatreds, it was nevertheless a remarkable progress to find four nations, belonging to four different ethnical stocks, achieving a political and economic *entente*.

Nothing comparable exists today. If Bulgaria and Yugoslavia side with each other, this is obviously the result of similar submission to Russian domination, and we have seen above that their agreement on the Macedonian question was less genuine than was believed. The same may be said of their solidarity with Albania, the main object of which is to make things difficult for Greece.

648 175 Rumania stands aloof from this temporary community of interests. As for Greece and Turkey, they have not relaxed the ties which have bound them since their treaty of friendship of 1932. And their [redacted] of Anglo-American

influence in Eastern Europe. President Truman's resounding message to Congress on March 12, 1947, marked, in this respect, a decisive attitude in connection with American politics in Europe. This message announced material and moral assistance to the two Balkan countries which eluded Moscow's ascendancy. 648 • 175

This simple outline of the new situation in the Balkans shows that the peninsula has, in fact, again fallen under the régime of spheres of influence which was its customary status between the Peace of Berlin and the Treaty of Versailles.

186* 829 Between the Balkan nations and the Slavs of the West, Hungary and Austria gravitate in the political orbit of Russia (Hungary's neighbour for the first time in modern history), but nevertheless see the West as the supreme defence of their historic and cultural individuality, not to mention the opposition movements discernible among the Croats, in whose ears still ring the words of Sufflay, one of their political philosophers—*Occidentem appello!*

But it is not from this territorial reshuffling that there emerges the real physiognomy of the Europe of tomorrow.

This results essentially from the division of the Continent into three sectors—the Western world, the Teutonic world, the Slavonic world; the second being doomed to oscillate between the first and the third until it feels it has attained the conditions of its own development.

Assuredly, all the official manifestations of the Slavonic world avoid the words 'race' and 'bloc'. But facts speak more eloquently than men. On the diplomatic plane Slav solidarity is a reality of international life, though on the psychological plane its outline is less clearly defined. In Yugoslavia, the official press regards the new state of affairs as a complete emancipation, and the very role of France in the Balkans, so long considered as liberating and humane, is often referred to simply under the aspect of a defunct 'colonising' enterprise. Yet in Czechoslovakia they take pains to maintain, with the West, those spiritual connections calculated to preserve for the country its role of intermediary between two civilisations. Poland remains bound to the West by powerful historical and sentimental affinities, strengthened by the desire to safeguard her ancient faith. Bulgaria, more subtle in her politics than Yugoslavia, likewise takes great care not to give the impression of a definite rupture with the West.

795 177 • 648 659 But it goes without saying that it was upon the Churches of the Balkan States that Muscovite influence was exercised most directly and decisively. In Yugoslavia the hierarchy created at Sremski Karlovtsi by Russian exiles, and which Mgr. Antoine, ex-Archbishop of Kiev, had organised immediately after the First World War, was dissolved and had to go into exile. A Russian delegation, presided over by the Metropolitan Serge of Odessa, went to present a mitre to Joseph, Metropolitan of Serbia, in February, 1946. The real object of this mission, which spent a month in Belgrade, was to define the future relations between the Yugoslav Church and the Muscovite Church.

186* 795 659 Then arose the case—a rather complicated one, it must be confessed—of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch, Mgr. Gavrilo. The latter had been accused by the Germans of having hidden part of the Crown treasure; he was interned, then taken to Dachau. When the Allies occupied Bavaria, he preferred retirement to Italy to a return to his country, where he was being begged to resume his duties. He adopted an attitude of opposition towards the régime established by Marshal Tito, as shown [798] by his pastoral letter of Easter, 1946. The Serbian Orthodox Church had been rather badly treated by this régime, for she had been deprived of the education of the young, religious marriage had been declared invalid in law, and she had lost most of her property. It is said that it was under the influence of the Russian clergy that her Metropolitans invited the Patriarch to return. He did, in fact, return on November 14, 1946, and had an interview with Tito, during which 'all misunderstandings were cleared up'. And, as proof of this, at the Slav Congress in Belgrade on December 11, he made a speech in which, after having recalled the sacrifices made for the 'safeguarding of truth, the application of justice, and the defence of liberty', he manifested his joy at finding that the Slavonic peoples 'sorely tried by the bitter experience of their recent and remote past, were expending all their energy in their spiritual unity'. 'Slav solidarity', he concluded, 'is manifested, today more than ever, with the help of our mother, Russia, and of Generalissimo Stalin; it is the surest guarantee of the development of the Slavonic peoples'.

186 795 648 659 In Bulgaria the clergy, after seventy-five years of schism, returned to nominal obedience to the Patriarchate of Con-

stantinople, in agreement with the Muscovite hierarchy. The 186*
thousandth anniversary of the death of the anchorite, Saint John 795
of Rila, restorer of Bulgarian monastic life, was the occasion, 648●
in May, 1946, of impressive solemnities which were attended by 659
the Patriarch Alexis. It was the second time in ten centuries
that the head of the Russian Church had visited the monastery.
He officiated in person. The head of the Communist Party,
George Dmitrov, took the opportunity of reminding the Bulgarian
clergy that they should no longer look back towards the fallen
régime:—

'Today we can ask that our Church shall remain faithful to her millenial traditions and become, in fact, a Republican Church, by ceasing to render homage to the dynasty and the monarchs who have betrayed the Bulgarian nation. Let our Fathers in the Holy Synod and all honest servants of the Church understand that today we are living in new times, that they must on no account thwart the aspirations of the people, and that they may take example from the chiefs of the Russian Orthodox Church'.

We can fully understand this warning only if we visualise the 659
state of latent tension existing in the relations between the
Church and the Bulgarian State since the liberation. It had [871]
shown itself, since the month of January, 1946, in a protest from
the Exarch, Mgr. Stephan, against the prohibition of religious
instruction in the schools. Since the new Constitution provided
for the separation of the Churches and the State, the Bulgarian
Holy Synod announced in December, 1946, that, while remaining
hostile to this separation, it would nevertheless accept it if the
Charter surrounded the exercise of the Church's spiritual mission
with juridical guarantees. Moreover, it demanded that lay
instruction should be neither anti-religious nor anti-Christian,
but strictly neutral.

At the same time, in order to create conditions facilitating [85]
adaptation to the new state of affairs, it announced a programme
of reforms destined to 'democratise' the internal régime of the
Church and to bring its principles more in line with those of
popular power.

So that, in Bulgaria, the separation did not appear as persecu- 186*
tion; it was manifested rather by a strengthening of the 659
autocephalous character of the Church, too closely bound up

186* 659 with Bulgarian national life to be neglected by the new régime, which will continue to subsidise it, and counts upon its co-operation in rallying the masses; in which, moreover, it is assured of the goodwill of Mgr. Stephan and his clergy. On August 28, at the Bachkovo pilgrimage, Mgr. Cyrille, Metropolitan of Plovdiv, made a speech urging the faithful to vote, at the referendum, for the Republic and against 'the abhorred monarchy, whose role', he said, 'has been as fatal in the history of the country as in that of the Church'.

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185 Whereas, in the Balkan countries, the religious problem lay in getting the clergy to forget that they had, for some centuries, been the support of the monarchical institution, it had a quite different aspect among the Western Slavs, where the problem was, first and foremost, the liquidation of Uniatism.

175 795 •648 As the reader will know, the 'Act of Union' (hence the word 'Uniat') was concluded three and a half centuries ago, in 1596, at Brest-Litowsk, where the Metropolitan of Kiev acclaimed the renewal with Rome of the Union of Florence. As a result, since that date there had been flourishing communities 'of the Oriental rite', which recognised Papal supremacy while keeping their national liturgy and their discipline—which, among other regulations, permits (as the Orthodox Church does) the clergy to marry. These communities today number in all about two million followers, especially in territories formerly incorporated in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

[829] Uniatism had always been regarded by the Russians as a 'turning movement' on the part of the Roman Catholic Church, supported first by Poland, then by Austria-Hungary, to detach the Orthodox from their traditional faith. Urban VII's apostrophe: 'Ruthenians, the East will be conquered by you!' has obsessed the Muscovite Church, which has never ceased to endeavour to recapture its positions.

After the fall of the Tsarist régime this Church's efforts were paralysed by the crisis she was herself experiencing, and by the official atheism professed by the Soviet State. The Holy See sought to take advantage of this crisis to restore the 'seamless robe of Christ'. It gave repeated proofs of solicitude, placing the Uniats on a footing of complete equality with their brethren of the Latin rite. It cherished the hope, thanks to these Uniats,

of one day seeing Slavonic Christianity return to Catholic unity, 175
and the immense flock of all the Russians come back to the 795
Roman fold. As is well known, the critical point in dogma is 648
the divergence between the two Churches regarding the proces- [771]
sion of the Holy Ghost. It is the famous 'Filioque' quarrel. Now, in the Liturgy published by the Holy See in June, 1943, for the use of the Russians and Ruthenians, the *Credo* is given according to the version of the early centuries, without reference to the 'Filioque'—in other words, ignoring the chief dispute which separated the Orthodox from the 'Romans'.

In spite of these concessions, Orthodoxy has never given up. In Carpatho-Ruthenia the number of its followers doubled from 1921 to 1930. Moscow had nothing to do with this; at that time it was the Serbian Patriarchate which presided over the destinies of the Russo-Carpathian Orthodox Church.[1]

And, after the incorporation of the Eastern Marches of 795
Poland and of Carpatho-Ruthenia in the Soviet Union, a 185
counter-offensive for the return of the Uniats to Orthodoxy 648
was organised, using the customary resources of Russian political power. On June 18, 1945, a Committee of Initiative was formed, with a view to winning over these Catholics to Pravoslav unity. A 'Council' of the Uniat Church of the Western Ukraine was held in Lwow on March 8, 1946; it proclaimed the dissolution of ties which, for 350 years, had bound that Church to the Vatican,[2] and its submission to the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church. In the name of the delegates of the three Uniat Eparchies which were represented at the Council, a message was sent to Stalin announcing this decision, and the breaking of the spiritual bond between the Eastern Catholics and Rome.

The Bulletin of the Moscow Patriarchate[3] commented on this event as follows: 'So, gradually, day by day, in union and in united prayer, will the breach opened by Rome within the ranks of the Orthodox clergy be closed; the time is not far distant

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[1] In 1921 the figures for Ruthenia were: Catholics 55,000; Uniats [162]
332,500, and Orthodox 60,997.

[2] The anniversary of the connection was commemorated by the encyclical letter *Orientales omnes ecclesias*, published on January 19, 1946, in which the Pope accused the Russians of treating the Catholic Ruthenians as enemies of the State and encouraged the latter to persevere in their traditional faith.

[3] February 6, 1947.

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when the word 'Uniat' will survive only as a historical idea'.

The Vatican published a note contesting the validity of this Council, recalling that part of the Catholic clergy of the Ukraine had been cast into prison; it saw, in the Lwow decision, the result of political pressure exercised by apostate priests.[4]

Nevertheless, the movement spread. The Patriarch Alexis, addressing the Uniats of Ukraine—formerly Poles or Czechs—put its development in the domain of political realities: 'You have always been united to Russia and her people by ties of language and of customs. Now that Divine Providence has restored to Russia her ancient frontiers, you are with us for ever'.

In any case the role of Uniatism as the vanguard of Catholicism in the Slavonic world seems to be, if not completed, at least paralysed for many a year, despite the resistance of part of the clergy and the support the dissentients can expect from the Catholic Ukrainians of Canada and the United States. The Bulletin of the Moscow Patriarchate[5] defined the lines on which the 'unification' is being carried on, by opposing the 'œcumenical spirit' to the 'imperialist spirit'. 'Universality is of God; Imperialism is of Cæsar. A new Orthodox era has been inaugurated by the rebirth of Western Orthodoxy at the great Council of Moscow; by the renewal of communion between the Russian Orthodox Church and her Eastern sisters; by the end of schisms and discords among the Orthodox (especially the reconciliation of the Bulgarian Church with Moscow, and the restoration of her rights to the autocephalous Georgian Church, brought into subjection to the Moscow Synod by the will of the autocratic Tsarist régime); by the journey of the Patriarch Alexis who, for the first time, went to pray at the Holy Sepulchre in 1945; and by the visit which the Metropolitan Nicolaï made to the Orthodox Christians of Western Europe'.

Indeed, Orthodoxy is driving its offensive towards the West,

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[4] Radio-Moscow protested, in its turn, against this assertion, affirming that the Council represented 78% of the whole of the Uniat clergy. As for the bishops incarcerated before the meeting of the Council, these were, they said, traitors or accomplices of the German occupation. Cf., for the Catholic point of view on Moscow's policy regarding the Uniats, Charles Pichon: *Le Vatican*, in the series *Le Monde et l'Histoire* (Editions S.E.F.I.), pp. 396 *et seq.* According to Pichon only 5% of the Uniat priests had obeyed the Soviet injunctions.

[5] Of February 2, 1947.

beyond the territories placed within its traditional sphere of 795 185
influence, and especially in Czechoslovakia. 648•

It is true that the saints given to the Church by the Czech 175
nation in the tenth century appear both in the Orthodox and in 779
the Roman calendars, but Orthodoxy disappeared as an official 795
religion in the twelfth century. However, its influence did not completely disappear; it still had a latent existence in the time of John Huss and his disciples, who established relations with the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1451—which relations were interrupted by the capture of the city by the Turks two years later.

With Joseph II's Edict of Tolerance in 1781, Orthodoxy, previously eliminated by the religious reaction known as the Counter-Reformation, re-established itself in Bohemia. We have related above (p. 24) the enthusiasm with which the people of Prague heard a Serbian prelate conduct an Orthodox service and pray for the soul of John Huss on the Wenceslas Square, on the occasion of the 1848 Slav Congress. In 1874 the use of the Catholic Church of Saint Nicholas was granted to the Orthodox cult, which thereafter worshipped in it concurrently with the National Church. After the Vatican Council, and in spite of the hostility of the Austrian authorities, conversions which created a great stir took place. But it was only after the First World War that the Orthodox Church was organised in Bohemia. Not being able, at that time, to attach itself to Moscow, it placed itself under obedience to the Serbian Patriarchate of Karlovtsi, which, in September, 1921, consecrated the first bishop. This Czech Orthodox Church was itself torn by the current of dissidence created by the 'Czechoslovak National Church', which claimed to be based on the ideas of John Huss, but was in reality far from being so. In 1929 the Patriarchate of Belgrade approved the constitution of an Orthodox Eparchy (Bohemia-Moravia-Silesia) in which divine worship was offered in liturgical Slavon and in Czech.

When the two Resistance heroes who were parachuted to deliver Bohemia from her torturer, the 'Protector', Reinhard Heydrich, had executed the latter,[*] they hid in the crypt of the

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[*] The execution took place on May 27, 1942, on the outskirts of Prague, in a street which bore the symbolical name of Strossmayer. The practical details of the murder curiously resembled those connected with the

Chapter Eight

SLAV SOLIDARITY BREAKS UP

186* WE have already spoken of the resurrection of the Slavonic idea during the Second World War—the only European conflict in history which found all the Slavs on the same side of the fence. We reviewed the congresses of 1942–1945 which restated the old themes of Slav solidarity, based on the liberating rôle of Soviet Russia. Never had such unanimity been shown within the Slav community. For the first time 'Panslavism' could be spoken of as a reality in international life.

186 728 175 This 'Panslavism', uniting the oppressed, occupied peoples against Hitler's Reich, was not to last long. It made itself felt again in 1946 and 1947, but in a purely oratorical form, and exclusively in justification of Russian ascendancy over the countries of Eastern Europe. In reality, it was again the Slavs who benefited least from the victory. While it is true that Bulgaria came out of the war with enlarged territory, this was due to an agreement concluded under the auspices of the Axis Powers. Czechoslovakia and Poland suffered the loss of a large part of their eastern territories. Yugoslavia recovered part of Istria, but her claims to Trieste and Southern Carinthia met with opposition from the Western powers, and were backed by the Russians only within the limits of their own interests. The state of affairs created by the Soviet Union within the area subject to its influence failed to reflect any Slavonic trend, or any preferential treatment for the 'sister nations'.

177 .18 186 •648 175 The Kremlin is aware that the Slavonic world is an object of aversion to the Rumanians and the Hungarians. It can retain these in its orbit (into which it will try to attract Greece) only by lulling to sleep the old Slavophile ideology, or by relegating it to the rank of 'romantic values'. It is to the collaboration of Slavs and non-Slavs on the basis of Lenin-Stalinist Marxism that the Kremlin looks, for the creation of an eastern community, modelled on its own institutions and obedient to its watchwords. From 1946 onwards its whole policy, in this part of Europe, aimed at directing the guidance of the satellite States more and more into the hands of the Communists. This policy was to be

pursued on parallel lines, in Slav and non-Slav countries alike. 177 .18

On the instigation of Moscow, these countries entered into 186
treaties of friendship and mutual assistance. These were so 648•
worded as to give the impression, at first, of being designed to 175
wipe out long-standing heritages of hatred or distrust between
peoples hitherto antagonistic to one another. Passed for a period
of twenty years, and all on the same lines, these treaties were
signed on the following dates:—

November 27, 1947: between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.
December 8: between Hungary and Yugoslavia.
December 16: between Bulgaria and Albania.
December 19: between Yugoslavia and Rumania.
January 16, 1948: between Bulgaria and Rumania.
January 24: between Hungary and Rumania.
February 4: between the Soviet Union and Rumania.
March 18: between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria.
April 23: between Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.

The commentaries which accompanied the signing of these [829]
agreements spoke, with ever-growing emphasis, of the 'peril' to the peace of Europe involved in the attitude of the Western powers. Centred at first on the German menace, they subsequently referred to fresh risks, clearly indicated. Thus the Soviet radio declared that the pact between Bulgaria and Moscow acquired significance from the fact that 'certain Western powers have, under the patronage of the United States, taken the creation of military blocs as the basis of their policy'.

Even the idea of a 'Balkan Federation', which in 1944 had found partisans in Moscow, was gradually pushed into the background, for fear that the essential core of this federation, the Bulgarian-Yugoslav bloc, might create a Slav community, which should one day grow strong enough to adopt an attitude of independence in regard to the Soviet Union. So, although it was originally inspired by Russia, this project for a union was later to be denounced by the Kremlin as a ruse of 'Western imperialism', and Dimitrov, the Bulgarian Premier, was to be disavowed by Moscow, in January, 1948, for having made an untimely allusion to it.

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The standardisation of Soviet policy in Europe was to take 648
its definite shape in the conference held in Warsaw in September, 665
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177 648 665 175 1947, by the delegates of the Communist Parties of nine European nations. It was then decided to set up a 'Joint Information Bureau' (*Kominform*), whose function would be to ensure organic liaison between these different parties, with a view to co-ordinating their activities and pooling their experience. A communiqué was broadcast on October 9 by the delegate of the Russian Communist Party, Idanov, a member of the Soviet Politburo. He contrasted the 'war-mongering' of the Western States with the 'pacifism' of the 'popular democracies' placed [185] under the influence of the Soviet Union. He[1] affirmed the mission of the Communist Parties to combat 'attempts at enslavement', the most dangerous form of which was, in Moscow's view, the Marshall Plan.

The seat of the new organisation, which was to publish a bi-mensual organ, was fixed in Belgrade. Its activities, in conformity with policy dictated by the Kremlin, aggravated the crisis in relations between East and West, and opened the period of tension to which the name of 'cold war' has been applied.

The Kominform is not a resurrection of the Komintern, dissolved in 1943. It is based, indeed, on the idea that the 'national' Communist Parties have reached a state of maturity and power which enables them to be henceforth regarded as autonomous on the plane of the common struggle against capitalist régimes.

The signatories to the Kominform's declaration were: Idanov and Malenkov (U.S.S.R.), Kardelj and Djilas (Yugoslavia), Tchervenkov and Poptomov (Bulgaria), Gheorghiu Dej and Anna Pauker (Rumania), Farkas and Revai (Hungary), Gomulka (Poland), Duclos and Fajon (France), Slanski and Bastovanski (Czechoslovakia), Longo and Reale (Italy).

The Kominform, controlled from Moscow, was rapidly to exert its activities in a domain which its promoters had not foreseen.

186* 665 648 175 Indeed, Slav solidarity, already overtaken and superseded by the watchword of Marxist unity, was to suffer a still more serious set-back from the rupture between Tito and Moscow. It was in Belgrade that the Kominform had set up its seat; from Belgrade came the blow which was to shake its authority, and the dogma of Muscovite infallibility, in the whole of Eastern Europe.

[1] [Delegate of Russian Communist Party, Idanov -- Analyst]

In a motion published on June 28, 1948, the Kominform, 186*
which met in Bucharest from June 16–24, approved the 665
sensational resolution of the U.S.S.R. Communist Party, 648●
denouncing the policy of the Yugoslav Communists and the 175
errors of Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and Rankovitch, 'who have embarked on a road leading to treachery towards the international solidarity of the working classes'.

Thereupon began the struggle between Moscow and Belgrade, which was to grow more acute as the months went by. And the organisation of the offensive against Tito and the progress of 'Titoism'—in other words, 'national Marxism'—in the popular democracies, headed the agenda of all the meetings of the Kominform, especially the one held in Hungary in November, 1949, when a resolution passed at the conference invited even the Yugoslav Communist Party to get rid of the 'spies' and the 'assassins' who were governing the country.

One of the consequences of the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture has been the revival of the old Bulgaro-Serbian quarrel over Macedonia: the Balkans are again being plunged into hatred and irredentism, as we saw them at the end of the nineteenth century, during the Balkan Wars, and in the First World War.

Such were the events which, between 1946 and 1948, transformed the general physiognomy of the Slavonic world. A rapid review of the internal policies of the different countries concerned will show how they evolved.

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Until 1947 the Belgrade Government's policy remained based 648
on complete solidarity with the Soviet Union. The agreements 175
reached on June 10, 1946, during the Stalin-Tito interview, formed the basis for the commercial agreements of July 25, 1947.

The starting-point of the rupture between Stalin and Tito [665]
is to be found in an exchange of letters (in March, 1948), between the (Russian) Bolchevik Party and the Yugoslav Communist Party, regarding the conduct of Soviet officers in Yugoslavia.

But that was only a pretext. In reality, the Soviets could 186*
not forgive Tito for being the only head of an Eastern European 648
Government to pride himself on having been an armed leader 829
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186* •648 829 175 in the fight for liberation, at a time when Russia could not intervene. His dictatorial attitude, his personal prestige, aroused distrust on the part of the Kremlin. On the Yugoslav side, they were shocked by the conceit of the Russians, who lavished instructions and counsel on a nation which considered its own political experience superior to that of the Russians, and who, in the course of history, had won and rewon its independence entirely by its own efforts. Serbian pride, wounded by the demands made by Moscow, precipitated the rupture.

565 423 175 On the other hand, Yugoslavia is peopled by an emancipated peasantry; it has made its own agrarian reforms, and has not had to suffer the yoke of political dynasties (as has been the case with Rumania), nor (like Hungary) that of a landed aristocracy. Communism could not get a footing there, either in the same form or at the same speed, as in the other 'popular democracies'.

Finally, the systematic enslaving of the economy of Yugoslavia to Russian interests was bound, one way or another, to provoke violent reaction in Belgrade.

186* 665 648 175 687 It was nevertheless a surprise for the world when, on June 28, 1948, the Kominform communiqué pronounced the condemnation of Tito and his collaborators, accused of desiring to establish themselves by a régime of terror, of over-estimating the possibility for their country of safeguarding its independence without the assistance of the other Communist Parties; finally, of seeking the support of the capitalist States.

Dr. Pijade, the theoretician of Tito's régime, felt able to reveal[1] that the Kominform's resolution simply reproduced a text prepared in Moscow: he stated that the hands of waverers had been forced by a lying assurance that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party contained spies on behalf of England and the United States.

175 648 [439] Then began a diplomatic battle between Moscow and Belgrade: at first it took the form of a criss-cross exchange of notes, then that of an economic boycott and, finally, of a vast scheme to detach Yugoslavia from the other popular democracies and reduce her to isolation.

The diplomatic notes at first (July-August, 1948) dealt with the fate of Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia; then (August-

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[1] Speech made on July 8, 1949, at Novi Sad.

September) the role played by the Soviet Union in international 175
conferences regarding Yugoslav claims to Southern Carinthia. 648
In one of these notes (August 11) Moscow accused the Belgrade [186]
Government of acting 'not as an ally, but as an enemy of the
Soviet Union'.

'We can establish Socialism without the U.S.S.R.', Tito 186*
had declared. 175
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For a few months the Belgrade press attacked the Komin- [665]
form, without going so far as to mention its real promoters. On May 30, 1949, for the first time, *Borba,* the organ of the Yugoslav Communist Party, openly attacked the Soviet Union, which it accused of seeking to foment the Yugoslav people against the Government. And Pijade denounced 'Russian nationalism', cloaked under the mantle of Marxist orthodoxy, 'which does not allow any other Communist Party to consider itself the equal of the Bolchevik Party, or any other State to raise itself above the level fixed for it by Moscow'. He accused the Soviet Union of recruiting traitors to form a 'pro-Stalin, anti-Tito front' in Yugoslavia.

The friendship and mutual assistance pacts concluded by the [829]
other popular democracies with the Belgrade Government were denounced during the same week: on September 28, 1949, the Kremlin gave the signal for these notices of termination. On October 1 Bulgaria annulled the pact of November 27, 1947, and was followed by Rumania in respect of the pact of December 19, 1947, and by Czechoslovakia (on October 4) in respect of the treaty of friendship of May 9, 1946, and the cultural agreement of April 27, 1947. The Warsaw Government had anticipated matters by declaring, as far back as September 8, 1949, that Tito's Government had 'trampled on and destroyed' the Polish-Yugoslav pact of March 18, 1946.

The heads of the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Moscow, 648
and of the Soviet mission in Belgrade, were recalled during the 687
autumn of 1949, and the majority of their collaborators declared 175
'undesirable', on charges of espionage or sabotage. The cases brought, in Hungary and Bulgaria respectively, against Rajk, ex-minister (September) and Kostov, ex-Vice-President of the Council (December)—cases involving Yugoslavs—were so arranged as to bolster up the Soviet accusations against Tito and his role in the Balkans.

648 175 687 The Yugoslav Government replied by trying, in Sarajevo, some White Russians, naturalised Soviet citizens, who, after having served the occupying authorities during the war, were said to have become agents for anti-Tito propaganda; on December 9 they were condemned to imprisonment for a term of years.

648 175 In the shade of Soviet-Yugoslav antagonism, the old quarrel between Belgrade and Sofia over Macedonia was reawakened.

Early in August, 1947, Tito and Dimitrov met at Bled and signed a protocol providing for closer collaboration between the two Governments: this protocol was to find its application in the 'pact of collaboration and mutual assistance' concluded on November 27 following, at Euxinograd.

648 563 175 [086] Yet, at Bled, there were signs of disagreement. Tito would have liked to see the formation of a Federation of Southern Slavs. But such a federation would imply the inclusion of Bulgarian Macedonia in the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—which would have the effect of committing the Macedonians in Bulgaria to a policy for the future, on the lines of the old Serbian aspirations. Dimitrov shelved the solution of the Macedonian problem until the federal pact should be concluded. The Yugoslavs then insisted that psychological conditioning for the union should be ensured by the granting of 'cultural rights' to the Macedonians in Bulgaria. Now the Sofia Government refused to consider the latter as a minority, and therein lay the germ of the new Bulgarian-Yugoslav crisis.

Later, on December 20, 1948, after the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture, Blagoje Neskovitch, Vice-President of the Belgrade Government, was to claim that the quarrel unleashed by the Kominform arose simply out of the pressure brought to bear by the Bulgarian leaders, with a view to securing recognition of their territorial claims on Vardar Macedonia.

Then Belgrade reproached the Bulgarian Popular Republic with having refused a statute of autonomy and the designation of a 'nationality' to the Pirine Macedonians.

648 175 Thereafter the Macedonian Question remained in the forefront of Bulgaro-Yugoslav relations: a Macedonian, Poptomov, became Minister of Foreign Affairs in Sofia and, when Bulgaria denounced the pact of November 27, 1947, Yugoslavia accused her of violating the peace treaty by refusing to pay the repara-

tions due for the exactions made by Bulgarian troops who occupied Serbian Macedonia during the war. 648 175

Yugoslavia's relations with the other Slav States followed the same lines as her relations with the Soviet Union. In June, 1949, negotiations in view of commercial exchanges with Czechoslovakia came to a standstill. In July, the two Governments exchanged subacid notes: Belgrade accused the Czechs of inspiring a campaign of press hostility towards Tito; Prague replied that any criticism tending to unmask Titoist treachery was 'a mark of appreciation and friendship towards the Yugoslav people'. Such arguments prepared the way for the formal denunciation of the pact of friendship and assistance. The Czechs, like the Poles, accused the Yugoslav diplomats of carrying on subversive activities: there were numerous recalls of diplomatic or consular agents, on the now customary charge of espionage on behalf of the 'capitalist powers'.

On the other hand, Yugoslavia endeavoured to renew commercial ties with the West. Her negotiations with Washington resulted in the agreement of July 19, 1947, liberating 47,000,000 gold-dollars and 220,000 dollars accruing from other Yugoslav credits in America, subject to the settlement of various arrears and repayments under Lend-Lease. The United States granted Yugoslavia the necessary licences for the delivery of materials destined for the equipment of a steel-plate factory; on November 3 they removed the prohibition on the supply of military equipment to that country. 648 457 439 175

And, on December 22, 1949, President Truman, confirming an assurance given by George Allen, his ambassador in Belgrade, declared: 'An act of aggression against Marshal Tito and Yugoslavia would be regarded by the Government of the United States as being just as serious as any act of aggression elsewhere'. [829]

This change of attitude shows the road travelled in Washington since the declarations made, on November 1, 1945, by Secretary of State James Byrne, recognising 'the special security interests' of Russia in Eastern Europe, and affirming that the United States 'would never associate themselves with an intrigue directed against the Soviet Union . . .'.

Indeed, the United States and Great Britain decided to grant economic aid to Communist countries which were 'really independent', and resolved to fight the Kominform. In London,

● 648 in August, 1947, a Yugoslav delegation opened negotiations for
457 a commercial agreement. These negotiations were prolonged,
439 but in September, 1949, the British Cabinet decided to open a
175 credit of £9,000,000 for Yugoslavia.[2]

A parallel change of attitude was shown in the relations between Belgrade and Rome: after rather lively incidents in Julian Venetia, the two Governments drafted, in December, 1948, a reconciliation, which was to be recognised by the commercial agreement of August 4, 1949, in which press commentators saw a political significance. The question of Trieste, which had been settled by the agreement of April 27, 1947, between France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, henceforth became of secondary importance, although Yugoslav claims to the Trieste zone (as to Slovene Carpathia) were never formally renounced.

On October 20, 1949, Yugoslavia was admitted to the Security Council by thirty-nine votes (out of fifty-eight voters) to nineteen for Czechoslovakia.

To sum up: Yugoslavia is seeking to reconcile her fidelity to Marxism with economic collaboration, on a footing of equality, with the Western States. Her attitude is defined in these two declarations made by Tito: 'While remaining solidly in the Socialist camp, Yugoslavia will regard as her enemy any one who interferes with her Socialist construction'. 'With the East we maintain economic relations, without any political set-off. When we sell copper to buy machinery, it is the copper we sell, not our conscience'.

* * *

648 As for Bulgaria, she has maintained with the Soviet Union
696 ties which the Soviet-Yugoslav crisis only served to strengthen.
829 The Government dealt the opposition a mortal blow by con-
175 demning to death the Agrarian leader, Nicolas Petkov, who was executed on September 23, 1947. This execution called forth a declaration of disapproval from the American State Department; on September 29 a speaker on behalf of the Foreign Office

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[2] On July 2, 1949, General Ivan Gochniak, Vice-Minister for Defence, affirmed that, in 1944, Great Britain and the Soviet Union had agreed upon their respective spheres of influence in the Balkans: the Russians were to have a 75 per cent predominance in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania; in Yugoslavia they were to be on an equal footing with the English, in whose sphere of influence Greece was left.

described it as a 'crime against European civilisation', and on 648 •
October 1 it was brought up at the Security Council by the 696
French delegate, Parodi, during a discussion on Bulgaria's 829
candidature for the United Nations. 175

In January, 1948, on the occasion of the signing of a treaty of mutual assistance with Rumania, the Bulgarian Premier, Dimitrov, risked an allusion to a project for the federation of the Balkan States, but this was immediately disavowed by the Kremlin. [185]

Dimitrov died on July 1, 1949; he was replaced as leader of the Government by Kolarov, and at the head of the Bulgarian Communist Party by his brother-in-law, Valko Tchervenkov.

The sentencing (March 8, 1949) of four Protestant pastors, accused of espionage, to life imprisonment, and the imprisonment of eleven others for a term of years, called forth vehement protests in the Christian world, and justified the sending of a diplomatic note by Great Britain, on March 12, in which these proceedings were described as a violation of Art. 2 of the peace treaty concerning 'fundamental liberties'.

The year 1949 was marked by progressive tension in the 648
relations between Belgrade and Sofia. In September the 687
Bulgarian Government denounced the treaty of friendship and, 175
on October 6, the frontier agreement with Yugoslavia. This antagonism, which revived the Macedonian Question, reached a crisis at the trial of Traitcho Kostov, ex-Vice-President of the Council. Accused in March, by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, of 'flagrant errors' (the most serious accusation being that of having invoked the principle of State secrecy in order to withhold information of a commercial nature from representatives of the Soviet Union), Kostov found the charges gradually extended, until he was involved in a plot against the safety of the State, with the complicity of the Anglo-Americans and the agents of Tito. He was condemned to death, and executed on December 16. The Yugoslav press considered this [208]
charge as having been trumped up entirely with a view to compromising and discrediting Tito.

The municipal elections of May 15, 1949, gave the Com- 666
munist-controlled Government of the 'Homeland Front' 175
92.1 per cent of the votes cast (370,000 blank votes); the legislative elections of December 18 raised this percentage to

666 175 98.89 per cent (110,180 blank votes), the electors having no other option than to vote for the 'Front' or to register a blank vote.

185 175 Faithful to the guidance of Benes, Jean Masaryk and Ripka, the Third National Front Government, presided over by Gottwald, endeavoured to secure the triumph of a policy of equilibrium between East and West, between Liberalism and Marxism. 'In our country', declared Benes, 'under the pressure of the masses, Communism has become national.'

• 648 175 The first signs of Soviet pressure were seen when, after the Czech Cabinet had decided, in July, 1947, to accept an invitation to attend the Paris Conference for the application of the Marshall Plan, it was forced, on orders from Moscow, to withdraw its acceptance.

[578] The final crisis was reached in February, 1948. An exceedingly violent press campaign was launched against Vaclav Nosek, Minister of the Interior, as the result of a purge which followed the discovery of illegal arms deposits. The Communist Party accused the National Socialists (Benes Party), the Popular Democrats and the Slovak Democrats of attempting to constitute an 'anti-Communist bloc' within the Government, and of paralysing the legislative power of the National Assembly. Tension reached its peak with the approach of the elections, then fixed for April 11, 1948.

668 642 175 The partisans of obedience to Moscow centred their efforts around the nucleus of the police and the trade union organisations. A 'Central Action Committee' was established, to back up, by mass movements, the offensive led by President Gottwald and his Communist colleagues against the moderate section of the Government. On February 20, 1948, the Ministers belonging to the three incriminated parties resigned. The Marxists held demonstrations in the streets; a political strike was declared on February 4, and the Congress of Works' Committees demanded the removal of the 'reactionaries'. President Benes, taken unawares by the suddenness of this attack, rejected the idea of a Government of Civil Servants and, on February 25, he formed a new National Front Ministry, with Gottwald as President, Gapotocki as Vice-President, Jean Masaryk at the head of Foreign Affairs. The Communists secured entire control of this Cabinet, which was in favour of unconditional collaboration with the Soviet Union. The opposition was reduced to

Congregation of the Holy Office, forbidding the publication and diffusion of Communist doctrine. 659 798 175

So the *Kulturkampf* was waged, now energetically, now quietly. 648 829 659 The Prague Government was accused by the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, of violating 'human dignity and civilisation'; once more the conflict passed from the national to the international level, symbolising the ideological antagonism which exists between the Soviet world and the Western democracies. Neither the Government nor the clergy showed any signs of weakening. On November 17[1] the bishops again asked the civil power to abandon the laws relating to religious teaching, as conceived by the State, and the interference of lay authorities in the nomination of priests and the administration of Church property.

The end of the year 1949 was marked by waves of purges in Communist circles, and by fresh trials on charges of treason, 661 175 incriminating, like those of Budapest and Sofia, Tito's 'agents' or 'accomplices'.

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During this period politics in Poland were somewhat less sensational than in the other Slav countries. 178 659 686 175 There again, however, the régime of 'popular democracy' evolved in the direction of Stalin-Marxism. The struggle against the Church was less open, and did not, as in Czechoslovakia, go to the length of making the clergy civil servants. The Government concentrated its efforts particularly on increasing exports, on economic reconstruction, and on exploiting the German lands brought under its control—and these efforts, it must be admitted, were attended with remarkable results.

The German Question was its chief external problem; in its view, it was France's policy in respect of the Reich which 648 728 175 prevented the renewal of the Franco-Polish treaty of alliance. What Warsaw particularly feared was lest a change of attitude on the part of the Allies towards Germany should reopen the question of the Oder-Neisse frontier, which the Poles considered sacrosanct, but which transferred to them territories whose final allocation was, legally, postponed until the making of the peace treaty for the Reich.

The most sensational event was the nomination (on November 7)[2] of Rokossovsky, the Soviet Marshal (of Polish 177 64 175

1[1949--Analyst] 2[1949--Analyst]

177 origin), as Minister of Defence in the Warsaw Cabinet; he took
•64 as his deputy General Wladislaw Korczye, Chief of Staff of the
175 Polish Army. This appointment was naturally interpreted as a further step in the subordination of Poland to the Soviet interests.

• 648 And the Polish-Sovietic *rapprochement* (at governmental
175 level) had an unexpected result: the expulsion or the trial, on the
696 ritual charge of spying, of French diplomats and nationals (Wroclaw case), thus creating a state of tension between two countries whose friendship had historic and spiritual roots of such strength that no political vicissitudes had hitherto been able to affect them.

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186* Thus the events of 1948–1949 once more disturbed that
648 'Slav solidarity' which had been revived by the Second World
578 War. It cannot be said that there exist, between the Soviet
175 Union on the one side, and Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, on the other, ties which are stronger than, or of any different nature from, those which unite Moscow to Budapest or to Bucharest. The 'collaboration' operates exclusively on the basis of Stalin-Marxism and obedience to Moscow.

On the contrary, the Soviet Union's Enemy Number One is Tito's Yugoslavia. There is violent and complete rupture between the Southern Slavs for the one part, the Bulgarians, Eastern and Northern Slavs for the other.

The historic current which has, periodically, split up the world of the Slavs, has reasserted its mysterious disintegrating force.

Two small but typical facts may serve as a postscript to this study. On Stalin's seventieth birthday the only country which sent no 'homage' to the master of the Kremlin was Yugoslavia. And the President of the Panslav Congress in the United States, George Pirinsky, was imprisoned in Chicago as belonging to an organisation aiming at the overthrow of the American Government by force.

186* 175 succeed in convincing the suspicious Muscovites — they felt a Latin and a Catholic in him, and in accordance with an already well-established tradition they deported him to Siberia. However, that poor Panslavic enthusiast somehow escaped from Siberia and reached the more comfortable Wilno, traveled farther in order to volunteer in the army of Jan Sobieski and to die for the defense of Austria in the Battle of Vienna under the Polish banners which he had vehemently insulted during his Muscovite sojourn.[2]

Indeed, in the Križanić *Politica*, a work written in Siberia, it is possible to find several elements which some 200 years later were crystallized in the Slavophil and Panslavistic systems. As I suggested above, it would be possible to find some even earlier manifestations of Panslavic trends. But first of all we should indeed try to define at least in a general form the essence of this ● [648] doctrine. I think that by and large Panslavism is a conception which embraces two main, divergent currents: one was connected with the movements of and hopes for regeneration and liberation among the oppressed Slavs; and as such this movement was directed against the two main oppressors of these nations — the Turks and the Germans. Since the Germanization of Bohemia and the disappearance of Poland from the map of Europe there has remained only one independent and powerful Slavic nation—Russia. Therefore one could see quite strong tendencies among Bulgarians, Serbs, some Croatians and Czechs, and a few Poles toward Russia as a possible liberator of the Slavs. On the other hand, among the same nations there developed at certain periods, especially in the nineteenth century, conceptions of a Federation of Slavs around Austria and without Russia.

The other expression of the Panslavic movement is the Russian one. The oppressed Slavic nations were looking for liberation, and their Panslavistic conceptions represented their hopes for freedom. Russia had, of course, a different approach to the

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[2] Cf. P. N. Milyukov, *Ocherki po Istorii Russkoi Kultury*, Paris, 1930, vol. 3, pp. 135-185.

186* 829 812 a Slavophil philosophy was fostered by the propaganda of Czechs like Dobrovský, Kollár, and others who championed the claims of freedom for people of good will—propaganda based on affection for the national past and on Catholic conservatism which saw in the Slav world, and particularly in Orthodox Russia, a bulwark against Western Jacobinism. Finally there were many political factors to be taken into account: on one hand, the role of Russia in the Napoleonic Wars and the growing political power of Russia, which was held to be the only power able to win freedom for the Slavic nations; and on the other, the anti-Russian tendencies voiced in the Polish risings, the leaders of which considered the enemy a nest of political reactionaries and a stronghold of violence. All these elements, various and even contradictory though they were, contributed to the establishment of the Slavophil doctrine and at the same time indicated the goal which it might ultimately attain.[3] As far as the purely Russian Slavophil and hence Panslavistic doctrine is concerned, some other factors must also be taken into consideration.

186* 175 I must start *ab ovo*. For several very important historical reasons the Byzantine political influence in Moscow, in the Muscovite ideology, became particularly potent. I have in mind the fall of Byzantium and some other events bound up with this great
● [648] catastrophe. In connection with the more and more imminent Turkish menace, in order to save Byzantium, in order to organize a coalition against the Turks, men in the Roman Church began to consider with even more urgency the already existing concept of a possible union of the two churches; and at the Council of Florence in 1439 the union of the churches was accomplished. The whole Greek world accepted this union. The representative of the Muscovite Church at the Council, the Metropolitan Isidor, also adhered to the union; but unfortunately his adherence did not conform to sentiments at home. And when he reached Moscow, after celebrating masses in Cracow, he was confronted by com-

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[3] This follows my articles, "Poland and the Slavophil Idea" published in the *Slavonic and East European Review*. London. 1928 29.

186* 175 1848, the Crimean War of 1854-56, the Polish Insurrection of 1863, the Slavic Congress in Moscow in 1867, the time of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the period preceding the World War of 1914-18 with the so-called Neoslavism and finally the recent movements organized by Russia in Moscow and in this country among the American Slavic population and the Congress organized recently, also by Russia, in Belgrade.

2. The Polish Problem

186* 668 648 The first "set" of the Muscovite Slavophils was composed of well-to-do people, people belonging to the Russian landed nobility; they had estates with serfs, they had fine and rich apartments in Moscow. In the beginning they devoted their time either to discussions on historical, theological, and literary problems in Moscow salons or to writings in which they expressed their views. And they also manifested these views in a special national type of domestic life; they wore peculiar hats and *kaftans*, which very often provoked sensations in the streets of Moscow; they ate Russian meals and drank Russian vodka. All these details concerning their private lives and their naïve manifestations of Russianism are very pleasantly related in the memoirs of Herzen and Chicherin. At this stage of their development they were rather innocent and pacific, but they later became strongly intolerant and aggressive. Chicherin gives some episodes characteristic of this intolerance and aggressiveness. This appears particularly in connection with the great Slavic and European problem which the Muscovite Slavophils, by the very fate of their doctrine, were the first to be called upon to solve. This problem was the Polish one. Slavic reciprocity, Slavic sympathy, harmony, regeneration, wars for the liberation of the oppressed Slavic nations—all these slogans, ideas, and initiatives could mean but very little in the face of the still bloody Polish nation under the Russian regime. How could other Slavs who were outside of Russia trust all the great promises given to them by the Russian Slavophils and later Pan-

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slavists if these same Slavophils and Panslavists had no solution 186*
for the fate of a Slavic nation which was within Russia? As in 668
our days, Poland was a test case, and without a just solution of 648
the Polish problem there was no possibility of offering any more or less satisfactory solution for the Slavic problem in its entirety. And just here the whole system broke; and sympathy, justice, and harmony were replaced by pure violence. The usurping character of the whole doctrine and its demagogical essence became obvious in the light of precisely this problem. As a matter of fact, the 538
Slavophils had a precursor in this field—and a great one. This 668
man was Pushkin. And unfortunately he may be considered ide- 648
ologically responsible for the direction taken by Russian poli- 186*
tical thought toward Russian-Polish relations. The intransigent and even ferocious attitude which Pushkin took at the time of the Polish Insurrection of 1830-31 predetermined the attitude of many generations of Russians toward Poland.[12] His anti-Polish and anti-European odes published immediately after the defeat of the Polish Insurrection could not but create an abyss between Russia and Europe. This historical event was especially tragic because of the fact that its creator was the most outstanding and captivating symbol of Russian Europeanism—a Russian who indeed might be considered the Peter the Great of Russia in the field of her spiritual culture. Pushkin refused to see that Russia's annexations in Poland brought her geographically closer to Europe only at the cost of moral separation. In his odes he expressed not only a violent anti-Europeanism and an aggressive imperialism but also traced the lines for broad Panslavistic, Panrussian conceptions. These vociferous odes, belligerent as they were, became a kind of poetical citadel, an arch of triumph under which passed one generation after another of Russian Russificators and persecutors of Poland as well as all Russian Slavophils and Panslavists. These odes became a cànon, a national catechism, a kind of lasso thrown by the powerful hand of the great Russian

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[12] I cannot enter into details of Pushkin's role in this case. I have devoted a special book to it.—Cf. *Pouchkine et la Pologne*, Paris, 1928.

186* poet over the heads of Russian politicians, writers, and poets.
668 From this point of view it would be difficult to evaluate the enor-
● 648 mity of the moral disaster achieved by Pushkin. And, as I men-
538 tioned before, the fact that it was just the great European Russian who assumed the responsibility for this makes it particularly painful. One has the right to say that had Pushkin taken a different attitude, the fate of Russian-Polish relations and therefore partly of Russian-European relations could have been different. It is possible, however, that my point of view is too idealistic and that I evaluate too highly the importance of poetical texts in the life of nations; nevertheless I am not at all certain that I am wrong. When examining the works of the Russian Slavophils and Panslavists—the Aksakovs, Khomyakov, Samarin, Pogodin, Leont'ev, Katkov, Danilevsky, Dostoevsky, and even Vladimir Solov'ev (whose opinions were in many respects opposite to those of the Slavophils and especially the Panslavists), whose views are so actual for our own day, one sees how completely Pushkin's poems were in accord with the basic tendencies of Russian nationalistic historical and political thought, and particularly with its anti-Polish aspects. As a matter of fact, the sources of the historic, philosophic, and religious inspirations of the Slavophils were quite different; Pushkin had nothing to tell the Slavophils in this sphere. Yet it is sometimes difficult to resist the impression that they had him in mind and that his "anti-Polish trilogy" was a sort of poetical noose cast over Russian political thought, the coils of which bound even the most courageous and the most spirited.[13] It appeared that the Muscovite Slavophil system was unable to find any solution for the Russian-Polish problem which would harmon-
186* ize with the general conception of Slavic unity. The Slavophil
668 systems, both Russian and Polish (to which I shall come later),
648 failed to produce anything positive and creative: the Russo-Polish
829 antagonism in these systems could be dissipated only at the expense of either Russia or Poland; there was no other alternative. This applies especially to the Russian side—to Aksakov, who in

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[13] Cf. my article "Poland and the Slavophil Idea," as mentioned above.

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the presence of foreigners preferred not to speak of this "family quarrel," and to Pogodin, who, forgetting the ethnographic frontiers of Great Russia, attempted to enclose Poland within ethnographic and "democratic" lines. In Pogodin's opinion the latter boundaries were soon destined to disappear, since the only obstacle to an alliance with Russia lay in the Polish gentry, of "mixed Celtic and Latin origin," which should be destroyed by the Russian government with all possible speed. Aksakov used similar arguments in regard to the old Polish frontiers, while both Strakhov and Katkov attacked these frontiers even more vehemently.[14] Samarin saw in "Latin and Catholic Poland" "not only a historical contradiction of Russia but of all the Slav world." According to him Poland, "having become a poisoned sword and an instrument of destruction in alien hands, has received the same poison into her own flesh and blood." Her only salvation lay in union with Russia, which should become "the historical representative of the Orthodox and Slavic element." This would, in Samarin's view, be the triumph of the one cultural view over the other, although he admitted the possibility of Poland's separation from Russia. Aksakov admitted this separation in the same way, prophesying that in such case Poland would be eaten by Germany. But even here we see the break of the Slavophil conception: the Slavophils indeed did not know what to do with Poland. However, the most characteristic speculations were connected with the analysis of possibilities as to how a real union between Russia and Poland might be realized. The Slavophils were sure that the only obstacle between Poland and Russia was the Polish Latinism and Catholicism—in other words the Polish Western civilization. They thought that this civilization did not penetrate to the masses and that only the Polish inelligentsia—the gentry—represented that civilization. Consistently enough, they advocated the liquidation of this class—a liquidation which would bring into the Russian pale the amorphous masses of the Polish peasantry. This was

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[14] The case of Strakhov, however, was less simple in this circumstance. Cf. my article "Russian Polish Cultural Relations," *New Europe*, New York, 1944.

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186* the liberation and regeneration which the Muscovite Slavophils
668 were trying to secure to the enslaved Polish nation. The whole
● 648 armament of their arguments and weapons may be found in the
829 writings of Aksakov, Pogodin, Samarin, Leskov, Danilevsky, and Dostoevsky. In the light of the present Slav movements organized by Soviet Russia and in the light of the present extermination of the Polish intelligentsia under Russia's "liberating protection" one may see that the most audacious dreams of the Slavophils and Panslavists of the nineteenth century are now being realized. The Russian autocracy was not able to use all means of extermination against the Polish spiritual culture because some of the elements of it were attached to a social regime which the Russian autocracy was bound to protect and preserve in Russia itself. From this point of view Stalin's hands are more free, and his policy of Russification might become more efficient in its destructiveness. However, even at the time of Alexander II and Alexander III, in accordance with the plans of the Muscovite Slavophils and Panslavists the Russian government began certain reforms aiming at the gradual liquidation of the Polish landed gentry through the emancipation of the peasants and through measures favoring the latter at the expense of the former. These reforms would have been entirely justifiable if they had not followed the principle *divide et impera*. Russia was usurping the role of a liberator of the peasants, because the Polish revolutionary national government of 1863 proclaimed the emancipation of the peasants and promised them land without any compensation for the landlords. At this time the Slavophil school became indeed a political one.

And here something very important should be stressed: the Russian democratic and radical groupings were sympathetic to the Poles just because of the democratic character of this insurrection. Such was the attitude of the society *Zemlya i Volya* and of Herzen in his *Kolokol*. They were even trying to prevent the Russian soldiers and officers from fighting against Poles. Herzen at that time published eloquent articles in which he attacked the

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"patriotic syphilis" which was raging in Russia. The whole of 186*
reactionary and nationalistic Russia launched its offensive pre- 668
cisely at this point—the slogan was that the Polish Insurrection 648 ●
was not a national one and that presumably the Polish masses 829
had nothing in common with it. This point of view became the leitmotif of all Katkov's writings, but very soon Aksakov's *Den'* (the organ of the Slavophils) joined Katkov's *Moskovskiya Vedomosti.* The Slavophil phraseology followed that of the government, and Aksakov as well as Samarin explained the Russian-Polish War of 1863 as a war of Slavs against Latinism, as a war of Russia against the Polish landlords. We may see that history indeed repeats itself. The same slogans were used during this war when it was necessary to abolish the legitimate Polish government in London. Herzen understood this situation very well. On January 1, 1864 he wrote in his *Kolokol* as follows: "Having grasped here and there some vague ideas about the social mission of Russia and about her lack of any solid aristocratic principle, our sweet dreamers preach that Russia represents some sort of democratic empire, some sort of kingdom of *equality* and masses, that *she* fights with Poland in the name of the freedom of the peasants against the landlords, etc. Do not be mistaken. . . ."[15]

Sumner in his excellent book *Russia and the Balkans* (Oxford, 186*
1937) brings very correct comments to this development: "The 175
Polish revolt of 1863 unleashed century-old hatred and fears. In 648
the years which followed, the old 'Congress Poland' was mercilessly dragooned within the framework of the administration common to Russia proper while the 'Western Lands' Lithuania, White Russia, and the Western Ukraine were subjected to every measure of Russianism. Meanwhile a campaign was initiated of the same nature in the Baltic provinces and Bessarabia; and, to show without mistaking that Russian meant Great Russian alone, the Little Russian or Ukrainian cultural revival of that time was successfully attacked by Moscow, above all by the prohibition in 1876 of the use of the Ukrainian 'dialect' for any academic or

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[15] *Istoriya Rossii v xix Veke*, vol. 3, Z, Lensky, "Polskoe Vosstanie," p. 322.

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186* 175 ● 648 literary purposes. Symptomatically two of the men most actively associated with this denationalizing, Russianizing policy, were among the most prominent Slavophil or Panslav Muscovites of the day: Prince Cherkassky and Yuri Samarin, a close friend of Aksakov."[16]

186* 668 Cherkassky, Samarin, and N. A. Milyutin worked at the agrarian reform in Poland, and Cherkassky "distinguished" himself in the campaign for reuniting the Uniates with the Orthodox Church. "Samarin and Cherkassky are significant in the Panslav movement in that, unlike Aksakov or the earlier Slavophils, and unlike the professorial type, represented by Lamansky, Miller, or Grot, they were active in administration and were well-known public figures. . . . Both men are also, above all, significant as representing the transformation of the idea of Panslavism into that of Panrussianism." (*op. cit.*, *p.* 67) Characteristically enough, Samarin was, besides all the traits mentioned by Sumner, a "considerable theologian," the collaborator of Khomyakov in this field.

186* 812 It is not mere chance that I mention this trait of Samarin's personality. The Slavophil doctrine was from its very beginning deeply rooted in religious thought. The father of the Muscovite school, Ivan Kireevsky, was first of all absorbed by problems of religious and moral categories. Parallel to the pre-Romantics, the Romantics, and the German idealistic philosophers, he was primarily interested in the spiritual structure of the human personality and in the problem of perfecting it. He was fighting for the unity and entirety of the human personality and believed that the superior truth cannot be conceived by rationalism but by the entire spiritual personality in which the factors of feeling and belief were more efficient than reason. M. Gershenzon, in his book, *Istoricheskie Zapiski* (Berlin, 1932), sensationally enough stresses that Kireevsky committed a mistake which became the starting point for the whole Slavophil Doctrine. Milyukov pretends that the century-old Russian trends toward Constantinople and world domination also originated from a mistake—from an orthographic

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[16] B. H. Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

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186* 829 ing the fact that Byzantinism was the most definite historical type ("for the state it means autocracy, for religion—Orthodoxy, for the moral world—contempt for earthly things, repugnance for the dreams about the earthly happiness of people, humility") and that the "Byzantine spirit with its principles and influences, like the complicated tissues of the nervous system, penetrated he whole Russian social organism," he proclaimed that: "Russia should be frozen so that she may not decay," as every living process ends in death and decomposition—the state in which Western Europe now finds itself. Although there are no universalistic elements in the Russian past, the Russian civilization must be preserved as it is.

For Leont'ev all means are good as "politics are not ethics." He calls for courage, for people who will not fear the words "reaction" and "reactionary," who will understand "that nothing can be achieved without violence" and that in order to stop the "defrosting" of Russia "retrogressive reforms" are indispensable, first of all "the fight against public education because if Russia has succeeded in her resistance against the spirit of the times, she owes it to the ignorance of the Russian people."[32]

5. Tyutchev (1803-1873)

186* ● 648 Perhaps from the purely chronological point of view Tyutchev should have been discussed before Danilevsky. Indeed some of Danilevsky's most essential views were first brought to public opinion in 1869 in the review *Zarya*, in which he said that: "Europe not accidentally but in her very essence is hostile to us. Therefor only when she is in conflict with herself might she be safe for us."[33] In a letter to Aksakov on the second of October, 1867, Tyutchev said: "Civil war in the West is our best political ally."

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[32] K. Leont'ev, *Vostok, Rossiya i Slavyanstvo*, vol. I, vol. II, Moscow, 1885-1886; vol. I, p. 81; vol. II pp. 86, 109-120, 78-152, 180, 24-27; quoted by P. N. Milyukov (Milioukov), *Le mouvement intellectuel russe*, Paris, 1918, pp. 400-410.

[33] K. Pigarev, F. I. "Tyutchev i problemy vneshnei politiki Rosii" in *Literaturnoe Nasledstvo*, vol. 19-21, Moscow, 1935, p. 206.

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(cf. *ibid.*) However, as early as June 26, 1864, Tyutchev wrote 186*
to his sister: "I of course am not one of those who in their gloomy 648 ●
patriotism would like to doom Russia to permanent solitude, isolate and seclude her forever. I admit agreements, but on the condition that they be only *accidental* and that, accepting them, they never forget the truth-dogma, that between Russia and the West there can be no alliance, neither for the sake of interest, nor for the sake of principles, that in the West there exists not a single interest, not a single tendency which would not conspire against Russia, especially against her future, and which would not try to harm us. And this is why the only *natural* policy of Russia toward the Western powers must be not an alliance with one or the other of these powers, but *disunion*, division of them, because, only when they are divided among themselves do they cease to be hostile to us—because of impotence and, of course, never because of conviction. This severe truth will perhaps shock the tender souls, but in the end this is the law of our existence as a tribe and as an empire, and the only way of ignoring this is to cease to be Russian."[34]

The case of Tyutchev is perhaps the most fascinating. Belonging 186*
to a distinguished Russian family, a man with intimate ties with 538
the court, a diplomat, one of the most brilliant Russian poets, the poet of the *Last Love*, the poet of the metaphysic fear of "the cosmos" and the universal "chaos," the poet of nature, the poet who created new rhythms and melodies in Russian poetry, the Russian poet who translated Goethe, Byron, Schiller, Heine, Lamartine, and who himself wrote poems in French, a man who was plunged in religious indifference and scepticism, a pantheist, an "ashamed atheist" who was "entirely foreign in his domestic life not only to orthodox customs of the church, but alien to the traditions of the Russian church,"[35] (words of Aksakov), a man who had an arrogant disdain for the "gloomy grey Russian life," in which he saw only "offices and barracks, *chin* and *knut*," a man

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[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 205-206.

[35] A. Lezhnev, *Dva Poeta*, Gos. Izd., 1934, p. 22.

186* who spent most of his time abroad courting Germans, French, 538 Italians, establishing very friendly relations with Heine, Schelling, and other distinguished poets, writers, and intellectuals in Europe, married to two foreign women who did not know Russian, a cosmopolitan in his private life, "entertaining German barons, poets, and diplomats," always speaking French[36]—Tyutchev became not only in his political treaties, articles, and diplomatic reports but also in his poetry the most violent advocate of Slavophil and Panslavistic ideas and of Russian anti-Europeanism.

186* 648 There were, of course, slight distinctions between him and the Muscovite Slavophils. The kind of patriarchial democratism which characterized them, their adulation of the Russian peasant, their theory about the Russian village community—for all these things Tyutchev cared very little. His primary interests were connected with foreign affairs. He was the "minister of foreign affairs" of the Slavophils. Therefore the Slavic problem was always important to him. He wrote and published many political poems addressed to the Slavs and to the Czechs and poems connected with the Polish problem,—but again in a very peculiar way. When Murav'ev the "hangman" plunged the Polish Insurrection of 1863 into massacres and blood, Tyutchev addressed to him a homage of greatest thankfulness and admiration. And when the grandson of Suvorov, the famous hero of the Prague massacre in Warsaw in 1794, appeared decent enough to refuse participation in a collective address to Murav'ev, Tyutchev launched a mischievous and sarcastic epigram in which he made fun of Suvorov's misplaced humanitarianism. Besides, he, in 1866 wrote a poem glorifying Murav'ev's memory. True enough that in 1831 his attitude had been a little different. He wrote at that time a poem by which Poles have very often been lulled and which was usually quoted as a Russian pro-Polish text. First of all there is, I think, a kind of moral insanity in bringing the name of Tyutchev as a symbol of Russian-Polish fraternity; the name of the poet who in the most cynical way sang the glory of Murav'ev! Besides, even

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[36] Lezhnev, *ibid.*, p. 20.

the poem of 1831 gives a rather peculiar consolation to the Poles 186*
—this is what Tyutchev says to them: "Believe the word of the 648 ●
Russian nation: we shall sacredly preserve your ashes, and our common freedom as a Phoenix will find its birth in them."

In the recent works devoted to Tyutchev such as those of Pigarev, Gippius, Stremoukhov, Lezhnev, one important detail has been revealed. Both the Slavophils and Tyutchev representing the landed Russian nobility, were deeply impressed by the revolutionary movements in Europe. Tyutchev in his anti-revolutionism, became a kind of Russian Joseph de Maistre and he very soon came to the conception that in Europe there existed two powers: Revolution and Russia. He developed this conception in his articles and poems and for many years he was busy with the organization of Russian propaganda in Europe for the spreading of his political ideas.

One of his[1] most significant poems in this respect was the poem 186*
The Sea and the Rock, in which he gives a picture of how the 829
gigantic foot of the rock will appease the stormy waves of the 538
sea. The idea which was symbolically presented in this poem was developed in a political language in his article *Russia and Revolution* written in 1848.[37] His conception of the greatness of Russia developed as a function of the mission which he attributed to Russia; and here his imagination becomes boundless. In his famous poem *Russian Geography* he mentions Moscow, Petersburg, and Constantinople as the *capitals* of the Russian empire, in which he sees "seven interior seas and seven great rivers from the Nile to the Neva, from the Elbe to China, from the Volga to the Euphrates, from the Ganges to the Danube—this is the Russian empire."

This was written by a poet who, although he revealed in his lyrical poetry his tenderness for the "original charm" of the "poor villages," "humble nakedness," "boring nature," of the "land of everlasting patience," did not himself care at all for the Russian landscape. This is what he wrote in a letter to his wife:

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[37] Pigarev, *op. cit.*, *Literaturnoe Nasledstvo*, pp. 195-196.

[1] [Tyutchev's --- Analyst]

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It is true enough that in the very last period of his life as if 186*
having lost his hopes for Russia to achieve that universal mission 829
he suddenly called: "To Asia! To Asia!" "To that great mother of all religions, to the original 'neighborhood of God,' to the sacred nearness of the thousand-year-old contemplators of heavenly revelations—to India and Palestine. . . ."[50]

7. Bakunin (1814-1876)

There is a literary theory that Dostoevsky's "possessed" Stav- 000
rogin is a fictionized portrait of Bakunin. The author of this hypothesis, L. Grossman, accumulated extremely interesting proofs for his discovery. I shall not enter into an analysis of this theory, but it is quite true that the moral labyrinths of Bakunin's life and political revolutionary career lend themselves very well to this comparison. Bakunin's biographers made great efforts to explain and justify by political Machiavellianism Bakunin's rampant attitude towards Nicholas I and Alexander II, and his behavior in Siberia, which was morally paradoxical to say the least. Therefore, there is no doubt that the ideological prestige of Bakunin's political activities as well as of his writings is strongly contaminated by his very doubtful personality. His *Confession* and his letter to Alexander II surpassed the repentence of the Decembrists, the agony of Chaadaev, and the yielding of Dostoevsky. His infatuation for Murav'ev-Amursky and the role he played in
the Irkutsk society are not less astonishing. However, he has his 186*
place and an important one in the development of Slavophil and Panslavistic ideas. Bakunin represents a kind of revolutionary Panslavism, but in this field of his political conceptions one may find the same inconsistency that characterized his moral attitude.

National and Slav feelings as well as feelings of sympathy for 186*
Poland had been awakened in him by Lelewel, famous Polish his- 829
torian and geographer, radical democrat and member of the Rev- 648 ●
olutionary Government of 1830-31, during their meeting in Brus-

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[50] Grossman, p. 213.

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186* 829 ●648 sels. Lelewel "told him about the primitive democratic Polish municipality, about the agrarian Slavic collectivity, about brotherly institutions and customs distorted later by the class structure and the enslavement of people which came from the West. At that time he conceived a new goal for himself which was "a Russian revolution and a republican federation of all Slavic lands, and the establishment of one indivisible Slavic republic, federative only as regards administration, and politically centralized."[51] At that time, under the influence of western European populism and socialism on one side and, on the other, of his intimate contacts with the Polish emigration in Paris, Bakunin started to crystallize his own Russian populist and revolutionary ideas. The first manifestation of these crystallized ideas took place in Paris in 1847 when he delivered his famous Polish speech at the commemoration of the Polish Insurrection of 1830-31. In this speech he attacked Nicholas I, he asserted that the Russian and Polish nations must be reconciled, that both were paying for the discord introduced by Russian autocracy, and that the Russian revolution would bring freedom to both nations. He said that this task could be realized only through the Russian-Polish alliance: without the liberation of Poland, Russian freedom could not be born. And finally he called for the liberation of all Slavic nations in order to bring about the final collapse of despotism in Europe.

186* 668 [575] A little more complicated was the atmosphere of the Slavic Congress in Prague, in which he took part and delivered several speeches. At that Congress, as we know, Palacký advocated the idea of a Slavic federation with Austria in which the Czechs would play the dominant role. This idea was not popular among other Slavs, and the atmosphere of the Congress was not at all encouraging.

Bakunin first of all stressed the fact that Russia, by enslaving Poland and especially by giving a part of her to the Germans—the main enemies of the Slavic race—tore herself away from Slav-

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[51] J. Kucharzewski, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 161-162; cf. also V. Polonsky, *M. A. Bakunin*, vol. I, Gos. Izd., 1925, pp. 155 156.

slavism of a special order, which would consist of grouping the 000
different Slavic nations under the sceptre of the Romanovs as protected powers. This thought appears from the beginning to the end 186*
in the long Panslavist epos of the Slovak poet Kollár under the 829
title *Slávy Dcera*. The poet visualizes the peoples as united to 538
form a sort of Colossus modeled on the Babylonian Colossus of the Bible. Russia forms its head, Poland its heart, Bohemia and Illyria are its hands and feet. It would be imprudent to contest what the ideas have of the seductive and the dangerous, one must indeed recognize the exxistence of a Russian Panslavism, only one may deny its Slavic character and that it ever could possess the sympathy of any independent Slav."

C. Robert stresses another important point when speaking about 000
the activities of the "great protector" among the Danubian and Adriatic Slavs. He would protect them on the condition that they would never follow the example of Serbia and show any pretension for a distinct national existence. "Let one look through the history of these Russian protectorates since the protectorate has been exercised over the last kings of Poland and Georgia to those which the tsar exercises at the present time over the Serbian and Moldavian-Wallachian principalities and over the crumbling Persian empire. One will see that these various protectorates have always had and still have as a unique aim to prevent the protected nations from rising from their humiliation and being reborn to independence."[87] More than that, the same C. Robert observed that during the upheavals in Cracow and Galicia Russia constantly played the role of an ally of Germany.[88]

On the other hand from time to time, as we may see not only in 186*
the brilliant articles of Marx but also in the extremely interesting 648 ●
recent publications of the Soviet scholar Tarle connected with the Crimean War, the tsardom was ready to utilize the Panslavic conceptions when they appeared advantageous for it. It is quite true, for instance, that for Nicholas I it was not easy to combine his

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[87] *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1846, pp. 472-473.

[88] *Ibid.*, p. 479.

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his Scotch origin, with Dostoevsky and his Polish origin, and 000 Gogol with his Ukranian descent, not to mention Kantemir, Fonvizin, Delvig, Boratynski, Korolenko, Blok, and so many others? And is it not really stupefying that the ultimate aggressiveness of an Asiatic Scythian Panslavism found its expression in the terrible poem *The Scythians*, written by one of the most European of Russian poets, the above mentioned Alexander Blok?

Let us return again to the Russian Polish problem, which is 186* edifying enough. The Russian Slavophils and Panslavists, who, 648 ● because they were indebted for their inspiration to European humanitarianism and idealism, seemed to have been destined in theory at least to sanction Poland's right to independence and thereby to redeem the political crime committed by Russia, never proved capable of being true to the dictates of political conscience. They remained blind even to the dictates of necessity, because any attempt to achieve the unity of the Slavic world as long as the Polish question was unsettled was chimerical, just as indifference to Polish national injuries was dishonesty of thought and conscience. No wonder, then, that the Russo-Polish *mariage forcé* was not dissolved by the Slavophils and Panslavists; divorce by collusion was achieved between those Poles and Russians who lacked connections with the Slavophil traditions and represented the spirit of positive Western thought. It is indeed striking to note the absence among the Russian Westerners of any irreconcilable hostility toward Poland. From the brothers Turgenev, who are contemporaries of Pushkin down to Granovsky, Stankevich, Chicherin, and the later liberals, the Westerners, although they realized the difficulties of solving the antagonism, did not succumb either to Slavophil fancies or to an elemental Slavophil hatred for Poland. The Polish problem, as I mentioned above, was from the very beginning the most important obstacle to the advancement of Slavophil ideas, for either the system collapsed or the "unity" of "indivisible Russia" was endangered; consequently the Russian Slavophils and Panslavists were frozen into immobility by the dangers of both alternatives and were unable

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186* 648 to pursue their proper course. An exit from this dilemma did, however, exist and was discovered by the Westerners. Characteristically enough, the author of the manifesto by which the Provisional Government of Prince Lvov proclaimed Poland's independence, Professor Milyukov, was one of the most brilliant critics of the Slavophil and Panslavistic doctrines. His collaborator in this field was a Pole, Alexander Lednicki, who also never had any tendencies toward the Slavophil fancies but from the beginning to the end of his life remained faithful to his European orientation.

But perhaps the most edifying Russian example of the overcoming of nationalism and chauvinism by Christianism and humanitarianism is to be found in the "Polish story" of Tolstoy —in the touching tribute paid to the Polish martyrdom which truly inspired this great Russian writer.[92]

13. "Facies hippocratica"

186* 829 648 After this rapid course through the thoughts of so many Russian, Polish, Czech, Slovak and other writers and politicians, one unavoidable conclusion is that practically all of them, in spite of their political conflicts, ideological contradictions, and national antagonisms, agreed on one point—the recognition of the moral weakness and lack of moral dignity of Europe. Of course their approaches, motives, points of view, and goals were different. The Russians stated the moral decrepitude of Europe in a more or less speculative way. The Muscovite Slavophils could, after all, take an attitude of indifference and disinterestedness towards Europe. Russia could separate herself from the West and build a life independent from Europe. The Russian Panslavists could try to take advantage of the weakness of Europe for the realization of their Russian imperialistic views. The other Slavs, and especially the Poles, were in a different situation—for them the di-

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[92] W. Lednicki, *Quelque aspects du nationalisme et du christianisme chez Tolstoï*, Cracow-Paris, 1935.

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lemma, Europe—Russia, was not a question of speculation—it 186*
was a question of life or death. What did Europe give to the 829
Poles? Every day of their life was a day of betrayal by Europe 648 ●
of those ideals which Poles considered Polish ideals because of the very fact they were European. This is the main item of the Polish political texts of that period; and perhaps the most eloquent and at the same time tragic expression of these feelings is to be found in the famous message of the Polish National Government of August 15, 1831 addressed to its Western agents: "Truth, seen whole, has appeared before our eyes. We no longer count on the support of the great powers, who could and who would not, who still can and who will not, save us. We can no longer place any faith in the promises which they have made to us and which they belie by their conduct. . . . England and France, then, would not have employed us for the occasion except as an instrument fit to serve the course of their interests. England would not have lulled us with a few illusions except in order to have one more method of establishing the independence of Belgium. And France would not have made promises to us except to win a majority in the Chambers. Will faith, then be wholly banished from cabinets, and the words of a French and English minister be nothing but worthless farthings? . . . If France and England abandon us today and fail to justify the hopes that they have aroused, our ruin will have been brought about, not by the fury of Russia, or the hostility of Prussia, or the indifference of Austria, but by the self-styled sympathy shown us by France and England. . . . If the cabinets lack the courage to help us, let them at least possess enough dignity to acknowledge their barbaric indifference toward our cause. And if they have ignored the duty imposed on them by prudence, morality, and humanity, the Poles will know how to follow him who prescribes to them the sanctity of their rights and the love of their country. . . ."[98]

For Poland was facing not only the loss of her independence but a complete change of her historical mission. For centuries

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[98] W. Lednicki, *Life and Culture of Poland*, pp. 212-213.

186* she was considered the *antemurale christianitatis,* the rampart of
829 Western civilization. An absorption by Russia within the frames
648 of a Panslavistic conception would mean that Poland would become an anti-Western rampart. This is what Count Valerian Krasiński stressed already in 1848, foreseeing the present Polish catastrophe; Krasiński wrote: "If however the Poles will see that they have no chance of receiving from other nations and particularly from the Germans, the necessary assistance for the recovery of their country's independence, and that those nations in granting them some advantages, have no other object in view, than to make use of them as a bugbear to frighten Russia, in order to prevent the consolidation of the internal strength of that country by an intimate union of its Slavonic elements, being themselves ready to sacrifice the Poles as soon as their interests may demand it. If such a conviction becomes prevalent amongst the Poles, and there can be no doubt that it is rapidly spreading, what will then remain to them except cordially to unite with the Russians and to become, from a barrier between Russia and the rest of Europe, the vanguard of the Slavonic race against western Europe and Germany in particular."[94]

000 There was perhaps some consolation in the fact that the Poles, Russians, and the Slavs in general were not alone in their pessimistic critique of Europe. The Polish catastrophe, which absorbed the Poles and became a test case for all conceptions of Slavic union, was not the single factor that shook all European life in 1830-31 and in 1863. The French Revolution inaugurated a long period of upheavals and perturbations—revolutions, wars were following one after the other and the thunder of social turmoils was constantly menacing Europe during the whole 19th century. Have I to mention here the piercing voices expressing despair and "Weltschmerz," the voices of Chateaubriand, Byron, Alfred de Musset, Alfred de Vigny, and so many others as far as the "period of transition," to use Krasiński's formula, is concerned? Have I to recall the pessimism of H. Taine, the indig-

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[94] Valerian Krasinski, *Panslavism and Germanism,* London, 1848, pp. 218-219.

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disciples of Methodius made their influence felt that Christianity as religion made real progress among the Serbs, and 797 even so, many pagan customs were retained and, more or less, blended with the new Faith. But the official conversion of the Serbs is dated from the baptism of Mutimir. During his reign the Serbian Church was under the direct influence of Byzantium and the services were in Greek. But as Bulgarian ascendency became predominant in the Balkans, Byzantine suzerainty gradually gave place to Bulgarian, and the Greek liturgy to the Slavonic.

The first Bulgarian king to receive baptism was Boris, 659 who reigned from 852 to 889 and was one of the ablest monarchs in Bulgarian history. Christianity had penetrated into Bulgaria before that time, and there had even been some persecution of it, due largely to fear of it as an agent which prepared the way for foreign and, in particular, for Byzantine domination. Boris was a statesman and although his own personal religious convictions played their part in his acceptance of Christianity, there were other considerations also that he had in mind. To make his realm a Christian State was some defence against the political and religious missionary zeal of his Christian neighbours. Further, it would tend to consolidate his own position. The great bulk of his subjects were Slavs, and many of them already Christian; the Bulgars were a ruling minority among whom Boris was the chief of many rulers. To favour the Slav element in his realm, therefore, and to Christianize it would be to break the power of the Bulgarian nobility and establish himself as sole ruler with all the force of the current Christian conception of royalty and the divine authority delegated to kings, to support him. The revolt of the Bulgarian nobles which subsequently broke out showed that they realized all this clearly enough, but they were too late.

In furtherance of his plans Boris looked first towards Rome 659 for the same reason that Rastislav of Moravia had looked to 648 Constantinople, i.e., each looked to the opponents of those from whom their own danger was greatest. But the Byzantine Emperor and Photius, then at the height of his quarrel with the Pope, were just as much alive to the facts and struck first.

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Boris found his country invaded and himself compelled to receive baptism at Greek hands. Accepting the situation, Boris now set himself to achieve the independence of the Bulgarian Church and with much astuteness availed himself of the bargaining power which the quarrel between Rome and Constantinople placed in his hands. He would have preferred to align himself with the West, and he made urgent and persistent efforts to induce the Pope to give him a Patriarch of his own. Pope Nicholas, who saw a chance of recovering for the Papacy the jurisdiction of which Leo III had deprived it, gladly sent Boris a couple of bishops, Latin service books and much good instruction (in answer to Boris's questions), but not a Patriarch. So Greek priests and books were turned out and Latin took their place and Boris continued patiently but urgently to press his request. But the Pope's star was in the ascendant, in 867 the Byzantine Emperor was assassinated, and the Patriarch Photius deposed. Feeling the ball at his feet the Pope ignored Boris's requests and adopted a high-handed policy towards him.

Boris lost patience and turned to Constantinople, which was ready enough to receive his overtures. But in view of the fact that a Council had been called to try to settle the differences between the two great sees, the question of the Bulgarian Church was submitted to it. The Council was packed with Eastern bishops, and in spite of the protests of the Papal legates who were present, naturally it was decided that the Bulgarian Church should be under the jurisdiction of Constantinople. An archbishop, with considerable independent powers, was appointed for Bulgaria. He was himself a Bulgar and with a train of bishops and priests he left for his archbishopric where once more everything Latin was replaced by Greek. Thus the victory in this affair remained with Constantinople. Not that the Papacy acquiesced in it. Much expostulation, many exhortations, and the sternest threats issued from the Pope, but no one paid any attention. But the time came when the sagacious Photius, now again Patriarch, thought it prudent to try to secure the Pope's recognition of his status. The Pope agreed provided that Bulgaria was restored to him.

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The matter was once more submitted to a Council (in 879) 659 which, surprisingly, decided that Bulgaria should be returned 648 to Rome. But Boris refused to be returned to Rome. It is possible that this was a contingency which had been foreseen by Photius, but in any case he loyally abode by the agreement reached, sent no more clergy to Bulgaria, and remained on good terms with Nicholas's successor, John VIII. The final decision had, however, been reached and the Bulgarian Church was to remain within the orbit of Orthodoxy. One other aspect of Boris's policy remained to be realized. To make his Church a really national institution, worship must be in the language of the people, to whom the bewildering changes from Greek to Latin had meant but the substitution of one foreign language for another.

The disciples of Methodius, who had just been expelled 659 from Moravia provided Boris with precisely what he needed. 648 The less important of these unfortunate men had been dubbed heretics and sold as such into slavery, the more prominent 797 leaders, Gorazd, Clement and others more politely conducted to the Danube and bidden to cross it, never to return.

Boris gave them a cordial welcome, and under his patronage they did a great work, far-reaching and permanent, for Slav Christianity and culture. A centre for the training of a Slav clergy was established, a Slav Bulgarian Church was organized, and many translations into the Slav language were made. Boris was wise and skilful enough to effect these changes without offending Byzantium and his own Greek hierarchy, and the latter were in due course replaced by Slav bishops. Thus through Clement of Okhrida and his companions the work of the Apostles of the Slavs bore a rich harvest among the Slavs of the Balkans. For the political ascendency of Bulgaria continued to grow until for a while it wrested the hegemony from Constantinople itself. Boris's successor, Simon, was an outstanding personality, who not only decisively defeated the Byzantines in war, and had himself crowned with an imperial title, but himself a scholar and erstwhile monk, carried on his father's ecclesiastical and cultural policy and declared the Bulgarian Church autocephalous. Thus was welded into shape in Bulgaria a cultural and religious instrument which was ready to hand when needed for the evangelization of Russia.

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but they at least tolerated Christianity, and Olga who lived until 969 was able to foster the growing Christian community. 777

It was Vladimir, an illegitimate son of Svyatoslav, who less than twenty years after Olga's death took the decisive step and accepted the new religion for himself and his people. He was lord of Novgorod and made himself master of Kiev. Much discussion has taken place about the circumstances of Vladimir's baptism and the relation in which that event stood to his marriage and his capture of Kherson.

Some scholars see no reason to look for any one external event as the occasion which brought about his baptism. He must have been familiar with the Christian religion and with the work of his paternal grandmother Olga, and it would not escape the attention of an intelligent man that while culture, civilization and political power were associated in his world with Christianity, paganism belonged to the half-barbarous hordes against whom he warred on the steppes. They therefore suppose that Vladimir was baptized in his own city of Kiev, before, or possibly during, the visit of an Embassy from Constantinople.

The more usual view is that the baptism took place at 797
Kherson after Vladimir had captured that place, in the following
circumstances. In Byzantium the imperial throne was being 648.
shaken by rebellion, and its occupants hard put to it to deal with the rebel. The Embassy was sent to solicit the military assistance of the Russian chieftain. It was successful, Vladimir's terms being good payment for his men and the hand in marriage of the Emperor's sister for himself. The terms were accepted, Vladimir carried out his part of the bargain, and with his help the rebellion was crushed. When the danger was over, however, the Emperors showed marked reluctance to let their sister go back with the victorious Russian, and Vladimir had to resort to force to secure possession of his bride. The walls of Constantinople were too strong even for his wild warriors, so on his way home he besieged and captured the Greek town of Kherson in the Crimea. This display of force proved sufficient to bring the Byzantines to reason, and the bride was forthwith despatched to her distant future home. She, with her ecclesiastical retinue from Constantinople, joined Vladimir

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648 at Kherson. And thither also at the same time arrived an Embassy from Pope John XV.[1]

Vladimir set to work with energy to make his people 797 Christian. The idols of the great god Perun and others, erected in not too distant a past (for Vladimir before he embraced Christianity had toyed with the idea of revitalizing the pagan religion) were overthrown and churches built in their place. The more or less instructed people were baptized in droves in the Dnieper. Other influences were at work beside that of Byzantine Orthodoxy. The institution of tithes is found in the early Russian Church, and it would seem that that must have come from the West, and the same is true of the veneration of certain distinctively Latin saints.

Even before the time of Vladimir, books and perhaps missionaries also had arrived from Bulgaria. The work which the disciples of the Apostles of the Slavs had carried on in that country spread into Russia, with the result that the Russian Church had a Slavonic liturgy from the beginning. After Vladimir's death there was a continued period of quarrelling among his sons, in the course of which the celebrated Boris and Gleb, unresisting, met their deaths. But one of the sons, Yaroslav, finally succeeded in establishing his position and reigning for thirty-five years. He it was who finally settled the dependence of the Russian Church upon the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

[793] In 1037 Alexis the Studite consecrated Theopemptos as Metropolitan of Kiev and thereafter, with two notable exceptions, the Russian Metropolitans were Greeks appointed from Constantinople until the fall of that city. Yaroslav was a great lawgiver and he raised Kiev to a status in which he treated with European nations on equal terms and married his daughters into royal houses of the West. He built the superb cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev and in his time the Petchersky Monastery was founded there. He died in 1054, the year in which the schism between Rome and Constantinople was finally consummated.

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[1] On the puzzling question of the contact between the West and the Russian Church of this early period, see Dvornik, *The Making of Central and Eastern Europe*. London, 1949, p. 173 ff. and 255 f.